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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Creation, Operation of 'Main Sector Commands'

93UM0787A Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, 1993 (signed to press 27 May 93) pp 9-17

[Article by Col-Gen (Ret) M.N. Tereshchenko: "On the Western Sector: How the Main Sector Commands Were Created and Operated"¹]

[Text] Dear Editor!

Could you shed some light on the history of the creation and the missions and fate of the main sector commands? In the 1980's, the entire country knew about such sector main commissariats, but, unfortunately, the maniacal secrecy in which society lived deprived us of the most basic official information. A. Palitsyn (Saratov)

The author of the article, Col-Gen M.N. Tereshchenko, is a veteran of the Great Patriotic War (from Nov 1941 to May 1945). During the war, he was a company commander, deputy battalion commander, regimental chief of intelligence, and chief of a division headquarters operations section. He was wounded twice in battles with the fascists. After the war, he performed important work at headquarters of military districts and the General Staff. From 1954 he was a regiment and division commander, from 1971 chief of staff of the Baltic Military District, and from 1974 to 1977 chief military adviser—adviser to the Minister of Defense of the Syrian Arab Republic. Between 1977 and 1979 he was chief of staff of the Belorussian Military District, then first deputy chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. From September 1984 through October 1988 he was chief of staff and first deputy commander in chief of the Western Sector. He is now retired.

In the second half of the 1970's and early 1980's, large-scale reforms, which included a set of measures, were undertaken in the Soviet Armed Forces. It called for transforming the Main Command of the Ground Forces into the headquarters of the commander in chief of reserves with civil defense and military commissariats subordinate to it; creating main sector commands; forming separate brigade-strength army corps (as assets for operations in the enemy's operational depth); creating air forces in the military districts and simultaneously eliminating air armies; organizing air defense on the territorial principle—each military district responsible for the air defense within its own administrative boundaries. An attempt was made to distinguish more precisely the functions between the General Staff, the main commands of the branches of the Armed Forces, the sector troops, and the military districts.

This process was long overdue. The expanding scale and pace of war preparations by the opposing blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact, their creation of the latest weapons, above all for a first nuclear strike, and also the desire of western countries to break the military-strategic parity that had taken shape by that time prompted the Soviet leadership to take effective measures aimed both at improving organizational structures and at radically changing the forms and methods of command and control activities.

During the postwar years, the command and control activities of commanders and staffs continued to become more complicated. Command and control was becoming the most important component of combat readiness of the troops and naval forces and one of its decisive factors. This required a constant search for effective ways to improve the entire command and control system, especially of large groups of forces in theaters of military operations [TVD].

Taking this into account, in September 1984, a new level of operational-strategic command and control of troops and naval forces was added to the command and control system—main sector commands.

The Soviet leadership took this action as a measure in response to similar actions by NATO leadership. Back in the early 1950's, the member countries of this bloc created coalition bodies of operational-strategic command and control in Europe. The Supreme High Command in Europe, with an area of responsibility within the territories of all European member countries of the bloc (other than Great Britain and Portugal) and Turkey and also the water area of the Mediterranean Sea, occupied a central place in the overall system of the NATO Armed Forces. Simultaneously, three main commands of the allied armed forces were created: in the Northern European (headquarters personnel strength of up to 700 people), Central European (up to 2,000 people), and Southern European (over 1,500 people) theaters.²

The bloc leadership conducted specific work for their training, construction of command and control facilities, and organization of communications. The main commands were at a high degree of readiness and in a short time could assume command and control of the troops assigned to them. The command and control facilities had modern communications equipment and automated control systems for this purpose.

Thus, the NATO leadership by that time had achieved certain advantages in the area of command and control and had an efficient command and control system both in peacetime and wartime. The Soviet Armed Forces lagged behind NATO considerably in this area (more than 30 years in time and hopelessly in terms of organization and technical equipment).

The ideas of transforming the Soviet command and control system were based on the experience of the Great Patriotic War³ and operational-strategic exercises. The process of creating main sector commands was accomplished sort of in two phases.

The **first phase** covered the period from November 1978 through September 1984. During this period the main commands were envisioned as coalition bodies of operational-strategic control of troops and naval forces of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces in the Western and Southwestern TVD's and only for wartime.⁴

Creation of the main commands resulted both from the very essence and complexity of the problem of ensuring the collective security of the Warsaw Pact member states and from the volume and pace of war preparations by NATO, as

well as the nature of a possible war. It was believed that without unified centralized command and control of the Joint Armed Forces on the theater scale, it was impossible to count on success in war should an aggressor unleash it.

One of the forms of conducting military operations in a possible war was recognized theoretically and practiced at operational exercises—a strategic operation in a TVD, in which large groupings of forces of all branches of the armed services could participate. Organizing and conducting such an operation were exceptionally complex and difficult tasks that required strict centralization of command and control. It was assumed that success in such an operation was possible only if command and control were highly competent, operational, and coalition, for which command and control bodies were to be created in advance, during peacetime.

Proceeding from this, the Headquarters of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, which for wartime was transformed from a military-political body into two operational-strategic command and control bodies in the TVD's, was taken as the base for creating the main sector commands in the Western and Southwestern TVD's. For centralized control of these troops, it was envisaged to establish a unified Supreme High Command⁵, and the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces became a command and control body.

The headquarters of the sector commander in chief in the TVD included: deputy commanders in chief—representatives from each allied army, a staff, a political directorate, and directorates for Missile Troops and Artillery, Air Force, Air Defense Troops, Engineer and Chemical Troops, Armament, and Rear Services.

The staff of the main command, headed by the chief of staff—a first deputy commander in chief, was the basic command and control body. There were to be deputies—representatives from each allied army—under the chief of staff and also under the chief of the political directorate. The staff and all directorates were manned with generals, admirals, and officers from all allied armies on a proportional basis, including generals and officers who served at the Headquarters of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces during peacetime.

It was planned to accomplish command and control of air defense forces in the TVD from a joint Air Force and Air Defense command post under the leadership of the commander of the Air Defense Troops—deputy commander in chief in the TVD.

The command and control system for joint fleet forces was structured on a completely different basis. The commander of such a fleet became a deputy commander in chief in the TVD and, in essence, was to exercise command and control of all fleet forces.

After working out all the necessary documents (regulations, basic tasks and functional duties, table of organization and establishment) and making all the appropriate decisions, the Main Command of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, the national commands, and the staffs began practical working out of the processes of forming the Western and

Southwestern main sector commands. The Main Command of the Joint Armed Forces conducted much work in this context, especially the commander in chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, and the chief of staff, General of the Army A.I. Gribkov, the ministers of defense, and the main staffs of the allied armies. It must be noted that operational-strategic exercises such as "Soyuz," "Granit," and "Schchit" played a special role in this. They were conducted according to plans of the joint and national commands of the allied armies.

The most typical exercise of this scale was "Soyuz-83" under the direction of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov. At this exercise, the headquarters of the main command in the Western TVD was deployed for the first time up to full strength using generals and officers of four allied armies (the GDR National People's Army, the Polish Army, the Czechoslovak People's Army, and the Soviet Army), and also of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces Headquarters; staffs of fronts and armies, troops, and naval forces were also involved.

Such actions were approved by the leadership of all Warsaw Pact member states and, as was already noted above, resulted from the complexity of the military-political situation in Europe at that time and from the importance of the European TVD in NATO's plans. It was hard not to agree with this.

However, for the sake of fairness, it should be emphasized that not everything was taken to a logical conclusion. Above all, questions concerning the composition of the unified Supreme High Command of Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces were not resolved, which adversely affected the resolution of other problems. One cannot help but dwell on the special position of the Romanian leadership, which advanced a completely different scheme for command and control of troops and fleet forces in the TVD's.

Back during the course of drawing up the draft documents (primarily the draft regulations) on the main commands, the Ministry of Defense of Romania, while not rejecting as a whole the need to create the main sector commands (in the TVD's), expressed a special opinion, the essence of which came down to the following:

- The Political Consultative Committee should be the Supreme High Command of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, for it alone is the authoritative body capable of accomplishing major military-political tasks;
- for wartime, the working body of the Supreme High Command should be the Main Command of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces and not one of the general staffs of the allied armies;
- under the commander in chief of the sector (in the TVD) there should be generals from each allied army in the rank of first deputy commanders in chief in the TVD. The Military Council, as a collective and coalition body of leadership, should make decisions on all basic questions of organizing and conducting operations and exercise command and control;

- the commander in chief of the sector (in the TVD) exercises command and control through his first deputies from the allied armies and through the Military Council, and not through the staff of the sector. Only the first deputy commanders in chief are authorized to issue directives, orders, and instructions and thereby ensure command and control;
- generals, admirals, and officers from all allied armies are proportionally appointed to leadership positions in all directorates and departments and alternate;
- there is no need to create a political directorate. The party of each country conducts political work in the troops through its party apparatus in close cooperation with other armies.

As you can see, comments are unnecessary here, but one can clearly see the desire of the Romanians to erode the sector command of the Joint Armed Forces (in TVD's), make it amorphous and unable to function, and, in short, remove the national troops from under its subordination. One could not agree to this. That is why the fundamental documents on the main sector commands (in the TVD's) were adopted by the Committee of Ministers of Defense and the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states without consideration of the Romanian arguments. During the course of exercises and while conducting other operational measures, these and other desires of Romania, as a rule, were taken into consideration when possible.

Such are the main milestones in the first phase of creating the main commands of the Joint Armed Forces in the TVD's. This system of command and control in that situation, in our opinion, met the requirements of organizational development of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces.

The **second phase** covers the period from 1984, when the Soviet leadership, unilaterally and contrary to the decisions already made by the heads of the Warsaw Pact member states, placed on a practical plane the task of creating main sector commands during peacetime and only for Soviet troops. Besides the arguments already cited, this decision was caused by the Soviet Union's geopolitical situation, the large size of its territory, and also by the fact that the situation required an immediate improvement in command and control on the most important strategic sectors. It was believed that creation of the main sector commands would be a new important step towards developing the entire system of command and control of the Soviet Armed Forces and would bring the leadership closer to the troops, which would facilitate command and control activities of the top military bodies—the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

Thus, in September 1984, the Main Command of the Western Sector was created and the composition of the troops and naval forces subordinate to it determined.⁶ On 24 September, Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov became commander in chief of the sector. At the same time, the Military Council was formed, consisting of the chairman, N.V. Ogarkov, and council members—B.P. Utkin, chief of the political directorate; the chief of staff, the author of this article; and also the first deputy commander

in chief, General of the Army M.I. Sorokin. Subsequently, deputy commanders in chief were appointed Military Council members: Colonel-General of Aviation S.V. Golubev for the air forces; Lieutenant-General A.A. Ivanov for armament (from 1985, deputy for combat training); and Lieutenant-General G.P. Pastukhovskiy for rear services.

Directly subordinate to the commander in chief of the Western Sector were two military districts (Belorussian and Carpathian), three groups of forces (Group of Soviet Forces Germany, Central Group of Forces, and Northern Group of Forces). Operationally subordinate were the Baltic Fleet, one air army of the Supreme High Command, and one air defense army (Second Separate Air Defense Army). The composition of the grouping of troops and naval forces was roughly identical to that of NATO on this axis.

The commander in chief of the sector, by his position (but more so formally), was given full authority to command subordinate troops. He was charged with resolving all matters associated with life and activities of the troops: ensuring constant combat readiness of the troops, naval forces, and staffs; operational planning; organizing operational, combat, and political training of troops and staffs, conducting operational exercises, including with participation of troops, fleets, and staffs of allied armies; conducting measures for strengthening military discipline, for material and technical support, and for creating operational reserves of material resources; accomplishing missions for operational equipping the TVD's; and creating a communications and command and control system.

The commander in chief of the sector resolved issues of operational planning and conducting joint exercises affecting allied troops through the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and coordinated directly with the military leadership of the allied countries (in the West with the general staffs of the Polish Army and the Czechoslovak People's Army, and the Main Staff of the GDR National People's Army).

Such an expansive declaration of rights of the sector commander in chief did not find support. The difficulty was that the center (in the person of the main commands of the armed services) did not want to lose hold of their absolute control of subordinate troops and forces (this was particularly evident on the part of the Air Force and Air Defense commands). The middle level—the military districts (groups of forces)—believed that the sector command would replace them in many matters; therefore, they did not wish to have this intermediate level of command and control above them. As far as the leadership of the armies and divisions was concerned, they responded with gratitude to the work of officers of the main command.

Let us note that for that time nothing actually changed in the practical work of the main commands of the armed services and staffs of military districts and groups of forces; the entire system developed over the years remained in force. The leadership of the military districts (groups of forces) not only retained the right to consult directly the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and main commands of the armed services, but this was even encouraged, although the range

of issues which were to be resolved through the main sector commands was clearly defined. This was also reinforced by the fact that all issues of material support and also personnel issues were resolved at the center, primarily in the staffs of the main commissariats of the armed services.

All this was leading to parallelism in work and a belittling of the role of the main commissariats of the sectors and the main commissariats of the armed services. This practice automatically created conditions for various conflicts.

Strange as it may seem, the Main Command of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, being one of the initiators of creating the main sector commands, with the appearance of the latter, began to oppose in every possible way their contacts with the leadership of allied armies. This position adversely affected general affairs. By that time the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces had not worked out precise guidelines on this, taking a somewhat ambivalent position regarding the new command and control bodies.

Creation of the main sector commands also did not receive the proper response as a retaliatory measure to NATO's war preparations, since the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense simply kept quiet about their existence.

All this was not conducive to normal work.

The headquarters of a main sector command at that time included a staff (comprised of operational, naval, intelligence, organizational-mobilization, and communications directorates; electronic combat, topographic, political, troop services, special services, administrative, finance, and other departments); directorates of the Missile Troops and Artillery, Air Force, Air Defense Troops, combat training, political, engineer and chemical troops, armament and rear services; construction inspectorate; trench inspectorate; financial service; signal, security, and support units.

In this variant, the staff of the main sector command is the basic command and control body. It is charged with the entire volume of tasks specified for the main command and, in addition: assessing the military-political situation; organizing reconnaissance; drawing up proposals for mobilization readiness of troops and improving their organization and establishment; organizing troop services; creating and improving the communications and command and control system in the TVD; ensuring the conduct of operational training courses and exercises; accomplishing supervision; and also studying, summarizing, and disseminating to the troops advanced experience and new training methods and techniques.

Supervision of the work of the staff of the main sector command was accomplished by the chief of staff (he is a first deputy commander in chief and member of the military council). He was authorized to issue instructions on behalf of the commander in chief to subordinate troops and coordinated the activities of all command and control bodies. The chief of staff personally participated in working out problems concerning troop combat readiness, operational planning, exercises, and training sessions. A special concern of the chief of staff was to establish and maintain

close business contacts with the leadership of the general staffs of allied armies. And there were considerable difficulties in this.

A political directorate was formed to organize and coordinate political work in the troops and in the fleet. It was headed by Lieutenant-General B.P. Utkin, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The political directorate was given rights of a leadership body, which did not sit well with the political directorates of the armed services and military districts (groups of forces).

Such a structure of command and control of the main command (up to 500 personnel) was considered quite acceptable for accomplishing the assigned tasks. But one must recognize that the apparatus of the Main Command of the Western Sector was created in haste, actually during September-October 1984, and organization and activation as a whole were accomplished in two sequences: September-December 1984—manning at a 40-percent level, and manning at full strength beginning 1 March 1985.

The staff directorates were headed by experienced general, such as Lieutenant-General V.N. Maganov (Operations), Vice-Admiral P.F. Sharov (Naval), Lieutenant-General V.A. Kartashov (Reconnaissance), Lieutenant-General P.F. Ponomarev (Organization and Mobilization), and Lieutenant-General G.F. Mishin (Communications Directorate). Lieutenant-General D.G. Shkrudnev, a participant in the combat operations in Afghanistan, became first deputy chief of staff.

Lieutenant-General N.A. Mikhaylov headed the Missile Troops and Artillery Directorate; Lieutenant-General V.V. Litvinov headed the Air Defense Troops; and Lieutenant-General of Aviation M.M. Kuznetsov headed the Air Force Staff.

On the whole, the directorates and departments of the main command were manned by experienced and well-trained generals, admirals, and officers. These were specialists in their job, having much practical work experience in the corresponding positions.

Nevertheless, staffing was not without its glitches. Many officers came from division and army level positions, did not have experience in working at higher headquarters, and did not know the peculiarities of the Western TVD very well. These and other miscalculations, certainly, could not help but reflect on the style and results of the work, particularly during the period of development of the main command directorate. The leadership's desire to begin practical work in the troops immediately without any preparatory period also had an adverse effect. After all, every officer had to learn his functional duties and the peculiarities of life in the troops, and also study the peculiarities of the TVD.

The main method of leadership of the main command and of the entire apparatus as a whole was direct work in the troops, in the fleet, and in the staffs. Work was structured on a principled but good-natured basis and was directed at carrying out the requirements of directives (orders) of the minister of defense and the General Staff of the Armed

Forces. The principle "Teach the troops what is needed in war" was indeed introduced into the practice of training troops and staffs.

I consider it my duty to pay respect to the ability and tact of the commander in chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, in this. Being one of the initiators of creating the main sector commands, he invested much work into the organization, activation, and development of the headquarters of the Main Western Sector Command. Having a broad outlook, creative operational thinking, much field experience, and experience in working in high positions, he was able to train commanders and staffs patiently and objectively. And not only teach them, but also demand that generals and officers of the main command have a similar attitude towards subordinates, providing them specific assistance in the localities.

Such a practice and style of work made it possible to accomplish one of the tasks—to bring leadership closer to the troops. In this context, the main sector command became the center's executive body in the troops in practice. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense should have merely depended more actively on it, which in practice was not enough. Tasks for improving the command and control and communications system in the TVD were also favorably accomplished. Actually, such a system did not exist at that time; it had to be created.

In those condition, it was extremely important to have firm and guaranteed reliable command and control of air force and air defense forces and assets in the TVD.

In connection with this, it was believed that air defense on the territory of the TVD (within the sector) should be structured along the territorial principle with responsibility for organizing it within the theater falling on the commander in chief of the sector (this introduced a new echelon of command assuming responsibility for air defense); within the military district, it was the responsibility of the district commander. This was considered a more flexible, reliable, and easier to control system capable of successfully accomplish its inherent tasks.

But it was not possible to accomplish everything fully, since the entire air defense system soon was again rigidly centralized under the sole control of the commander in chief of the Air Defense Troops.

So, we were unable to conduct radical, wide-scale reforms in the Army and Navy during those years—the conservatism of the center prevailed. Nearly all the organizational measures conducted in the armed forces mentioned in the beginning of the article were repealed, and everything was thrown back. This was a big mistake. Before breaking up the organisms that had taken shape and were set up in the second half of the 1970's, full-fledged replacements for them should have been prepared. It is a paradox, but that is precisely what did not happen. Often many structures that had taken shape over decades were broken up in haste, with major miscalculations and without proper foresight, which harmed the Army and Navy. Their development was thrown back many years.

The nearly simultaneous replacement of the leadership of the main sector commands and repeated cuts in their personnel strength, and also the removal of military districts (groups of forces) from under their direct subordination in subsequent years turned the directorates of the main commands into command and control formal bodies. With the breakup of the strategic grouping of Soviet and allied troops in Eastern Europe, the headquarters of the Main Western Sector Command was abolished.

I believe it is appropriate here to cite one of the statements of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev concerning this. In 1991, assessing the rightness of creating the main sector commands, he said: "Main sector commands were not created before the start of the Great Patriotic War, but all attempts to create them during the war were unsuccessful. It was too difficult and actually impossible already during the war to create such a large body of operational-tactical command and control body and the corresponding contingent of management troops for it. *Our opponents demanded the immediate breakup of both the structure and command and control system of the armed forces, including the main sector commands* (emphasis by author—M.T.). The system of postwar security of the country, on which our people spent so much effort and money, collapsed."⁷ Here is such a bitter conclusion.

It can be said in conclusion that as a new form of command and control of the troops and naval forces during peacetime the main sector commands were considered quite capable of accomplishing the tasks assigned to them and definitely played a positive role.

The fact that the main sector commands were created without a thorough assessment of the military-political situation, hastily, and, of course, without proper foresight was obviously a negative in this. Their functioning for approximately eight years proved to be too costly a measure even for that time.

Assigning to the main sector command a wide range of tasks with emphasis on functions of a military district headquarters and also the unjustified demand for their accomplishment dispersed the efforts of the leadership and diverted it from more objective accomplishment of the basic tasks. The small organization and establishment, which on the whole was more like the staff of a military district headquarters (and not even of the Group of Forces in Germany of that period), also did not help this.

The existence during peacetime (in the 1970's and 1980's) of such intermediate command and control bodies could have been more effective if their rights and responsibilities would have corresponded more fully and harmoniously with respect to subordinate troops. To carry out all the tasks assigned for command and control, the headquarters of the main command, particularly in the Western TVD, should have had been more powerful in its structure and operational composition (the NATO main commands are an example).

The growing pace and scale of military reform today and the organizational development of the new Russian Army—the heir of the best traditions of the Russian Army and Navy—

require new qualities from command and control bodies, impelling them to constantly improve the style, forms, and methods of command and control activities.

Footnotes

1. The article sets forth the personal opinion of the author about the creation and activities of main sector commands in the second half of the 1970's.

2. SOVETSKAYA VOYENNAYA ENTSIKLOPEDIYA [SVE] [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 5, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1978, p 683.

3. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the main commands of the Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern sectors (July 1941-May 1942), Northern Caucasus Sector (April-May 1942), and in the Far East (1945) were created. SVE, Vol 2, Moscow, 1976, p 562.

4. The decision to create main commands of the Joint Armed Forces in the TVD's was made at the Moscow Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states in November 1978.

5. In March 1980 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was confirmed as supreme commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces.

6. The main Southwestern and Southern sector commands were created simultaneously. The Main Command of Far East Troops was created back in 1978.

7. S.F. Akhromeyev, G.M. Korinenko, "Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat," Moscow, MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1992, p 295.

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Defense Commercial Use of Space Communications

93UM0751A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Jun 93 pp 1,2

[Article by Aleksandr Nadzharov: "Something is Wrong in Space: Businessmen in General's Uniforms Have Even Gotten Their Hands on the Russian Space Troops"]

[Text]

Scandal

The pulse of energy was emitted by the super-secret, most modern apparatus penetrated space and, via the Russian space defense units' communications reconnaissance satellite, reached the territory of the United States in a matter of seconds. An electronic decoder instantaneously translated the text into English, which the gentleman in civilian clothes impatiently awaited. Having rapidly scanned the lines with the indication of the frequencies and other secret transmission parameters, he read: "The blue toilets have been received and the money has been transferred. I am awaiting a new shipment. Colonel-General I."

No, this was not a Russian military intelligence super cipher. The Russian last name also did not turn out to be a pseudonym of some sort of modern Shtirlits. Despite that,

for a long time the CIA could not believe that an ordinary commercial message had been transmitted via Soviet space communications systems, which, until quite recently, had been protected in the strictest possible manner.

But then again, I am not vouching for the full authenticity of precisely this 'toilet' text. And yet we should not rush to consider what has been set forth above simple journalistic hyperbole: copies of commercial telegrams that are just like that one lie in the editorial staff's safe. All of them regularly intersect the far reaches of space with the approval of Russian Space Defense Units Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General Ivanov, unambiguously attesting to the transformation of one of our army's highest leaders into a banal shopkeeper. But then again, he was not that original in this regard. The agreement on commercial utilization of a secret military communications satellite was signed by two other generals along with him—one from industry and one from military intelligence. This was already done after the defense ministry order that categorically prohibited commercial activity in the army, especially in space communications.

We will return to the question of the nature of the use of secret communications. But, for now let us attempt to investigate just how the words "commerce" and "space units commander-in-chief" acquired the meaning of synonyms.

A little over two years ago, a team of American and, at that time, Soviet entrepreneurs decided to organize a commercial space flight along the route of the Plesetsk Cosmodrome—Seattle. The idea was outstanding: models of goods are located in the space shuttle that the two great powers could sell. Imagine, what advertising! Not all hopes on this score were later justified, but the flight organizers were not really at fault. Alas, as it so often happens in our country, almost all of the steam went up the whistle. The steam—these are the significant preliminary expenditures. What kind? Primarily—appropriations for continuously increasing generals' needs that are associated with catering to those people on whom, strictly speaking, the very possibility of the space flight depended. I remind you that Plesetsk is a military cosmodrome. And in our country to whom are space units subordinate? Correct, to Colonel-General Ivanov. Now Vladimir Leontyevich and his wife are sailing across the ocean on a chic ship. And there an unforgettable trip across America: expensive hotels, restaurants, and stores... And all of this, of course, not at his own expense and, fortunately, not at the expense of the defense budget. American and Russian commercial firms paid.

If that happened with an American general, he would hardly be moved to the family ranch. Vladimir Leontyevich just drastically increased the rates of providing all of the amenities to his own land plot [fazenda] in the Moscow suburbs. He has done some good, at one time personally heading the "Kosma" commercial firm, having thereby proven that the skilled hands of a businessman in stripes [on the side of the uniform trousers] are capable of privatizing even outer space. Or, in any case, the primary operations in it.

One of my unlucky colleagues, who sold the address of the modest home near Kursk Station—23, ulitsa Kazakova, to American intelligence—is serving his long term somewhere

not so far away, as they say. Here, two Ministry of Defense directorates, that are responsible for all manned space and also for defense from SDI and other space weapons, worked very productively both prior to and after his treachery. Now they don't work there. Ivanov's friends—retired generals—are preparing to move here in order to continue conducting dizzying hard currency deals on space services for foreign customers. This is a question of navigation, communications, photography, and sales intermediary activities. Since all of this is being carried out at the command of the unselfish Ivanov by space units that have been entrusted to him, it's as if an openly commercial firm is not considered to be commercial. In any case, leasing a beautiful building that at one time belonged to Savva Morozov's mistress and that is paid from the Ministry of Defense budget and also the wages (pay attention, capital mayor!!) about which similar entrepreneurs can't even decide to dream. Right now restoration is being completed here, unique parquet is being laid, and mirrors are being installed. And how can it be otherwise: the commander-in-chief himself is located in large apartments with a relaxation room, reception area, kitchen, and personal toilet instead of a merchant's passion. And, of course, his personal commercial service.

I foresee the rebuke: the author is attempting to revive the image of the enemy. I answer: yes, I am attempting to do that. Only not in the person of our foreign partners who are expending quite a bit of money and resources to support reforms in Russia. But, tell me, how is it with American military intelligence? Is it now our best friend? If so, why is there an article in the criminal codes of absolutely all of the countries of the world, including the United States, which punishes assistance to a foreign intelligence service?

There is also such an article in the Russian Federation Criminal Code. But where was the procurator when they invited the Americans (and not only businessmen) to visit the space defense units command post? Here, by the way, our generals still allow far from everyone to enter. So, having visited the super-secret command post and having attentively examined a high-energy laser at the Academy of Sciences that astonished the Americans and that is designed to destroy enemy satellites, one of the foreign guests frankly stated: "Russian openness [otkrytost] is simply astonishing". That sentence rang out with significance, especially after photographs of the operating indicator with super-secret data.

It's too bad that the law enforcement organs have already become tired of being astonished at what occurs in Ivanov's department. Otherwise, the reporter-traitor and the space general could change places. But then again, the army's fine-tuned bureaucratic machine of covering up for each other would hardly leave their best representatives in trouble. If they ever go to trial, they will certainly submit evidence that all of their actions were coordinated with the leadership. Or, on the contrary, they will attempt to conceal the compromising papers. For instance, the telegrams which, in accordance with Commander-in-Chief's Ivanov's order, directs work on organizing commercial communications between the relay point at Shchelkovo (Moscow Oblast), the "Altair" military satellite and the point with

coordinates 38° 47' North Latitude and 77° 09' West Longitude. For those people who are not too familiar with geography, I will report that the capital of the United States—Washington—is at that location.

And now the time has come to talk about the objective circumstances that promote what sometimes occurs in the army. In a recent conversation with the author of these lines, Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev noted that, due to the political cataclysms, right up to the beginning of last year the army was not involved with combat training for a number of years. Let's recall the first months after the August putsch. The man in uniform was humiliated and insulted and he was even afraid to put on that very uniform to avoid ridicule (and not only ridicule). However, few people know about one other form of humiliation—the cynical "recommendation" that was already issued by Yazov's generals to sell everything that is being sold, no matter how small the price. Pavel Grachev, to give him his due, quite rapidly put that matter in order. He prohibited commercial activity in the army, pressed for decent salaries out of the authorities, and rid the army of a significant portion of the embezzlers in uniform. But further our externally forming state machine got out of step. The pack of swindlers in stripes [on the side of the uniform trousers], despite the evidence of their deeds, have not sat at the dock for some reason. So, it has finished with nonsense—retirements, hospitals...

Right now the next scandal is ripening in this soil that is thickly fertilized with corruption. Based upon the order of Commander-in-Chief Ivanov who is truly indefatigable in his commercial activity, one of the military-space communications circuits has been sold to a foreign buyer. Not simply secret, but top secret. Experts know what this means and they are not hiding their outrage. It turns out that the communications protocols, transmission frequencies, code deciphering capabilities and all possible manipulations with Russian ground computer complexes also turned out to have thereby been sold abroad. In a word, what dozens of our restricted NIIs [scientific research institutes] worked on for many years and to which, to their great regret, the foreign intelligence services did not have access, just like they did not have access to a similar apparatus. The "Geyzer" and "Altair" military communications satellites alone along with the support systems cost the taxpayers trillions of rubles in current prices.

But if the matter was only in the aforementioned sums. The foreign partners and our businessmen have obtained the capability to take a bearing of any radio transmission sources, even super-secret ones. And in general to selectively affect the operation of Russia's space communications systems. Imagine if suddenly insignificant messages that have been transmitted on the Russian Ministry of Security, foreign intelligence, or diplomatic service "line" are shown to one of them? And is it good if an urgent dispatch with an order for blue toilets interrupts the messages of these departments? No kind of SOS that has been transmitted even in the most urgent situation will pass even under that.

Right now it is not even going to the law enforcement organs. Specifically because all of the papers associated with

the commander-in-chief's machinations pass under the secret and top secret stamp. So, only the department that has classified the documents can remove that classification in accordance with Russian law. That is, the Space Troops Directorate and General Ivanov personally. It is doubtful that he would acquaint the judicial community with his commercial archives.

According to the military intelligence experts who have turned to the editorial staff, the situation requires an immediate investigation by a special presidential commission. Meanwhile General Ivanov will certainly attempt to somehow justify this to Boris Yeltsin already in the next few days. He plans to be in Yeltsin's suite at Baykonur for the launch into space of the next joint crew. They say that the president is strict but disposed to quickly forgive...

CIS: POLICY

Chief of General Staff Kolesnikov Interviewed

93UM0763A Moscow ARMIYA in Russian No 9, 1993
(Signed to press 30 Apr 93) pp 25-28

[Interview with Chief of the General Staff, Russian Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Mikhail Petrovich Kolesnikov by an unidentified ARMIYA correspondent, under the rubric: "Permit Me to Introduce"; "Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov: 'No One Is Capable of Stopping the Military Reforms'"]

[Text]

Chief of the General Staff, Russian Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense Answers ARMIYA Magazine's Questions

[ARMIA] Mikhail Petrovich, you accepted the General Staff at the stage of its formation. What is the "brain of the army" like today?

[Kolesnikov] In all fairness, I will say that I accepted the General Staff already largely renewed. The process of the reform of its structures continues and entails significant quantitative and qualitative changes. For example, authorized strength has been reduced by more than 35%. Of the 17 directorates, 12 have remained—some have been eliminated, others have been restructured in accordance with new missions or have been removed from the composition of the General Staff. Incidentally, a large number of generals' positions have been reduced: previously there were 235, now 173 have remained.

To list the names of the directorates is a boring matter and it will hardly help to create the image of, how you expressed it, the "brain of the army". I will say only that it is tied with all of the cells of the Armed Forces organism by thousands and thousands of threads—from a submarine that is sailing under the ice to a satellite that is in orbit to, say, an independent battalion that is performing a peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia. Two powerful opposite information streams "are tied" on the General Staff. One, the incoming stream, permits us to track and analyze the situation minute by minute and to predict its development. The other, the

outgoing stream in the form of orders, directives, and commands arrive in the troops and in the fleets, ensuring their vital activities and combat readiness. And a man stands between these two streams. As a rule, this is a very experienced analyst, a professional who has gone through a large army or navy school and who has completed one and sometimes even two military academies.

I understand that this is a quite simplified diagram, but nevertheless it provides you with some sort of idea...

[ARMIA] Let's attempt to place this diagram into today's actual situation.

[Kolesnikov] Let's do that. After the disintegration of the unified defense space of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the USSR, Russia began to create its own Armed Forces. We had to develop a general concept of military organizational development in an urgent manner. Essentially, this required us to once again define the required effective combat strength of the troops, to review the correlation of the services and combat arms of the Armed Forces in the search for optimal variants, and to restore and reform many disrupted administrative structures. And at the same time to be involved with those practical tasks that cannot be delayed, such as ensuring the withdrawal of troops from nearby and far away foreign countries, their infrastructure, reduction of the army and navy, and participation in peacekeeping actions on the territories of the CIS countries and within the framework of the UN.

I enumerate this only in order for the reader to have a precise idea of how many new, extremely complicated and responsible missions have literally crashed down upon the General Staff. Under strict time constraints, we have had to urgently "fit" the old structures under these missions while simultaneously reforming and reducing them.

Unfortunately, there are people, including in army circles, who are attempting to present all of this as an ordinary, status quo apparatus "shake-up" and they accuse the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces of allegedly resisting the new course and impeding reforms. Indeed, they have no serious arguments. Therefore, for example, they are putting the following into circulation. They say what kind of reform of the General Staff can it be a question of if people sit there right now who were there under Marshals Akhromeyev and Yazov. And these "fighters for truth" do not ponder the fact that this is reminiscent of the times when interrogations were written on military experts at the ChK [Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Speculation, and Criminal Acts] organs whose only "guilt" was service in the Tsarist Army. It is impossible to lower ourselves to that baseness.

Actually, time has already judged who is right. After the disintegration of the Union and its unified Armed Forces, we lived through a most difficult period that was full of dangers. The Russian Armed Forces General Staff not only did not lose control of the troops and naval forces, as some people predicted, but also conducted a colossal—without any exaggeration—organizational work which noticeably

stabilized the situation in the army. And this is not boasting, (my personal contribution here was very modest), but a statement of fact.

And in general I am deeply convinced: to impede military reform today is like attempting to stop the drifting of ice that has begun on a large river. No one is capable of doing that. Reforms have occurred and no one is stopping them. But it is early to become complacent. Each river has its turns and narrow places. And what we have to worry about today is that ice jams don't carry away bridges and dams and don't cause problems.

[ARMIYA] Where do you see these narrow places?

[Kolesnikov] Unfortunately, there are many of them. Perhaps, the most graphic example—is the situation that has developed with manning the Armed Forces. Everything is heading towards the time when the army will soon be left without its main actor—the soldier. If only 29 of every 100 conscripts put on a military uniform in 1992 (the rest obtained deferments), then, according to predictions, only 16 will go to serve at the present time. We will reach a critical point in the fall when two conscriptions will be released at the same time as a result of the transition to an 18-month term of service.

Already last year we sounded the alarm and we hoped very much that it would be heard in the Russian Parliament which at that time was developing the Russian Federation Law "On Military Obligation and Military Service". But this Law was adopted and our proposals were rejected. And the Ministry of Defense essentially remained one on one with this very urgent problem. All of the dramatic effect is because it is incapable of independently resolving this.

In my opinion, all of the possible consequences have not been recognized at either the parliamentary, the governmental, or at the societal level. If this continues, we will reap an irreversible reduction of combat readiness. The greater the undermanning of privates and sergeants in units and on ships—the higher the physical and moral loads of personnel, the greater the preconditions for accidents, traumatism, theft of arms and military equipment, and such negative phenomena as "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts]. The situation will not permit commanders to establish life in accordance with regulations or to create a healthy atmosphere in military collectives.

In other words, we are moving toward the line and stepping across it is dangerous both for the army and for society.

[ARMIYA] Where is the solution?

[Kolesnikov] I think that we cannot escape measures which it is customary to call unpopular. For example, [one might] repeal certain categories of deferments of conscripts and increase the liability for evasion of military service.

[ARMIYA] Russia received practically wreckage in the inheritance from the Armed Forces of the former USSR. It received troops of the second strategic echelon and was deprived of part of the forces of the Black Sea, Baltic fleets

and of the Caspian Flotilla. Please tell me, within the limits of what is permissible, what new formations are being created on Russian territory?

[Kolesnikov] You have touched upon one of the fundamental problems of our military organizational development. Planned, purposeful work is now being done to find a solution. Yes, you are correct that Russia received practically only wreckage in the inheritance from the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. The most combat capable units that were equipped with the latest weapons remained outside the borders of the Russian Federation. We are faced with creating defensive formations on Russian territory, in the shortest time possible, that must ensure the inviolability of the borders and airspace, and stop possible provocations and infringements on the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Combat ready combined formations and formations will become the basis of the organizational development of the new formations.

A practice existed for many years in the Soviet Armed Forces when strong troop formations were deployed on the periphery of the USSR, near its borders, and also on the territory of Warsaw Treaty member-countries. This was justified at a certain historical stage but it is unacceptable today. Another principle has been laid at the foundation of our strategic plans and that is—the principle of the most reliable support of first of all the most important directions.

Say, whether we would like it or not, but the objective need compels us to review the significance in the general defensive system of Moscow Military District which already quite recently was in the category of internal military districts and, consequently, was structured while considering that. For its reinforcement we are withdrawing part of the forces of the Western and Northwestern Groups of Forces here.

It would seem that this is a question of indisputable, obvious things that are understood even by an individual who is far removed from military problems. And nevertheless a number of mass media publications have not been able to restrain themselves from the temptation to create the next "sensation". They say Grachev "is surrounding" Moscow with troops in order to make it simpler to suppress the speeches of democratic society. Let this remain on their conscience.

But let's continue the theme. The mission of the Volga and Urals Military Districts that were considered to be secondary is also changing. The Volga and Urals are currently becoming the base for the mobile forces that are being created. The selection of this region is associated with the fact that part of the mobile forces and military transport aviation must be located not in the primary zone of the defense but in the country's depth. The airfield network here permits the deployment of part of military transport aviation in a short period of time and nearby are mobile forces combat subunits. They can be efficiently airlifted to any threatened direction.

A new formation is also being formed in the North Caucasus Military District. We still have to resolve a multitude of issues associated with the reception of Russian troops from

the Baltic Region, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and Moldova in this and other regions.

[ARMIYA] The SALT-2 treaty that affects the holy of holies of Russia's defense capability—its nuclear potential—has caused the most acute polemics. Some people assert that the treaty, if it is realized, will strengthen the country's security. Other people, on the contrary, argue with serious analytical calculations that the SALT-2 treaty is a "mine" which we are voluntarily laying under our strategic triad. Whose side do you support?

[Kolesnikov] Let's discuss this while proceeding from specifics. In accordance with the SALT-2 treaty, the sides are obliged to reduce the number of nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 by 1 January 2003, and then to a lower level—by agreement. This, of course, is a step that is unprecedented in scale in the history of curbing the arms race by the world community. However, in the process let's record the following fact: even after these reductions, Russia will remain the possessor of a nuclear potential that does not lag behind the other nuclear powers in its might.

Furthermore, the treaty provides for the removal from the arsenals of the sides, the destruction and reduction of the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles [MIRV]. And here, many people, without investigating it, have sounded the alarm: they say, Russia is being deprived of the basis of its nuclear might—land-based nuclear weapons. At first glance, the impression can actually be formed that the Russians are losing quite a bit more than the Americans in ICBMs. In our country, the primary load of the nuclear shield was on land-based systems when in the United States the primary load was on strategic aviation.

So, first of all, while reducing its ICBMs, Russia is not at all being deprived of the primary component of the strategic triad. Heavy missiles with multiple reentry vehicles will be replaced by other systems with a single warhead which will result, after fulfillment of this obligation by both sides, in the substantial strengthening of overall strategic stability.

Second, the United States, which has always had an advantage in strategic aviation, is obliged to limit the number of nuclear warheads on heavy bombers to a level of from 750 to 1,250 in accordance with the START-2 treaty (for comparison: according to the START-1 treaty, by using its heavy bombers the United States can potentially increase the actual number of warheads to 2,000-2,500 over the 6,000 prescribed by this treaty). The American side is also resorting to major reductions of sea-based nuclear warheads—three times of the existing level and twice of the level planned by the START-1 treaty. They plan to eliminate some sort of obsolete weapons that have completed their service life but such modern naval missile systems as Trident-II.

If you take everything in sum total, while weighing the pluses and minuses, the conclusion is unambiguous: the SALT-2 treaty does not give any advantages whatsoever to either side, it preserves the balance of strategic forces but at a lower and, consequently, safer level both for Russia and the United States and also for all of mankind.

I would like to stress: I have touched upon only the military and have not at all touched upon the political aspects of the problem. Say, of that immutable fact that Russian-American relations today have undergone very enormous changes toward mutual trust and cooperation in the sense of strategic confrontation.

[ARMIYA] A little over two years ago when the highest military leadership reacted quite painfully to the proposal on manning the Armed Forces on a contract basis, you literally responded with the following to our correspondent's question on whether that transition was possible: "Of course. But that process obviously will be possible only after adoption of the package of laws on defense and the completion of economic reform". As of today there still aren't many laws, economic reform is spinning its wheels, but the decision on the transition to contract service has been made. Isn't that hasty?

[Kolesnikov] Yes, certain laws from the military package are still only being prepared. But then, as we know, such fundamental laws as the laws on defense, on the status of a serviceman, on military obligation and military service, and others have already been enacted. They create the legal and social basis for a gradual transition to manning the Armed Forces on a contract basis. The appropriate political, economic, and social conditions are certainly needed in order to implement it. Unfortunately, for now they are not working to the advantage of that transition. But it's already impossible to further delay the recruitment of people for service on contract—this would contradict the policy announced by us on the professionalization of the army.

Are we taking a risk, having begun the first, 100,000-man recruitment of those who desire to serve on contract? To a certain degree—yes. The six billion rubles (in 1992 prices) that the government allocated to us may not be sufficient under the current dynamics of inflation. We will raise the issue on indexing and flexibly maneuver financial resources while observing the regime of strict savings. At the same time, we are counting on receiving income from the sale of excess military equipment during the course of the reduction of the army.

I want to especially stress that the transition to manning the Armed Forces on a contract basis was not begun spontaneously. Varied calculations and research were conducted and predictions were worked out. We foresaw many problems which we have now encountered.

The main problem is the shortage of housing. There are nearly 1.0.000 homeless officers and warrant officers in the Russian Armed Forces. To our great regret, their number will not be reduced in the near future but, on the contrary, will increase and, based upon our predictions, will reach their peak—up to 400,000 homeless by 1995 as a result of the withdrawal of troops from abroad. And a young man, who has decided to go to serve on contract, will be the first to pose the question: But will I have housing? Thus far, we are incapable of providing firm guarantees.

Everything is very difficult. Any idea, like grain, sprouts and provides fruit only when the soil is well fertilized and there

is sufficient heat, moisture and light. In this case, I would say that the seed has been cast on meager, poorly turned up, and poorly heated ground.

[ARMIYA] Can it die?

[Kolesnikov] Why? They get a good harvest even on rocky soils. If you relate to the matter with attention and love.

[ARMIYA] In the near future, they plan to change the approved organizational structure of the troops, the basis of which will be formed by the brigade—corps. Our readers ask in their letters: what caused this decision? How will it be reflected in strategy, operational art, tactics, command and control methods and in much-much else?

[Kolesnikov] The planned transition to the "brigade—corps" echelon was dictated by many considerations. We are moving along the path of reducing the Armed Forces, including, of course, the Ground Forces. Consequently, the mission arises to preserve the quality of our defense with a reduced number of troops. The transition to the brigade and corps structure will permit us to resolve it to a significant degree. We arrived at that conclusion based not only on foreign experience but also on our own calculations and research. Besides all the rest, this reform augurs significant economic benefit that is extremely important under current conditions.

There are also other reasons. After the disintegration of the USSR with the formation of the Russian Army, the need arose to introduce serious adjustments in the system of defense and to conduct a regrouping of the troops while considering political, economic and other factors. In our view, the "brigade—corps" echelon will be successfully blended into the system of regrouping in a number of regions and will permit us to ensure their more reliable cover with fewer forces. These formations will have greater mobility and tactical independence.

As for strategy, it has already changed. It is its defensive direction among other factors that has resulted in a change in the authorized organizational structure of the troops and in the appearance of the "brigade—corps" echelon. All of this naturally will entail adjustment of the views for employing these forces, that is, changes in operational art and tactics. The need will also arise to develop more effective command and control techniques.

But this does not signify that we are rejecting divisions and armies. Yes, quantitatively there will be fewer of them but we advocate a complex combination of all types of ground and naval structures while considering new views on military organizational development.

[ARMIYA] Recently international contacts under the auspices of the General Staff have become much more intense. What guides you during the selection of partners?

[Kolesnikov] We think that today Russia does not have probable enemies. But ensuring our national security requires expansion of confidence-building zones and spheres. While moving toward contacts with representatives of the armed forces of other states, we are proceeding first of all from the security interests of our own state, naturally, while in the

process considering their interests. We must, as they say, know our neighbors along our borders and on the continents.

[ARMIYA] Let's assume that the days became an hour longer. To what would you devote this time?

[Kolesnikov] I would hardly manage to spend that given hour on playing tennis or swimming in the pool. It would certainly be added to my duty time. Such is the situation. Right now all of our strength is directed at reliably ensuring the process of the reorganization of the Armed Forces and ensuring the time is approaching when stability will come.

[ARMIYA] What style of leadership by people do you prefer?

[Kolesnikov] I will say this: you need to relate to a man in human terms whether he is military or civilian, a general or a soldier. In our country in Mother Russia, there are nearly always extremes. First master's relations then proletarian relations, although the homeland's intelligent people have always treated the simple person with respect.

I advocate that style of leadership under which a subordinate, when leaving his superior's office, is not clutching his heart and cursing everything in the world, but is full of dignity and consciousness of his significance and with a desire to undertake the assigned task.

[ARMIYA] Thanks for the interview. We wish you success.

From the biography

Mikhail Petrovich Kolesnikov was born in 1939 in Yeysk in Krasnodar Kray. He completed Omsk Tank Technical School, the Military Academy of Armored Troops (with distinction), and the Military Academy of the General Staff (with a gold medal). He consecutively passed through all the levels, beginning with platoon commander to army commander-in-chief. He has been involved with staff work since 1988. We was Siberian Military District chief of staff, troop direction, and Ground Forces. Since 1991, he has been in the General Staff—he headed the Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate, he was first deputy chief of the General Staff. He received the ranks of lieutenant colonel and colonel ahead of time. He became a major-general in 1981.

He is married. His wife is Galina Safronovna. His son—Vladimir—was born in 1963 and his daughter—Mariya—was born in 1976.

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CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Nazarenko Interview on Air Force Problems

93UM0802A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 13 Aug 93 p 2

[Interview with Major General Stanislav Nazarenko, chief of the Armaments Administration of the Russian Federation Air Force, by Major Sergey Babichev, the Russian Federation Air Force press center; place and date not given "Will the Motherland Fly?"]

[Text] *This is not the best of times for Russian aviation. Its current problems are the result not only of the disintegration*

of the Union into independent states and armies, but also of a clearly unbalanced economy.

"Still," Major General Stanislav Nazarenko, chief of Armaments Administration of the Russian Federation Air Force, said on the eve of Russian Air Force Day, "Russia has not lost the status of a great air power..."

"We can only regret," said the general, "that the advanced aircraft that had been based on the western, northwestern, and southern borders ended up as the property of the 'near abroad' countries [former union republics]. We have been left with a little more than one half of the air fleet—the machines that to a great extent have already served out their useful life.

"Judge for yourself. We have already stopped using MiG-21 fighters, and SU-17 and SU-7 assault planes. The same is about to happen to other obsolete one-engine aircraft: This year alone about 2,000 aircraft will be transferred into storage for the subsequent dismantling into precious metals and metal scrap.

"The current task is to equip the Russian Air Force with fourth generation flying machines. This process is not proceeding as smoothly as one would want to. In the past, thousands of enterprises in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other Union republics served the needs of the Air Force. Today, economic ties have been destroyed; to restore and get them going is not just a matter of practical economics—appropriate political decisions are needed, especially considering that none of the separated republics is capable of creating an aircraft industry complex.

"The most difficult problem is that of financing the air defense sector, the Air Force. Last year we got only 10 percent of the needed money. Nevertheless, the work on current and future equipping of the aircraft fleet has not stopped. More than 100 scientific research programs are being carried out. We try to attract nonbudget sources of financing—Russian and foreign.

"Most important is that our pilots have not lost their combat skills and are perfecting them. So, we look into the future with optimism."

Near-Crash at UK Air Show

93UM0795A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Aug 93 p 9

[Article by Yevgeniy Nikitin: "Seconds Separated Life From Death"]

[Text] "At the end of last month, two Russian military aircraft that were participating in the air show at Fairford Air Base in the west of England collided in midair. The aircraft disintegrated before our very eyes. However, MIG-29 Fighter Pilots Sergey Tresvyatskiy and Aleksandr Beschastnov managed to eject. How did that become possible?"

Ye. Shevtsov

Kiev

At the editorial staff's request, Journalist Yevgeniy Nikitin, who visited the enterprise that manufactures the K-36d ejection seat, talks about what saved the pilots' lives.

And the unique in Russia "Zvezda" Scientific Production Enterprise, which is located in the village of Tomilino in Moscow Oblast, is involved with the manufacture of these seats. Until recently "Zvezda" Machine Tool Plant was absolutely closed for the world and you could have caught sight of the signature of NPP [Scientific Production Enterprise] General Designer and General Director Gay Severin only on top secret documents along with the signatures of Academicians Vladimir Chelomey and Sergey Korolev and other famous scholars and designers of aircraft and space systems that were just as inaccessible to outside eyes.

Statistical data for ejection in the K-36d ejection seat speak more eloquently than any words. In the SU-25, SU-27 and MIG-29 aircraft, all 100% of the pilots who ejected in K-36d ejection seats returned to the ranks. Based on this indicator, all other countries of the world lag behind Russia by practically a factor of two. That is why we can boldly call the seat, in combination with the protective equipment, unique.

Today, over 10,000 of these seats are being operated in Russia and in the countries of the former USSR and there practically has not been a failure in their operation. In contrast to foreign statistics, Russia surpasses other countries by a wide margin in rescuing pilots in an emergency situation.

Isn't it paradoxical that, while creating such valuables, the enterprise is becoming poor before our eyes and is losing its best specialists? Today training a pilot, according to the assertion of G. Severin, "costs millions and millions of rubles" (Now perhaps already billions—Ye.N.). So, according to American data, training a fighter-pilot costs \$7-8 million when the fighter aircraft itself with weaponry—is approximately \$30 million. In other words, if you view a pilot as an integral part of the aircraft—weaponry—pilot system, his worth is nearly one third of the entire complex. Therefore, to save one of the elements of this system, means to resolve, besides a task of high moral standards, also a purely economic task.

Returning to the specific case in Great Britain, let's note that, having landing after ejecting, Aleksandr Beschastnov and Sergey Tresvyatskiy stood on their feet alive and well. They practically did not receive any injuries, although the ejection situation was difficult.

Specifications of Mig-29M Fighter

93UM0804A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Aug 93 p 2

[Article by Col Valentin Rudenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "The Arsenal": "The Mig-29M: A Fighter's New Role"]

[Text] The Mig-29M light, multipurpose fighter was created at the Design Bureau "A.I. Mikoyan" by thoroughly modernizing the Mig-29, well-known here and abroad. It is not surprising that the two aircrafts are very similar. The Mig-29M is actually a qualitatively new combat aircraft, however. When it enters the arsenal, its name will most likely also be different.

Chief designer Valeriy Novikov believes that it is not a matter of the name. The aircraft's basic features are the important thing. While the characteristics of its predecessor, a combat aircraft designed for gaining air superiority, have been retained entirely, the Mig-29M has acquired a new role, with an airborne system capable of operating effectively against both land and naval targets. The fighter is designed for employing practically the entire range of domestically produced air-to-surface missiles. This includes guided missiles with television and laser-controlled, homing warheads, adjustable-path aerial bombs and other high-precision weapons. The Mig-29M's arsenal also includes a 30mm aircraft gun with highly accurate fire and 80mm, 130mm and 240mm free-flight rockets.

The Mig-29M has nine suspension points. Its bomb load has been increased to 4.5 tons. The pilot can control the operating mode and select the weapon without removing his hands from the throttle and control stick. The pulsed Doppler radar allows for tracking up to 10 targets and firing on as many as four targets simultaneously. The aircraft has facilities for mapping the terrain, "freezing" an image, and so forth.

The specialists estimate that the Mig-29M is almost three and a half times as effective against ground targets and twice as effective against air targets as the Mig-29M. With respect to tactical performance and combat qualities, our fighter is superior to its foreign counterparts and prototypes, including the F-16C, F-18, Mirage-2005 and Rafal, as well as the Eurofighter now being created. It is also one and a half or two years ahead of them in the development cycle.

Everyone involved in the test flights has commented on the aircraft's extremely good controllability. Composite materials are used extensively in the structure, and the system for protecting the engine from extraneous objects has been fundamentally altered. This has made it possible to preserve practically the same "empty" weight as the Mig-29 and to increase the fuel supply by 1,500 liters, which in turn significantly increases the fighter's operating range (by more than 40 percent).

The Mig-29M made its first flight in 1986. The fighter was taken up by Valeriy Menitskiy, former chief pilot for the Geroy Sovetskogo Soyuza firm.

A deck-based version of the fighter, the Mig-29K, was being simultaneously developed from the Mig-29M. This program has now been curtailed, however, due to a lack of financing.

Clouds are also darkening around the Mig-29M. The preliminary deal to put it into regular production went to the Moscow Aviation Production Association, the oldest in Russia, back in 1991. There has still been no decision on starting regular production, however.

Basic Specifications of Mig-29M

| | |
|------------------------------|----------|
| Crew | 1 |
| Engines | 2xRD-33K |
| Take-off weight, kg | |
| Normal | 15,300 |
| Maximum | 19,700 |
| Maximum M number | 2.3 |
| Service ceiling, m | 17,000 |
| Take-off thrust-weight ratio | 1.1 |
| Operational G-force | 9 |
| Take-off distance, m | 250 |
| Landing distance, m | 600 |
| Flight range, km | |
| with extra tanks | 3,200 |
| minus extra tanks | 2,000 |

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Basing Problems for Baltic Fleet Aviation in Belarus

93UM0794A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Aug 93 First edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Valeriy Gromak: "The Aircraft Are the First Priority... How a Hasty Troop Redeployment at Times Affects People"]

[Text] The laws and documents that have recently been adopted in the Republic of Belarus were lying on Baltic Fleet Aviation Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant-General Vasilii Proskurnin's desk along with a pile of official telegrams.

Having drawn my interest in him, Vasilii Vladimirovich said: "I am flying to Bykhov tomorrow for a meeting with representatives of the local authorities. We need to resolve a number of official problems of aviation and the navy..."

The Baltic Sea does not wash the borders of Belarus from any side. But a division of TU-22M naval missile-carrying aircraft was based in Bykhov until recently. The division of the Union and the aspiration of the republics to build their own armed forces have compelled the large formation to change its deployment location. In general, everything is simple with the aircraft: they took off, they flew, and they landed at the new airfield. But the aviators' families? The depots with equipment and the ready inventory? You will not be able to pluck them from the location with directive orders alone. Proskurnin knows very well how firmly all of this grows together with the basing airfield.

Prior to entering the academy, Vasilii Vladimirovich commanded a division in the Belarusian city of Bykhov and he became an honored pilot in that post. There is constant thought on the problems of the Russian aviators and their families who have remained there. Recently the Republic of Belarus minister of defense appointed a new garrison commander in Bykhov. They immediately reported to Proskurnin on the possible "seizure" of the Russian Air Force depots. How much this is true—one cannot assess from afar. Therefore, the general is flying to Bykhov in order to meet with his subordinates, to calm people, and to resolve disputed issues with the new garrison commander. One of them is the apartment issue. For now, Russians from nearby foreign countries have no place to go, who in some parts are treated worse than stepchildren and being pressed to leave. Already today there are 710 people without housing in Baltic Fleet Aviation and this figure will total 1,683 after the final withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries. Baltic Fleet Aviation has not known this in its 75-year history...

Everyday problems—that is one side of the coin. While resolving them, we need to first of all think about everyday life in the military. The general frequently visits aviation regiments and sees that pilots are flying less than they need to. The level of their flight training is suffering. We needed to be clever with the training plans in order to preserve a nucleus of pilots who are capable of working in all types of combat employment. As they say, you can always put meat on those bones. If it is necessary, all flying personnel will be pulled up to the required level of readiness in 3-4 weeks.

In the regiments, people are eager for flights. They use any possibility in order to take-off. The Baltic Fleet Aviation commander recently visited the aviation unit that Colonel A. Vlasov commands. And it was as if he had returned to his lieutenant's youth.

Low, swelled clouds poured over the land by a cold wind but the airfield was alive. Aircraft took off and landed and the general noted that it was as if the naval aviators did not note the damp wind or the heavenly abyss. You could see the sun behind the clouds but flights during any weather is a holiday of the spirit for the aviators. It's as if they strive for the sky from the first meeting.

"In the situation that has developed with the withdrawal of aviation units from the Baltic countries, the most painful

issue is people," said Proskurnin. "I don't have the right to leave them to the whims of fate..."

The Baltic Fleet aviation command authorities are doing everything in their power to resolve the housing issue. This year they are turning over 215 apartments in Chernyakhovsk and 118 at Chkalovsk Garrison. But this is a drop in the bucket. Once, having arrived at the garrison, Proskurnin learned that a total of only seven compulsory service seamen remained at the unit. He made a decision to transfer them to a neighboring unit and to re-equip the barracks for housing for families. Of course, that's nothing to rave about. But at least it isn't tents...

General-Lieutenant of Aviation Proskurnin has a special day to receive people on personal issues. Such an agenda has not been established for telephone calls. Staffs, as they say, make things red hot and I see that they don't yield any flow of joy to the commander-in-chief. Judge for yourself.

They reported that two AN-2 aircraft had been repaired in the city of Shakhty but they needed to bring their own fuel to ferry them and money for the use of the take-off strip. KA-29 helicopters require repair but they cannot fly to the assigned location without refueling. Now we don't have any of our airfields in the Baltic Region. They transported the SU-24M aircraft from the plant and all of the ZIP [kits of spare parts, tools and accessories] for them went to Ukraine... Problems, problems, problems. In order to resolve them, we need a commander-in-chief with a double or triple reserve of strength.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Cost of Military R&R Facilities

93UM0763B Moscow *ARMYIA* in Russian No 9, 1993
(Signed to press 30 Apr 93) p 35

[Unattributed article, under the rubric: "Please Clarify: "How Much Does a Pass to a Sanatorium Cost?"]

[Text] "Due to the uncontrollable price increases, many things are now becoming inaccessible for servicemen. While planning my leave, I would like to know: will it be affordable to spend it, say, at a military sanatorium or rest home? How much do passes cost right now?"

Lieutenant Colonel V. Morozov, Kostroma

Prices for Passes to a Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Sanatorium or Rest Home

| No. | Name of Sanatorium or Rest Home | Period of Treatment (Stay) in days | Price of the pass (in rubles) |
|--------------------|---|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Sanatoriums | | | |
| 1 | "Arkhangelskoye" Central Military Clinical Sanatorium | 24 | 12,000 |
| 2 | "Aurora" Military Sanatorium (Northern Fleet) | 24 | 8,000 |
| 3 | "Adler" Military Sanatorium (Air Force) | 24 | 8,000 |
| 4 | Atamanovka Children's Sanatorium (Transbaykal Military District) | 30 | 8,000 |
| 5 | "Volga" Military Sanatorium (Volga Military District) | 24 | 7,000 |
| 6 | Darasun Military Sanatorium (Transbaykal Military District) | 24 | 7,000 |
| 7 | "Divnomorskoye" Military Sanatorium (Navy) | 21 | 7,000 |
| 8 | Yessentuki Central Military Sanatorium | 24 | 9,000 |
| 9 | "Yeltsovka" Military Sanatorium (Siberian Military District) | 21 | 7,000 |
| 10 | Zvenigorod Central Military Sanatorium | 24 | 9,000 |
| 11 | Zelenogorsk Military Sanatorium (PVO) [Air Defense] | 21 | 7,000 |
| 12 | Kislovodsk Central Military Sanatorium | 24 | 9,000 |
| 13 | Kuldur Military Sanatorium (Air Force) | 21 | 7,000 |
| 14 | Leningrad Military Sanatorium (Air Force) | 21 | 7,000 |
| 15 | Marfinskiy Central Military Clinical Sanatorium | 24 | 12,000 |
| 16 | Molokovskiy Military Sanatorium (Transbaykal Military District) | 24 | 7,000 |
| 17 | Okean Military Sanatorium (Far East Military District) | 24 | 7,000 |
| 18 | Priozersk Military Sanatorium (Leningrad Military District) | 21 | 7,000 |
| 19 | Pyatigorsk Central Military Sanatorium | 24 | 9,000 |
| 20 | "Paratunka" Military Sanatorium (Pacific Ocean Fleet) | 24 | 8,000 |
| 21 | "Riga Seashore" Military Sanatorium (Northwestern Group of Forces) | 21 | 7,000 |
| 22 | Svetlogorsk Central Military Sanatorium | 24 | 8,000 |
| 23 | Solnechnogorsk Military Sanatorium (Navy) | 24 | 9,000 |
| 24 | Sochi Central Military Sanatorium | 24 | 9,000 |
| 25 | Sochi Central Military Sanatorium imeni Ya. Fabritanus | 24 | 12,000 |
| 26 | "Slobodka" Central Military Sanatorium | 24 | 7,000 |
| 27 | Tarkhovskiy Military Sanatorium (Leningrad Military District) | 21 | 7,000 |
| 28 | Khabarovsk Military Sanatorium (Far East Military District) | 21 | 7,000 |
| 29 | Chebarkul Military Sanatorium (Urals Military District) | 21 | 7,000 |
| 30 | "Chernomorskoye" Military Sanatorium (Air Force) | 21 | 8,000 |
| 31 | Shmakovskiy Military Sanatorium (Far East Military District) | 24 | 7,000 |
| 32 | "Yalta" Military Sanatorium (Black Sea Fleet) | 21 | 8,000 |
| 33 | Children's Department of Okean Military Sanatorium (Far East Military District) | 30 | 8,000 |
| Rest Homes | | | |
| 1 | "Betta" Military Rest Home (North Caucasus Military District) | 20 | 6,000 |
| 2 | "Gorki" Military Rest Home (Navy) | 20 | 4,000 |
| 3 | Zelenogorsk Military Rest Home (Leningrad Naval Base) | 20 | 4,000 |
| 4 | Mozhaysk Military Rest Home (Rocket Troops) | 20 | 5,000 |
| 5 | "Sokol" Military Rest Home (Navy) | 20 | 4,000 |
| 6 | "Podmoskovye" Central Military Rest Home | 20 | 6,000 |

Furthermore, a surcharge will be collected at sanatoria and rest homes for giving a single individual or a family a separate house or a two or three-room hotel room with conveniences (washbasin, toilet, bathroom or shower). Individuals who have received passes free of charge also pay this surcharge. The additional payment totals: for one or two bunks—R1,000; for a two-room hotel room—R2,000; and, for a three-room hotel room—R3,000.

Disabled persons from among servicemen and also disabled pensioners of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense will not be charged a surcharge for one or two bunks with conveniences.

An additional payment can be adjusted in consideration of price changes for energy resources, food products, utilities and other types of services.

The prices cited for passes to military sanatoria and rest homes have been prescribed by Russian Federation Minister of Defense Order No 116 "On Prices for Passes and Standards of Expenditure for Food Products of Sick Persons and Those Persons Who Are Relaxing at Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Sanatoria and Rest Homes", dated 4 March 1993, which went into force on 20 March 1993.

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Official on "Moscow-St Petersburg Program" to Aid Reservists

93UM0758A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Aug 93 p 7

[Interview with Lt Col Igor Kotov, an originator of the Moscow-St Petersburg reservist resettlement program, by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Andrey Ivanov: "We Are Building 'Sun' Villages in Capital Area Siberia: Discharged Servicemen to Settle There"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are KRSNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] *In the fall of 1992, we reported on the development of the Moscow-St Petersburg State Program. The RF/Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium recently examined this program's concept with respect to resettlement, employment, and assistance to servicemen discharged into the reserve (in connection with the socio-economic development of the Leningrad, Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, and Tver Oblasts). Submission to the Supreme Soviet for consideration is to follow revision of the draft program. Our correspondent interviewed Lieutenant Colonel I. Kotov, one of the project's originators, for his comments on several questions.*

From the files of KRSNAYA ZVEZDA: Igor Kotov is a sociologist. He holds the degree of candidate of historical sciences and is a senior instructor in the Sociology Department of the Armed Forces Academy of the Humanities. He heads the working group of the RF Supreme Soviet Committee on Affairs of the Disabled, War and Labor Veterans, Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Dependents under the Moscow-St Petersburg Project.

[KRSNAYA ZVEZDA] Igor Leonidovich, it is no secret that the minds of men being discharged from the army are dominated by thoughts of obtaining housing and employment.

[Kotov] That is true. According to information supplied by the ARMIYA News Center, which provides employment and retraining assistance to servicemen, the gap between the state's capabilities and the number of servicemen in need of re-entry into civilian life is increasing - not decreasing - with each passing year. That is why it was the intention of the principal developers of the project, Ye. Vasilyev, S. Vinogradov, A. Korshunov, and O. Shkaratyan, who incidentally are colleagues of mine, to set up as the project's major purpose the mitigation of the consequences associated with the forthcoming mass discharge of officers and army and navy warrant officers and the lessening of social tensions caused by forced migration of servicemen and their dependents from areas of interethnic conflicts. We also took into consideration the fact that officers as a rule possess a higher education and are willing to take up a new career, and that is true for their wives as well. The average age of the servicemen receiving a discharge is 36 years. If suitable conditions are created, this kind of person will do his best to succeed.

[KRSNAYA ZVEZDA] Why does the title of your project include the names of the two Russian capitals?

[Kotov] Russians have since ancient times lived between Moscow and St Petersburg: in Tver, Novgorod, and Pskov Oblasts. By the way, the population density in a number of locations lying between the capitals does not exceed two persons per square kilometer! There is a reason why researchers refer to the expanse as the "capital area Siberia." It is there that about 30 percent of servicemen being discharged intend to settle, on that soil, and start an activity of their own. That is why the project is designed with natural migration trends in mind.

[KRSNAYA ZVEZDA] Exactly what does the plan intend to create in the area?

[Kotov] We wish to promote the creation of a resettlement system offering a highly developed infrastructure that comes up to European standards. For example, one in which a family would be able to acquire a cottage in which each person would have 22 to 25 square meters of living space. We will create not just schools, but gymnaziya- and lyceum-type schools; and we will develop an insurance-based health care system.

It is common knowledge that Russia has lost many Baltic ports and a direct outlet to West European countries. Therefore, one of the project's pivotal ideas is the construction of a modern, high speed, major motor highway - between Moscow, St Petersburg, and Vyborg - a state border that would help to resolve the transportation problem to some extent. Quite a number of working locations will come into being as a result of the road's construction. Plans call for erecting motor vehicle fuel and service stations, fuel stands, travellers' complexes, and a tourist industry.

Data provided by the same ARMIYA News Center indicate that the majority (36 percent) of those surveyed would like to take up an entrepreneurial activity, while 9 percent preferred to obtain land and, after completing suitable training, become farmers. Approximately one-sixth of the respondents choose to work in MVD and security agencies.

It was previously mistakenly thought that many officers would opt for becoming farmers. Our information indicates that, in reality, only 2 or 3 percent of persons interested in settling in the area would like to work the soil. However, there would be a need for quite a number of persons for work in processing of agricultural products: in small mills, small shops producing sausages and cheeses, etc. It would be necessary for those so employed to bring to the job engineering knowledge, something which officers receiving discharge possess. Also, there is no doubt that, with time, there will be many persons wishing to take advantage of the agricultural products program "Fermers", which was developed by the Arnik Joint Stock Company.

Further off in the future is the creation of an industrial policy and industrial parks. The experience acquired by the military-industrial complex, enterprises of which are located in the area, could be utilized to set up science-intensive production facilities in such fields as communications equipment, computers, and others.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Those tasks are enormous in their proportions, I must say. But how could they be made a reality?

[Kotov] The enormity may indeed be hard to believe, but we at the same time do not intend to erect "cities in the sun." Working in concert with the administrations of the oblasts to identify the most promising private sector projects, we are looking for so-called growth points or initiation zones. For example, the Arnik AO [Joint Stock Company] has selected the Spirovskiy Rayon of Tver Oblast as a priority unit. We are setting up a data base with the names of departing servicemen. In November of last year we started to train teams to implement suggestions already submitted by various firms, and we are involved in retraining in the international center "EAST-WEST MAU".

The optimum mechanism for making the project a reality under today's conditions is the creation of a holding type joint stock company. World experience indicates that what is needed for this kind of project is an organization which combines the power, capabilities, and guarantees of the state on the one hand, with the flexibility and initiative of entrepreneurial structures on the other. This kind of AO already exists. The founding members held a meeting in May of 1993. The stockholders are primarily state structures. They hold 85 percent of the stock. This is one of the mechanisms for maintaining the viability of state interests.

Selected as president was Pilot-Cosmonaut Herman Stepanovich Titov. The founders of the Moscow-Petersburg Joint Stock Company are Goskomimushchestvo; property management committees in the Moscow, Leningrad, Tver, Novgorod, and Pskov Oblasts; Rosselkhozbank; representatives of mayors' offices of the two capitals; the International Union of Russian Germans; and many other organizations.

A coordinating council has even been formed at the Russian Federation Government level to implement this program.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How is it planned to finance the project?

[Kotov] The government should support servicemen, of course. And it will set aside a small amount of money for this purpose. However, the state is fully capable of making land available to us either gratis or on favorable terms, and it can grant the joint stock company the status of juridical person. The joint stock company is itself capable of generating revenue. Our estimates indicate that, at first, most profitable would be the tourist business and the development of motor vehicle servicing and a roadside infrastructure.

We intend to solicit investment in this activity by Russian and foreign entrepreneurs. The venture has already elicited the interest of business circles of the USA, Germany, Italy, and other countries.

Plans call for resettling about 10,000 families of servicemen (35,000 to 40,000 persons) in the 1993-1997 time frame. In addition, the administrations of Pskov, Novgorod, and Leningrad Oblasts have invited many thousands of Russian Germans into their areas. Russians presently located in neighboring countries in all likelihood would also like to take up residence in those oblasts.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How can an officer, or an Army or Navy warrant officer, say one serving in the Transbaykal Military District, express his intent of taking up permanent residence in Central Russia?

[Kotov] For the present, I suggest that he fill out the form published in the 4 June issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, or that he simply write to the following address: 117192 Moscow, ul. Vinnitskaya, dom 1, a/3 7, RITs "Armiya." He will be sent a form.

In 1993-1994, we will be inviting persons interested in resettling in the Moscow-Petersburg area on the basis of the Army personnel reduction plans, and that only as housing and employment become available. The procedure for handling the resettlement requests is still in the planning stage. It will be announced in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The Social Work Fund is taking care of that.

Poll: Soldiers Dissatisfied With Living Conditions

93UM0800A Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian
No 88, 7 Aug 93 (Signed to press 6 Aug 93) p 1

[Article by Vladimir Kiriyeenko, FEDERATSIYA sociological service director: "Military Service Today"]

[Text] What is life like today for our army? What problems does the flower of our Armed Forces—the officers and extended-service servicemen—encounter? It is to these and a number of other questions that we attempted to provide answers on the basis of a study conducted by the FEDERATSIYA sociological service jointly with a number of other sociological organizations. During this study, which was conducted in June of this year in 13 regions of Russia

(Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladimir, Nizhniy Novgorod, Syktyvkar, Volgograd, Yekaterinburg, Stavropol, Omsk, Ulan-Ude, Vladivostok, Kaliningrad and Moscow Oblast), 1,739 respondents were surveyed. Their answers to the question "To what degree are you satisfied?" distributed themselves as follows:

| | Yes | No | Difficult to answer |
|---|-----|-----|---------------------|
| Material conditions of your daily life | 18% | 71% | 11% |
| Your housing conditions | 34% | 62% | 4% |
| The psychological climate in your unit | 57% | 27% | 17% |
| Mutual relations with superior commanders | 65% | 20% | 15% |
| Mutual relations with subordinates | 82% | 10% | 8% |
| Mutual relations with colleagues in service | 90% | 4% | 6% |
| Personal conditions of your life | 28% | 65% | 7% |
| Pay and allowances (wages) | 14% | 74% | 11% |

We would have to assert on the basis of these data, and an analysis of other materials on this problem, that the majority of our respondents are not satisfied with the material and personal conditions of their life. Consequently the country's leadership needs to devote special attention to this problem.

The answers of officers and extended-service servicemen to the question "What is the current income in your family, per family member?" also suggests that most of their families are materially lacking:

| | |
|-------------------------|-----|
| Up to R10,000 | 8% |
| from R10,000 to R20,000 | 32% |
| from R20,000 to R30,000 | 34% |
| from R30,000 to R40,000 | 14% |
| Over R40,000 | 12% |

It would seem that in comparison with the families of teachers, doctors, VUZ instructors or scientific associates, the families of servicemen enjoy relative well-being. But this is only from a superficial point of view, which does not take into account that the "nomadic" life of an officer requires considerable additional outlays.

Construction Chief on Details, Progress of Housing Program

93UM0757A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Aug 93 pp 1,2

[Interview with Col Gen Nikolay Chekov, construction and billeting chief, Russian Federation Armed Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Ivan Ivanyuk: "The Housing Program: Can State Support It?"; on the occasion of Builders' Day; place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] As we have already reported, on 20 July 1993 the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet approved the state

program for providing housing in 1993-1995, to servicemen, persons discharged from active duty into the reserve or retirement, members of internal affairs agencies, and dependents of these personnel.

On the eve of Builders' Day, we interviewed Colonel General Nikolay Chekov, chief of construction and billeting of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, for his comments on this action and the ways in which the attendant plans will be implemented.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Vasilyevich, could you tell us your starting point for developing the state program?

[Chekov] According to information available as of 1 January 1993, the Ministry of Defense has in its records more than 119,000 officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel in need of housing, with 72,000 families requiring improvement in their living conditions. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that located in limited-access and special-purpose military installations there are 59,000 military personnel who have been cut off from the Armed Forces. There is no place where they can be resettled. Listed in the records in local executive authority agencies are 77,000 persons discharged into the reserve and retirement who are awaiting assignment of apartments.

Hardest hit by the housing problem are military districts, which have been the primary recipients of troops withdrawn from foreign countries. These are the MVO [Moscow Military District] (23,600 families needing housing; the LenVO [Leningrad Military District] (more than 15,000); and the SKVO [North Caucasus Military District].

Calculations indicate that, in the next 3 years, the number of Army and Navy families in need of housing as a result of continuing withdrawal of our troops to Russian soil, military VUZ graduates entering the service, and personnel accepting contract service, will increase even more - by 216,000. In addition, there will be an increase of 121,000 servicemen discharged into the reserve who will not have any housing at their chosen place of residence.

Considering that housing under a market economy is becoming a highly important social guarantee which servicemen should be assured by the state, the resolution of the housing problem with respect to the Army and Navy is not only most acute, but decidedly urgent.

We submitted the state servicemen's housing program, as referenced to the Russian Federation Presidential Statute, to the government as far back as September of last year. However, time brought about some changes that were included and the difficult economic and political situation has had its effect, with the result that now, with the backing of the President and the government, the program has finally met with the approval of the Supreme Soviet.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We all remember the sad story of the All-Union Program "Housing-2000," and that at a time when the economy was more stable. Is this project to take its place?

[Chekov] We fully realize that an attempt to resolve the housing problem for the Army and Navy by the end of 1995

is unrealistic. The state presently simply cannot afford it. As a matter of fact, the changes that were introduced into the program had the primary purpose of cutting it back. The goal we are now pursuing is more modest: Do what is necessary to stop the year-to-year increase; attempt instead to encourage a decrease. This is the task that has been incorporated into the state program.

In 1993, plans call for tapping all sources to erect and acquire 82,100 apartments (which would be 21,000 apartments more than last year), with the breakdown as follows: 61,700 apartments by employing the RF [Russian Federation] MO [Ministry of Defense] own plan, occupant participation, and apartment purchase; 1,700 apartments financed by nonbudgetary sources (sale of surplus property and equipment, personal funds); 9,600 apartments erected under the housing special construction program financed by the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] government; 8,200 apartments should be returned by local administrations in settlement of their housing indebtedness, etc.

In this connection, the Ministry of Defense's military builder manpower resources are to be employed to erect 45,000 apartments this year, 48,000 next year, and about 52,000 in 1995. Thus, the total for these 3 years is about 145,000 apartments.

In the years 1993-1995, there should become available an additional number of approximately 146,000 apartments, 44,000 in this year alone, taking into account the receipt of nonbudgetary funds, including the money of servicemen; the application of the FRG monies to this purpose; release of the housing funds tied up in limited-access and special-purpose military installations; and the cancellation of "apartment debts" owed by local authority agencies.

So the above are the principal facts and figures for providing an idea of the scope of the tasks at hand in the near future with the purpose of diminishing the severity of the housing problem the Armed Forces are facing.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The program as approved may be feasible from the theoretical point of view, but what about the practical? One need look no further than this year, one which has proven to be so difficult for military builders, something which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already discussed.

[Chekov] Indeed, we are encountering considerable difficulty in fulfilling the yearly plans. In 6 months' time, we have brought in 17,500 apartments on the basis of the Ministry of Defense's own plan, occupant participation, and acquisition. This amounts to about 28 percent of the goal for the year set by the plan. And all this was possible only by our maintaining a tight grasp on last year's backlog. Relative to residential housing slated for availability in the third and fourth quarters, the work is virtually at a standstill.

The primary cause of this situation is unsatisfactory financing of capital construction. Although the annual allocation for this purpose was 964.5 billion rubles, the Russian Minfin [Ministry of Finance] has disbursed in 7 months of this year the amount of only 298 billion rubles, which is 30.8 percent of the annual allocation, rather than 58 percent.

July's disbursement was 46 billion instead of 93 billion. As of today, the Ministry of Finance's indebtedness amounts to 200 billion rubles. In this connection, the majority of enterprises and organizations of the Ministry of Defense's apartment construction agencies lack the funds to pay not only their suppliers, but the labor collectives as well. Thus, as of the present, there are no funds to pay the salaries of civilian personnel, the amounts due military personnel for the month of May 1993, and 78 organizations, totalling an indebtedness of one billion rubles. The same situation obtains relative to payments for June.

We would be willing to receive a monthly sum, one amounting to one-twelfth of the annual budgetary appropriation, even though advance payment is actually required to maintain a smooth pace of construction. However, in April of this year the Ministry of Defense started to allot credits without tying them to the index. The budget was approved with a construction material price index of 55 relative to 1991 prices. The reality is that prices are rising every month; they are presently larger by a factor of two, and, in some places, by three. Nonetheless, the military are still being financed the old way. The absence of money in the accounts of construction organizations and industrial enterprises in effect paralyzed their productive activities.

The situation is no better in the case of other sources of apartments. To reduce their indebtedness to the Ministry of Defense, in the first half of 1993 local administrations provided only 1,100 apartments out of the 8,200 they promised. They also defaulted in their honoring the associated Russian Presidential Edict last year. In accordance with Russian Federation Presidential Statute 457-rp of 23 June 1993, local executive authority agencies are required to make good the remaining indebtedness in this year. This document is extremely timely and quite specific. However, the problem of money crops up again. For example, according to the Minfin, Stavropolskiy Kray allocated 1.9 billion rubles for this year, but the actual amount received was 1.1 billion, while the requirement is for 9 billion rubles if the task of erecting housing for servicemen being discharged into the reserve is to be met. In Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, 1.5 billion rubles was provided out of 3.3 billion, although the need is for 8.5 billion. In Volgograd Oblast, work completed there cost 2.5 billion rubles, but the federal budget has paid out less than one billion.

We have informed the government that failure to take highly decisive measures in the near future may threaten the viability of both the state servicemen's housing program and the state program for withdrawing Russian troops from the soil of other states, with attendant resettlement and family assistance, as approved by RF Presidential Edict No 952 of 24 June 1993. The latter is also closely tied to the republic's budget, which is to be instrumental in the construction of 70 percent of the total number of apartments, with 30 percent to be built by virtue of monies made available by the government of the FRG.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Vasilyevich, this conversation we are having on the eve of the professional holiday of military construction toilers - Builders' Day - has not been a pleasurable one. It would seem to me that many of

our readers recognize the selfless labor they perform under these difficult conditions. What problems other than those of housing are on the minds of military builders?

[Chekov] Regarding the provision of housing, we are in the same situation as other military subunits - military builders enjoy no special privileges. Our military and labor collectives suffer all other social and personal comfort problems to the same degree. Apartment building agencies, the same as the Armed Forces in general, are also undergoing reform. To accomplish construction work, the volume of which is growing from year to year, what is needed is a serious organizational and structural realignment. The number of personnel in the central apparatus of apartment building agencies has been cut by about half. Small and inefficient subunits are being dissolved.

This year, the authorized strength level of servicemen serving in military construction units of Russia's Ministry of Defense is being cut by almost 8,000 men, while military builders are taking a 69,000 man reduction. This year, we initiated changes to a new management structure in military construction organizations and enterprises. Military construction detachments will be employed primarily in construction work in remote areas, limited-access and special-purpose military installations, and at special sites. For this reason, we are experiencing an acute shortage of young replacements; we will continue to reduce the VSO [military construction detachments] with a view toward maintaining full strength. At the same time, we intend to attract civilian specialists to our construction sites. Last year, for example, 10,000 of them entered the rolls. In general, there is an acute shortage of workers.

I wish to point out that people are doing their best in working under these most difficult of conditions, realizing that their efforts and skills determine the combat capability of the Armed Forces, that the housing they are erecting constitutes a hope for the future of thousands and thousands of Russian servicemen.

An evening concert celebrating Builders' Day was held in the Red Banner Hall of the TsDRA [Central Club of the Russian Army]. It was attended by officers, warrant officers, enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, laborers, and office personnel of military construction units, organizations, and institutions.

Colonel General Nikolay Chekov, VS RF chief of construction and billeting, heartily congratulated the audience on the occasion of the forthcoming holiday.

Feliks Semyanovskiy

Law on Pensions for Parents of Deceased Draftees

93UM0797B Moscow *FEDERATSIYA* in Russian
No 90, 12 Aug 93 (Signed to press 11 Aug 93) p 5

["Law of the Russian Federation 'On Pensions for Parents of Deceased Service Members Who Were Conscripted for Military Service'"]

[Text] Law of the Russian Federation "On Pensions for Parents of Deceased Service Members Who Were Conscripted for Military Service"

Article 1. The parents of service members conscripted for military service (from among those termed compulsory service members in accordance with legislation previously in effect) who have perished (died) during their military service or died due to military injury after discharge from military service (except for cases when the death of the service members occurred as a result of their illegal actions) have the right to a pension for loss of breadwinner when the parents reach the age of 55 and 50 years (for the husband and the wife respectively) regardless of whether they were dependent on the deceased (dead) service members.

Article 2. The pension for the loss of a breadwinner, provided for by article 1 of this Law, is established for each of the parents in the maximal amount at the level of the minimal old-age pension for a total labor history equal to that required for designation of a full pension.

Article 3. The parents of service members indicated in article 1 of this Law are given the right to receive two pensions: an old-age pension (for disability, by virtue of length of service, or social pension) and also a pension for the loss of a breadwinner, designated in accordance with the terms and norms of this Law.

Article 4. Payment of pensions for loss of breadwinner, designated for the parents of deceased (dead) service members conscripted for military service, in accordance with this Law is made with funds allocated to the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation from the republic budget of the Russian Federation.

Article 5. This Law will enter into force on May 1, 1993.

The pension for loss of breadwinner to parents of deceased (dead) service members conscripted for military service is designated in accordance with this Law with the time periods indicated in article 119 of the Law of the RSFSR "On State Pensions in the RSFSR" (Register of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies of the RSFSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, 1990, No 27, art. 351), but no earlier than May 1, 1993.

President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin

Moscow, House of Soviets of Russia 21 May 1993 No 5001-1

Decree on Pensions for Parents of Deceased Draftees

93UM0797C Moscow *FEDERATSIYA* in Russian
No 90, 12 Aug 93 (Signed to press 11 Aug 93) p 5

["Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on the Re-Examination of the Law of the Russian Federation 'On Pensions for the Parents of Deceased Service Members Who Were Conscripted for Military Service'"]

[Text] After re-examination of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Pensions to the Parents of Deceased Service Members Who Were Conscripted for Military Service," which was returned by the President of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation **decrees:**

The Law of the Russian Federation "On Pensions for the Parents of Deceased Service Members Who Were Conscripted for Military Service" is to be adopted in the wording of 15 April 1993.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation
R.I. Khasbulatov

Moscow, House of Soviets of Russia 21 May 1993 No
5002-1

**Decree on Housing Program for Reserve, Retired
Servicemen**

93UM0797D Moscow *FEDERATSIYA* in Russian
No 90, 12 Aug 93 (Signed to press 11 Aug 93) p 5

["Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation 'On the State Program for Provision of Housing in 1993 to 1995 to Service Members Discharged from Military Service to the Reserve or Retirement, and to Associates of the Organs of Internal Affairs, and also to Members of their Families'

The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. That the appended State program for provision in 1993 to 1995 of housing to service members, persons discharged from military service to the reserves or retirement, associates of the organs of internal affairs, and also to members of their families (henceforth the State Program), presented by the President of the Russian Federation and the Council of Ministers - Government of the Russian Federation, is approved.

That the tasks of housing construction for this category of persons be provided for annually in accordance with state needs.

2. That the State Program be implemented through appropriations allocated from the republic budget of the Russian Federation, and also from non-budgetary funds received from the sale of freed-up state property and other sources, including the personal funds of citizens, with allowance for expenditures for the development of utilities and the social-consumer sphere in the amount of no less than 20 percent of the sum of expenditures for the construction of housing.

3. That in the third quarter of 1993, the Council of Ministers - Government of the Russian Federation jointly with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation is to introduce proposals regarding the granting of targeted preferential credits for implementation of the designated housing construction, including individual.

4. That the Council of Ministers - Government of the Russian Federation with the governments of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Latvian Republic, the Lithuanian Republic, and the Estonian Republic, is to coordinate a draft agreement on procedures for the receipt and use of compensation by service members, persons discharged from military service to the reserve or retirement, and members of their families for housing surrendered in connection with their relocation to the territory of the corresponding state, and is to duly submit it for the consideration of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

5. That supervision of implementation of this decree and the State Program is assigned to the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation for Questions of Defense and Security, the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation for Construction, Architecture and Housing and Utilities, and the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation for the Affairs of Invalids, Veterans of War and Labor, and Social Protection of Service Members and Members of Their Families.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation
R.I. Khasbulatov

Moscow, House of Soviets of Russia 20 July 1993 No
5467-1

Housing Budget Allotments for NWGF Personnel

93UM0793B Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 14 Aug 93 First edition p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Ranevskiy, Northwestern Group of Forces: "2.6 Billion Rubles Has Been Allotted for Housing Construction for NWGF Servicemen, But a Little Over 400 Have Obtained Apartments in Russia..."]

[Text] Who is at fault in this? The long-suffering economy with its monstrous inflation, the decline in production and the disrupted economic ties? But Novgorod contractors have managed to fulfill in a timely manner their obligations to the Northwestern Group of Forces, having supplied dozens of servicemen's families with the desired apartments and the city administration has made its small contribution to this truly noble cause. The Penza Administration has also related with understanding to our problems, having rendered assistance for the early allocation of apartments that were built through NWGF shared participation. The issue was also positively resolved in the city of Kropotkin for which Deputy Head of Administration V. Ruban deserves a great deal of credit. Leningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg, where the greatest quantity of housing for the families of our military personnel was turned over became record holders in this regard.

So why are similar problems being resolved in a so-so manner in other regions of Russia? Perhaps the interests of local residents or, even worse, bureaucratic indifference is the cause here. It is no accident that a total of 11 responses were received to 45 letters to the group of forces KEU [Billeting Directorate] regarding housing construction through shared participation.

The Lipetsk authorities were silent and the curators of construction in Pskov took the position of disinterested observers. They say that if military personnel need housing, let them do the best that they can. In Smolensk, the cost for one square meter of housing space has even increased to 221,000 rubles and Nizhny Novgorod is not lagging behind in that "zeal". Of course, a market is like any other market but why "rip off" the last shirt from a military person, really, he is one of us... And where else! The Kursk authorities have demanded from the NWGF allocations for social development of the city in the amount of 43% of the cost of 15 apartments that according to an agreement are designated for group of forces servicemen. Certain bureaucrats

have truly excessive appetites and how many all-possible commercial structures have been developed that do not miss a chance to warm their hands on the housing shortage and to twist the unsophisticated customer around their little finger, it is not labor for them—they have become skilled in this business. They put other peoples' money into circulation, they pluck their profit, and disappear without a trace.

The fact that Russian contracting organizations have violated their obligations in more than 80 contracts associated with housing construction also speaks volumes. Even worse, they say, is to wait and pursue that. In our situation, the anticipation of housing is in direct dependence on pursuit of endless price increases. Today, the NWGF needs R1.6 billion for additional payments alone for completion of housing construction through shared participation. That is today. If we stretch out financing, we will have to pay a lot more by the end of the year.

List of VUZes To Train Reserve Officers Approved

93UM0797A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Aug 93 First edition p 2

[Article by Col Oleg Glushakov: "Reserve Officers To Be Trained at Only 81 VUZes"]

[Text] In accordance with the Law "On Compulsory Military Service," the Russian government has approved a list of military departments at higher institutes of learning.

Starting this academic year, students will be trained in reserve officer programs at 81 state institutions of learning. Simultaneously, departments of military and disaster medicine will be formed at all state higher medical schools on the basis of military departments. The Russian Defense Ministry has been ordered to prepare a draft provision on military training of students.

Housing Situation for Officers Described

93UM0793A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Aug 93 First edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Ivanyuk: "To Shamefully Exchange an Officer's Honor for a Separate Apartment With Conveniences"]

[Text] The situation with providing housing in the army and in the navy has exceeded all permissible bounds. The predicted number of homeless servicemen in the near future totals hundreds of thousands. We need the incredible efforts of the state just to stabilize the situation, already not talking about providing a roof over the head of each person in uniform.

Naturally, you can't get even with desperate letters in the editorial mail. "Have our husbands who each served 20 years in the army really not earned the right to permanent housing?" by way of illustration, Marina Vakulenko and Galina Bezotchestva wrote to us from Krasnoyarsk Kray. "Understand us, we were so tired of bobbing from place to place with children and suitcases, and living in small temporary rooms or TsUBs [metal standard housing units]. Will we really not have the opportunity to live like human beings

after our husbands' release into the reserve? Right now the unit is being disbanded, we have no place to go, but they are not promising us housing in the city..."

The authors of that and similar appeals have been waiting and are waiting for an apartment for years without complaint, frequently losing any hope of obtaining one. But that prospect suits far from all of them. As an example, Captain Andrey Parashchiiy, assigned at the end of 1990 as teacher in the military department of the VTUZ [higher technical educational institution] MASI [Inter-American Statistical Institute], did not begin to appeal to the command authorities in order for them to place him on the housing list. But he appealed directly to... his father—chief of a Moscow Military District staff housing department.

He still had to involve quite a few officials in order to knowingly compile false excerpts from the military district commander's order, information on assignment to another position, verification of housing conditions, and an excerpt from the protocol of the military base housing commission session where he (Captain Parashchiiy) allegedly performed his duties. The documents successfully underwent approval at Moscow Military District KEU [Billeting Directorate] and then at the Moscow Moskvoretskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies Ispolkom [executive committee]. In July 1991, the young military teacher became the owner of a two-room apartment in Moscow.

THIS FACT along with other cases of violations of housing laws was discovered by the Moscow Garrison Military Procurator during the course of last year's inspection. Why are we returning to it after so much time? The fact is that after the procurator's discovery of the cases of forgery, a statement of claim was sent to the court on eliminating violations of the law. And a judicial lawsuit was going on until recently, military lawyers defended Moscow Military District KEU's interests during the course of it by whom control was so easily waived at one time.

Finally, on 30 March 1993, Kuntsevskiy Rayon Court recognized the order for the apartment that had been submitted by Captain Parashchiiy as invalid, just like the agreement on privatization of the housing space that the new tenants managed to complete. And on 28 July, the Mosgorsud [Moscow City Court] Judicial Collegium in a appeal session recognized the decision of the rayon court as valid. The officer had to vacate the occupied housing.

For the sake of completing the picture, it would be appropriate to cite several figures. There were 1,158 homeless servicemen and another 150 needed improved housing conditions, including 70 civilian VUZ [higher educational institution] military department officers who did not have housing, on the register at the billeting directorate at the time when he was allocated an apartment through influence by bypassing the list.

We need to say that Captain Parashchiiy was not the only one who decided to negotiate his own path due to the hopelessness of that situation. At the present time there are several other statements of claim in civil courts against

officers and generals who obtained housing through influence and the military procuracy is attempting, with enviable consistency, to ensure that social justice triumphs.

This is especially important right now, under conditions of a total shortage of apartments and when, let's be frank, public control of their allocation has clearly slackened. And not as many apartments as we would like are being added that we can share. Housing construction as a whole throughout Russia is practically not increasing. Based upon Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] data, 189,000 apartments were turned over in the first half of this year—just as many as during the same period last year. Other power structures also have an understanding of the need to put the allocation of housing in order.

So, according to an ITAR-TASS report, an inspection of the legitimacy of placing officers and army and navy warrant officers who need improved housing conditions on a priority basis on the register was recently conducted in Stavropol Kray. By way of illustration, in Kislovodsk it was established that the required documents were absent in 120 of 134 verified registration cases. In Yessentuki copies that were verified with deviations from notary requirements were attached to 113 registration cases instead of original documents. In Mineralnyye Vody, attestations were accepted from a certain Bushnev and a Valychevtsev, one of whom had been released from military service for inability to adjust to military service and the other—for discrediting the rank of a serviceman, in which it was indicated that they had been released for staff reductions and for age, respectively.

Many violations were discovered in the cities of Pyatigorsk and Zheleznovodsk, and in Predgornyy, Shpakovskiy, Neftekumskiy, Izobilnenskiy, Blagodarnenskiy rayons of Stavropol Kray. Inclusion on the lists for priority receipt of housing of servicemen who are performing service at local military commissariats who had no right to that have become widespread.

Kray Administration Head Yevgeniy Kuznetsov was entrusted with personal responsibility for the heads of administration of the cities and rayons for putting in proper order the allocation of housing that has been erected for servicemen who have been released into the reserve or who have retired. It has been provided for that inspections to determine whether the situation is being corrected will be conducted in the kray every six months.

Gross violations of social justice during the allocation of plots of land for individual housing construction and allocation of housing were discovered in Ulyanovsk. Specifically, in Central Rayon the allocation of land for private houses was conducted and is being conducted without taking into account the actual provision of housing of the claimants. There have been 834 families placed on the lists of claimants for the last two years of which there were only four veterans of the Great Patriotic War, five participants of battles in Afghanistan and 48 servicemen.

All of this must cause concern. The very urgency of the housing situation in the Armed Forces is a powerful destabilizing factor. And if deviations from legal and moral standards are imposed on it, the consequences of that could

become doubly destructive for military collectives. Therefore, right now it is so important at each military unit to establish fundamental order in the allocation of housing, without waiting for procuracy or other inspections. And we need to remind some of those who are attempting to dodge about officer honor and conscience.

Lack of Housing for Troops Withdrawn From Germany

93UM0800B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Aug 93 First edition p 2

[Article by Boris Mikhaylov, Western Group of Forces: "The Homeless of the Western Group of Forces: What Was, Will Be"]

[Text] A year from now, the Western Group of Forces will complete their withdrawal. The problems are numerous. Just about the most crucial is housing for officers and warrant officers. The command and the housing cooperative of the Western Group of Forces, headed by Colonel M. Zhabko, are doing everything possible today to ensure that the homeless would have a roof over their head in Russia. What have they been able to do? Five hundred forty-two persons have become the lucky owners of apartments after making a 25 percent payment in Deutsche marks (the other 75 percent are paid by the Western Group of Forces out of nonbudgetary resources).

Stavropol Kray sold the Western Group 201 apartments, Moscow Oblast sold 47, and Nizhniy Novgorod sold 54. Twenty-three are being occupied in the Leningrad region, and 99 in Cherkassy. It would seem that that's not all that much—just 542 apartments. But even they required considerable effort on the part of the group's housing agencies. To be honest, no one is waiting from officers of the Western Group of Forces with open arms: Except for a few, the administrative heads do not want to sell apartments, or they ask an absurd price.

Consequently every apartment that is fought for and begged from administrative heads comes at a high cost, in both the literal and figurative sense. But what does the future hold? The group's housing cooperative is conducting negotiations for the acquisition of 50 apartments in Yaroslavl, 28 in Volgodonsk, 40 in Staryy Oskol and 75 in Ryazan. It should be noted that the negotiations are difficult and complex.

Housing, Services Lacking for Division in Ulyanovsk

93UM0800C Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 41,
Aug 93 p 6

[Article by Mariya Dementyeva: "Russian Paratroopers Land at Ulyanovsk"]

[Text] Withdrawal of the 104th Guards Airborne Division to Ulyanovsk was recently completed. It was withdrawn here from Azerbaijan, from Gyandzha (formerly Kirovabad).

The city in a sense consisted of two parts—Armenian and Azeri. They were divided by bridges, and later on, by enmity. And then all five of Kirovabad's bridges were occupied by paratroopers. They stood as a living barrier between the brutalized people. Linking their arms, for 3

days they held the bridges. They lacked not only weapons, but even bulletproof vests. The paratroopers were protected only by rucksacks filled with rocks: They softened the blows of cobblestones flying at them from all sides. Torched combat vehicles burned, and brutal bandits killed Russian soldiers attempting to flee the flames. This was a real Hell. But thousands of lives were saved. Owing to the heroism of the paratroopers from the 104th Division, one more tragic page was kept out of the history of relations between Armenians and Azeris.

Few know about the Kirovabad bridges. This was in 1988, and it was recommended to the mass media that they shouldn't focus attention on outbreaks of "friendship between peoples."

The 104th has traveled a difficult road—Afghanistan, Sumgait, Karabakh and many other places. Returning home to Gyandzha, the paratroopers once again found themselves in a hot spot. And now they have returned to Russia.

Ulyanovsk is a quiet, tranquil city, provincial in a good way. You won't find a chamber of commerce even if you searched in the daylight with a searchlight. A liter of milk costs 80 rubles, while a loaf of bread costs 12. With this, of course, the characteristics of an "island of socialism," which people like to talk about, come to an end. Everything else is almost as expensive as in the capital. And the diversity of goods and products is significantly lower. Life is hard, like everywhere else.

Still, in contrast to Gyandzha, no one is shooting in Ulyanovsk. This of course does not mean that there are fewer problems. It will take years for the paratroopers to be able to set up their new station, and attain the level of comfort (if you could even apply this word to the Russian military) that the division enjoyed in Azerbaijan. In Gyandzha, each had his own apartment, while here they are available to no one. Families live where they can, and officers spend an hour and a half on the road. It is not an easy thing to rent a room, and when you can get one, it costs 30,000 a month. A one-room apartment costs twice as much. But who can possibly give more than two-thirds of his monthly wages just for apartment rent? And as for housing built for them, that's not in the cards—there is no money for the military.

The paratroopers aren't complaining. Because in comparison with many other places to which Russia is now withdrawing its retreating army, Ulyanovsk is still very good. At least they are not out in the middle of nowhere, which is something others have had to face.

By the way, when the division's housing administrators left Azerbaijan, they found out that the promised residential district had been occupied by certain commercial organizations, and that there was no room for the division. At that time, in February, the families of officers with small children had to live for several days at the airfield in Ryazan, until the conflict was resolved. It now seems that a mutual understanding with the administration of Ulyanovsk is beginning to materialize, although from time to time the airborne command has to remind local authorities that the division is not just another private enterprise, and as long as

the country is going to have an army, it has to be provided with at least the minimum necessary.

At the new place, everything has to be started practically from ground zero. A great deal of effort and resources have been expended in order to create at least relative order in the barracks left over from a military construction unit. In the half a year that they stood vacant, they were looted practically completely. But even what is there is not enough for everyone, and so a large part of the personnel are living in tarpaulin tents on Ulyanovsk's outskirts. The possibility is not excluded that these soldiers will have to greet winter in that same tarpaulin camp; at any rate they are making heating stoves ready. And next door is a fabulous military post belonging to the ground forces. Such that the paratroopers have to clarify their relations not only with local authorities but also with army colleagues.

Things are not very simple for the division's medical unit either. "One of the main tasks is to move the oblast tuberculosis dispensary out of military post. It moved here half a year ago, when the post belonged to no one," said Senior Lieutenant Valeriy Mashintsev. "By the way, it is a dispensary only in name. It is actually a hospital. Patients lie here, and they undergo surgery here. It was revealed in the meantime that wastes from these operations, which according to all of the regulations should be destroyed by a special procedure, are simply hauled to the city dump. According to those same regulations the security zone around such institutions should be not less than 8,000 meters.

"As the snow began to melt, we had to flood the entire division territory with chloride solution which, as you can understand was not a simple thing to do. But these are all half-measures. An outbreak of tuberculosis may occur in the overcrowded camp at any moment. The division's medical service has nowhere to deploy its hospital to the degree we enjoyed in Gyandzha. Here we can only set up 25 beds, which is eight times less than authorized for a division. It stands to reason that there is no place to carry out surgery—the maximum we can provide is primary medical assistance.

"But how can there be any talk of tuberculosis and surgical operations when under the present personal conditions soldiers often have nowhere to wash their hands properly, and they can't eat like normal people in a clean mess hall, rather than in a shed or simply out in the street where the field kitchens stand? That's the root of hepatitis, dysentery and other diseases. And the epidemiological situation in the city is not the best."

As you drive up to the camp you see the vacant lots with hastily erected barbed wire fences, inside which assault vehicles, ZILs, Urals and other equipment has been formed up right beneath the open sky. It is not difficult to imagine what things will be like here after the first snowfall. There is of course no money to build covered garages either, and even these vacant lots are still disputed territory. There is absolutely no guarantee that they will remain in the possession of the paratroopers. And then whenever the division is raised on alert, it will first have to make its way to other side of the city for its combat vehicles, and then move toward the

airfield. By that time, there wouldn't be any need fly anywhere—it would be too late.

"We have to fight for everything," said division commander Colonel Vadim Orlov. "It's hard, but I can't give up. After all, these people are under my care."

There are now 120,000 homeless military in Russia. If construction of housing for them continues at the current rate (that is, at a rate of zero—the Ministry of Finance is not allocating any money), then specialists predict that 2 years from now there will be around half a million in our country. The widely publicized military posts built in Russia by Western companies are but a drop in the sea. Most facilities that had been abandoned in the near and far frontiers will have to be built from scratch. But no matter how expensive this might be, a starving and homeless army may cost a great deal more. As we know, a country that is reluctant to feed its own army will end up feeding someone else's.

Main Staff Official on Officers' Contracts to Serve Abroad

93UM0769A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Aug 93 p 2

[Interview with Colonel Oleg Fedyayev, chief of administration, Main Directorate of Training and Assignment of Cadre, RF MO [Ministry of Defense], by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA unofficial correspondent Vladimir Silkin: "Serving Under Contract: Issue Plagues Russian Officers Serving Abroad"; date and place not given; first three paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] One of the most pressing problems is that of setting up contract service for officers. That is also evident from the letters received by the editors. Many officers are asking us questions: When should one agree to sign a contract? Who should do so? What kind of contract would that be?

It is known that, to effectuate Paragraph 6 of Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No 4983-1 of 19 May 1993 entitled "Certain Measures Related to Carrying Out the Russian Federation Law on the Military Obligation and Military Service", on 21 July 1993 the Russian Federation minister of defense signed Directive No D-67 entitled "Contract Service for Officers on Duty Abroad in the Russian Federation Armed Forces."

We are publishing here an interview granted our unofficial correspondent by Colonel Oleg Fedyayev, chief of administration, RF MO Main Directorate of Training and Assignment of Cadre, who was involved in developing the directive.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Oleg Maksimovich, what was the purpose of issuing this particular directive?

[Fedyayev] First, RF Supreme Soviet Decree No 4983-1 of 19 May 1993 confers on the RF minister of defense the authority to set up a procedure for administering contracts pending passage of a statute on regulating the details of military service. The minister of defense employed this authority to deal with the tension-causing morale problem existing among troops stationed abroad. The fact of the matter is that officers serving abroad are concerned about their future, especially in connection with their forthcoming

return to the Motherland and what they perceive as an unstable situation in Russia. Naturally, it was necessary to take measures specifically designed to resolve this problem.

Second, on 6 April of this year, Colonel General V. Mironov, deputy minister of defense, signed Directive No D3-31 entitled "Procedure for Drawing Up Contracts for Russian Federation Citizens Entering Military Service of the Russian Federation Armed Forces." The purpose of this document was to direct the corresponding commanders (chiefs) to disseminate information and initiate preparatory work on this issue, particularly in the case of servicemen on duty in the Western Group of Forces. Four months have passed, an amount of time we consider to be sufficient for holding discussions with officers relative to their future service in the RF VS [Armed Forces]. The time has arrived to take action.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Is this a matter merely of officers serving in the ZVG [Western Group of Forces]?

[Fedyayev] Not quite. It also pertains to officers serving in the North-Western Group of Forces; ships, units, large units, and installations of the Baltic Fleet located within the boundaries of the Baltics; unit officers who have remained behind with the force stationed in the Republic of Poland; and officers serving on the soil of foreign states located beyond the borders of the former USSR.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What sort of time frame has been set for contract completion?

[Fedyayev] There have been no changes made in that regard. The minister of defense has set the requirement that the contracts be completed (signed) by the particular officers by 31 August 1993.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How does that apply to officers who for one reason or another will not be present in their military collectives at that time?

[Fedyayev] In the case of officers who are not present until 31 August 1993 aboardship or in their military units, due to leave, official travel, hospitalization, or other valid reason, they will be granted an extension of a maximum of one month, following their return to their duty station, in which to sign their contract.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Please list the types of contracts that will be offered in accordance with Directive D-67.

[Fedyayev] Contracts to be offered officers serving a tour of duty abroad will be only of the type called for in Paragraph "a" of the first part of Article 33 of the RF Law on Military Obligation and Military Service, with the term of service specified in Article 34 or the fourth part of Article 60 (limited to a definite period of service or until the officer attains mandatory retirement age).

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] At what time does an officer start his contract service?

[Fedyayev] The date the officer signs his contract is to be considered the time he initiates his contract service. The start of contract service is to be confirmed by a personnel order issued by the particular commander (chief).

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Oleg Maksimovich, will any notations be made in the officer's service record?

[Fedyayev] Definitely. The notation will read as follows: "Contract to serve ... years signed on ... 1993." Entered on the same line as that notation will be information on the personnel order issued by the particular commander (chief), who is to confirm the starting date of the contract service.

I wish to make it clear here that commissioned personnel orders are not to be issued for warrant officers of the Army and Navy and other servicemen. The second copy of each order is to be forwarded to the RF MO Directorate of Training and Assignment of Cadre.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What is the procedure proposed in the case of officers who choose not to pursue contract service?

[Fedyayev] Officers who do not accept contract service by the end of the stated period - 30 September - set by the directive will be transferred to the territory of the Russian Federation, where a resolution will be made relative to their further military service.

In addition, officers assigned abroad in continuance of their military service will come under contract service in accordance with the requirements specified by the abovementioned directive, with these conditions in effect until they are reassigned to another duty station.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Who is granted the authority to negotiate contracts?

[Fedyayev] The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense grants such authority to commanders (chiefs) occupying the post of unit commander and higher, who are empowered to issue orders.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Oleg Maksimovich, contract negotiation is a new development, one requiring both a careful approach to dealing with people and, obviously, monitoring.

[Fedyayev] We do not intend to permit the process to go unbridled. The minister of defense has required that the commanders (chiefs) involved submit a report, by 15 October 1993, detailing their fulfillment of the directive, via the Main Directorate of Training and Assignment of Cadre, RF MO, which he has charged with the responsibility for the directive's accomplishment.

Progress, Problems of Contract Service in Transcaucasus MD

93UM0788A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Aug 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Sergey Dyshev: "Single. Moderate Drinker. Ready to Serve... Contract Recruitment Into the Army, While Resolving Some Problems. Alas, Gives Rise to New Ones"]

[Text] Oh, how they were awaited, with what enthusiasm they were greeted! At the Akhalkalaki Division in Georgia, all hopes were on them, the officers had almost fallen from fatigue, the next day sentries standing at their posts. The

army warrant officers on guard duty had not been replaced in weeks. And they didn't even ask the extended service military personnel what they would like... And here the long-awaited contract servicemen—well, finally, their own!—had arrived. And finally everyone sighed with relief.

And the result—they choked...

The fact that they bumped off a cow for "an attempt to penetrate to the post" (the sentry swore that he aimed at the tail)—this is just child's play. But then the other day the contract servicemen explained relations. Private Kuznetsov seized a grenade, jerked out the ring as an argument—and, as they say, a miracle did not happen: he killed himself and maimed two comrades who were in the room with him.

Colonel Aleksandr Petrachev, Deputy Division Commander for Personnel, who was himself involved with the recruitment of the contract servicemen, told this story while holding his head in his hands. It is a sad story, but it seemed to me that optimism still slipped into Aleksandr Nikolayevich's voice.

"We have already released 30%—during a month and a half..."

When they decided to go after contract servicemen, the opinions of the officers were divided. Some said: you will not bring anyone who will come here! Others were more optimistically inclined: it will be better with contract servicemen, they are trained specialists, they know service, work with them for a month and the manning problem will be 100% resolved.

The candidates were selected by the Moscow military organizational-mobilization directorate, Kaluga, Kursk and other oblast military commissariats. Based upon "gross numbers", the plan was obviously overfulfilled. Alas, it was impossible to look at some of the future "professionals" without a shudder. [They were] in ragged clothing, with blue-gray faces, frail. Without any medical board and with a cursory glance, one could determine that many could not be sent for military service but needed to be sent to a sanatorium with increased feeding. The psychologically abnormal and the criminal element were weeded out. Finally they recruited approximately 140 men. They had to reject two others even prior to seating them on the aircraft: they began to have epileptic fits.

Later, by the way, we learned that other military commissariat workers, with a rich imagination, while enticing them into the army, promised cinematic adventures in the spirit of the "green berets" and a monetary salary in the amount of R150,000 plus U.S. dollars...

Upon arrival, in the first days, the sifting out began. Someone had already contrived to drink up the salary received in a record short period of time, to get into debt from the local population and even to sell his uniform. In the anti-aircraft missile regiment of that same division a completely wild scene occurred. Local racketeers "surrounded" the contract servicemen. They, badly beaten up, barricaded themselves in their room with a dresser. The commanders were thrown into a panic: what-what, we won't endure that, we came to the defense of the lads. Later one of

the contract servicemen, smiling, explained: "What kind of racket is this? They owed money to the locals and they didn't want to pay it back. That's why they complained..."

From the first days, they plunged those who had arrived into "a young fighter's course". More accurately, not young. All were from 25 to 38 years old. They drove them through drill, tactics, and of course, according to the total plan: firing, regulations, special, humanitarian training. As one officer expressed it, the process of breaking and implanting military discipline occurred. They had to part with whomever it was impossible to deal with during the course of a month or so. There was no opportunity or time to educate them like ordinary soldiers. They continued to work with the others despite their failure, counting on character and bent to which one could get snagged. They were all masters of their craft: one worked as a lathe operator, one worked as an electrician, a fitter, a tractor driver, yes and for more than one year—you can't compare them with an 18-year old youth. You only had to feed them and a little human participation...

And yet a complicated contingent. In some collectives, the notorious "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts] is being noted and "authorities" are appearing who rule using their fists. In these situations, officers attempt to find the leader, and naturally they have to release the teeth breakers.

They are combating drunkenness. In my presence, Private Pankov with reckless determination (at the "request" of the regimental commander) broke a bottle of vodka on the asphalt—accompanied by the heavy sighs of his comrades. But persuasion not to drink—is more expensive than money. I wanted to photograph Pankov during this act but he proudly turned away.

During the evening I became acquainted with Private Sergey Sapunov. Catching sight of him, Regimental Officer Major Shakhnazariy noted:

"A good lad. We appointed him deputy radio platoon commander. He is an ace in his specialty."

He called to him—Sapunov walked over, introduced himself, it turned out that he was elegant and precise like cadre military. And I was not mistaken. Sapunov began to talk about himself and it turned out that at one time he was a warrant officer but got caught in an unpleasant story about an arrest at the commandant's office, was released and demoted. Later, he changed professions four times in two years, the last—a train coupler. Maximum salary—35,000 rubles. What's money for a healthy lad?.. But here they give him an apartment and he can bring his family. He said that at first, as they released him from the army, he felt like a man...

The antiaircraft missile regiment contract servicemen's dormitory is located on the second story of the barracks building. A room is assigned to four men. On Sundays, from morning they score "goals" and they play checkers while a television chatters.

"Of course, it's boring here. The women option is prohibited," one of the lads shares that with me while his comrades laugh. "Why did we come to this wilderness? There are

various reasons. Of course, we need to earn money and to see the world, yes and unemployment compels us to. There were bums here but they left... They feed us normally on the whole. Stew and groats. Well, let's furnish it a little bit. We pooled our money and bought a television, pails and brooms...

"All at their own expense," noted Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Sergeyev. "Alas, the appropriate budget items are empty. On Saturday, through their own efforts they conducted..."

A skinny, stoop-shouldered man with disheveled thinning hair interrupted the lieutenant colonel:

"I want to say something about myself, Vladimir Koshkin. May I? I am divorced and I have a ten-year old daughter. But how can you not get divorced here! They worked at the factory in Ivanovo once a week. And they did not play hooky—there wasn't any work. They did not bring in the cotton and kranty [not found]. Later my mother and father died." Koshkin's voice trembled and his eyes glistened with tears. "I went to the village and they didn't need anyone there either..."

We say on government-issued beds and each person talked about himself.

Sergey Filyushin is 23 years old and is from Kaluga Oblast. He served as a sailor on Russkiy Island. He worked as a driver at a slaughter house. He got tired of it and the salary didn't suit him. Here they promise him an apartment and his wife and two children will arrive soon.

Oleg Sobolev. He is divorced with a child and an apartment. His former wife tormented him with rebukes, she said, you get R3,000 per month—others get millions. "I get two times as much as you. In our village, women have five pairs of shoes each and they are having gold teeth put in..." In short, that family life turned out to be too much.

Yevgeniy Volovikov is 38 years old and the oldest by age. He is from Obninsk. Right now—he is a squad commander in a materiel support company. All of his subordinates are contract servicemen.

They treasure their jobs. By way of illustration, Aleksandr Volodin, to whom they wrote an order for release for drunkenness, literally with tears tried to persuade them to let him stay and to give him three days to get his life together, he vowed to quit drinking and assured them that life had reduced him to the bottle, that his former wife did not permit him to see his child. And so on, and so forth... And another three or four men are strolling through the garrison and sharing the hope that they will forgive them. Maybe they will forgive them...

No, the fathers-commanders do not have hearts of stone. And who, besides them, will understand these good-for-nothing and somewhat unlucky men? Our merciless market relations have thrown them overboard from life. From childhood they, like all of us, have become inured to some sort of housing, but the guarantees of social security, currently they have been cast to the bottom and have been deprived of everything. They are drinking from that life, the

majority of them are divorced, they are unable to support their families, they have been abandoned by their wives, they are unemployed or they earn pennies... They do not know how to rob, steal, or sell. These lads are from Kursk, Orlovskiy, Ivanovo, Tver and Kaluga.

Petrachev lamented:

Oh, we eased up on them too early. We should hold them in strict harness for another month. But we couldn't, we couldn't. We had to replace ours, they were already barely holding on, these endless guard details... But never mind, we will work better with the next recruitment of contract servicemen, there will be more time for training... By the way, the Americans, when they transitioned to a contract system, also worked out many bumps—and that was with their financing and with all social benefits. I made a special study of that issue. In their army, traumatism and crime increased at that time—they also didn't recruit the best contingent: drug addicts, the dregs of Harlem, and the unemployed... Who went into the army after the Vietnam War when its prestige had fallen? Yes, and in our country the "mister-democrats" have attempted to run down the army. As a result, we are still suffering the consequences.

We were talking about how there is no precise document or contract in our country where a soldier's duties and obligations, on the one hand, and the army's obligations to the soldier, on the other hand, are set forth. Also, military commissariats are not studying the professional and moral qualities of candidates and widespread advertising of professional service in the army is absent.

"Never mind, we will fight them some more!" Aleksandr Petrachev firmly concluded and I understood that all of his optimism had been expressed in this ambiguous sentence...

Recently, on the division's base, the group of forces commander-in-chief conducted assemblies for commanders of divisions and regiments and their deputies. This was a very serious undertaking and they spent days entire preparing for it. The primary load fell on the contract soldiers. They didn't sleep at night—some prepared the facilities, others performed duties. The assemblies were conducted in such a way that the entire division and all of the officers admitted in unison: "These young lads didn't let us down and they didn't make a mess of things". And there was both delight and touching warmth in that assessment. The division commander noted: "Of course, you can't become bored with our lads. But without them, it just wouldn't be the same."

Status of Contract Recruitment System

Mobilization Directorate Chief Interviewed

935D0511A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Aug 93 First edition p 2

[Interview with Lt. Gen. Gennadiy Bocharov, chief of the Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, by Lt. Col. Vladimir Matyash: "Contract Recruiting Will Be Continued"]

Recently the editor's office has been a lot of letters and telephone calls on this one question: Why have the military

commissariats and military units stopped contract recruitment for military service? KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has repeatedly raised the problem of the incomplete manning of units and subunits with specialists but here they refuse to accept....

Our correspondent met with Lt. Gen. Gennadiy Bocharov, chief of the Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and asked him to analyze the present situation and to tell our readers about the initial experience and results of the work under this method of bringing the army and navy up to strength.

[Bocharov] I will say at the very beginning that contract recruitment has not been stopped but only suspended. This "respite" is easily explainable: the gradual transition to a mixed method of bringing the forces up to strength was planned in three phases. In the first phase (1992-1993), it was anticipated that 100,000 people would be accepted for military service under contract. It was calculated that this would require 6 billion rubles [R]. This is precisely the sum that was allocated. The forecast turned out to be accurate: we appropriated the money and hired 100,000 volunteers for military service. Another 10,000 discharged soldiers and sergeants from the Western Group of Forces also signed contracts.

The second phase is intended to extend through the end of 1995. It is planned that by this time the armed forces will have 30 percent of the servicemen under contract and by the year 2000 they will account for half of the personnel of the army and navy. So there will be a place for professionals on the line. But for the time being we are forced to suspend recruitment. There is no funding for this purpose, although the problem of a shortage of personnel in the forces remains very acute today. One must also consider the fact that the last two-year and first 18-month draft calls will be discharged this fall. Considering the difficulties with induction, it is not hard to imagine the kind of situation that can arise in a short time. For this reason, the General Staff has developed and sent well-founded proposals to the government on supplemental appropriations for the recruitment of 50,000 volunteers, which will require R12 billion. The decision has not yet been made.

[Matyash] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, the eight months since the beginning of contract recruiting is not a long time and apparently it is not yet time for an in-depth analysis and assessment. But we have gained some experience in something that is new to us. What branches of the armed forces and combat arms were most popular and hence more fully manned? Probably the assault forces. Three out of four authors of letters to the editor's office are asking for help to come serve in the airborne troops by contract.

[Bocharov] Indeed, there are more than enough people who want to serve in the airborne troops. But by no means all of them meet the rigid selection requirements for the airborne troops. And this is one of the reasons why the airborne forces in 1993 accepted just 60 percent of the volunteers set by quota. But the navy took 142 percent, the air force 169 percent, the ground forces 75 percent, and the missile forces 156 percent. Now I will mention the preferred places of service under contract. The Northern Fleet fulfilled 205

percent of its initial quota for contract recruitment, the Far East Military District reached 153 percent, the Caspian Flotilla 190 percent, and the Siberian Military District exceeded 100 percent. But the figures by themselves are not an indicator of the qualitative situation.

To understand why the figures vary so much, it is necessary to remember the dynamics of the development of contract recruitment. For life has made its corrections. At first it was determined that specific units of the branches and arms of the armed forces will be manned by volunteers. And it was proposed that they take primarily specialists with basic combat specialties. It was planned to accomplish the financing purposefully, so that they could equip and train the volunteers within two or three years and establish a developed social infrastructure. It seemed that they took everything into account but...there were very few who wanted to come to these units determined from above. To be honest, no one had expected this.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense made a decision on the expansion of the list of units that may accept volunteers for contract service and then remove all of the restrictions—let all of the vacancies be filled. In so doing, of course, it was necessary to observe the top priority of recruiting the specialists who determine combat readiness.

Even after this, however, contract recruitment proceeded sluggishly. And only an increase in the monetary remuneration stimulated an influx of volunteers. This is when the commanders got in a hurry about recruiting the necessary number of people. They went after quantity and the quality of the professional selection frequently suffered on account of this. There is no use denying it, quite a few random people ended up on the military ranks. Almost 3,500 people have already broken their contracts. I must say, however, that most of the people who came were competent specialists, people interested in their work, and dependable soldiers, sergeants, seamen, and petty officers.

[Matyash] But what is today's volunteer like? How about his age and social and family situation? What kind of education...

[Bochayev] The largest number of volunteers—85 percent—are men and women up to 30 years of age. One-fourth are 25 years old and under, 15 percent are 20 years old or less, and an equal percentage of the men and women are 30 and over, whereas 10 percent are at least 40. Unfortunately only 8 percent have a higher education, 30 percent have a secondary special education, and 56 percent have a secondary education.

The forecast of sociologists that unemployment will force young people to sign a contract for military service is not coming true. Only 7 percent are persons recently unemployed, whereas 40 percent of the total number of volunteers came from industry and transport.

As for their family status, I will note that 60 percent are married. Very many of them have no housing and there is no escaping this problem.

Thus, as of today we have a contingent that does not meet all of the requirements. And we were not able to recruit volunteers for the "combat" specialties.

[Matyash] But before undertaking this work, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff studied the problem and made their calculations and forecasts....

[Bochayev] Nevertheless, we were unable to avoid mistakes, although it must be said that we did gain experience. In analyzing and assessing the work, it is necessary to take into consideration several important circumstances. In the first place, we began practical work on contract recruiting on wheels, in a manner of speaking, immediately after the government made the decision. The Americans, for example, prepared for four years. In the second place, we did not have and even today do not have a legislative basis; the recruitment is being accomplished on the basis of a temporary statute (this statute will be published in one of the very next issues of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA—the editor). Thirdly, enormous difficulties arise because of the absence of a social infrastructure. Fourthly, there is the lack of practical experience in the organization and implementation of the vertical work from the General Staff to the unit commander. These reasons, along with the haste on account of the low level of manning of the units, had a negative effect in the first phase.

[Matyash] I would like to know what measures are being taken to avoid vexatious blunders and mistakes in the future.

[Bochayev] The military leadership will perform a full and detailed analysis of the work that has been done shortly after we receive all of the necessary data for this from the units, combined units, districts, and fleets. But even now it is already possible to state with certainty that new approaches are needed in the organization of professional selection. A differentiated approach is also needed in the remuneration of the labor of professional military people. After all, it is one thing to serve as chief of a depot and quite another thing to experience on a continuing basis the very great physical and psychological stress of training and combat life at the test ranges and tank training areas, in field campaigns, and on alert duty. So we will establish a gradation in the remuneration of the labor of soldiers.

Professional selection will become more thorough and rigid. Representatives of the units will go out to the military commissariats to get to know candidates before signing a contract. All of the military commissariats have the necessary advertising material, documents, and information on the existence of vacant positions in specific units. I would like to put in a good word about the leaders of the local administrations and authorities of Leningrad, Tomsk, and Samara oblasts who made a great effort to ensure the performance of a task of importance to the state. Yes, everywhere we sense understanding and support.

It is also gratifying that patriotism and the willingness to serve the Fatherland in the military have not died out in the people, especially among young people.

Today there are already more people wanting to sign a contract for military service than we can accept. But we should not be seduced by this fact. We need to be more concerned about the establishment of a material, social, and housing base for present and future professionals.

And there is still one other thing that I would like to say: some people, including some of draft age, mistakenly think that contract recruitment automatically frees them of their constitutional duty of military service. This is not so. There are a number of reasons why our state cannot provide the armed forces exclusively with volunteers. The optimum ratio of volunteers to draftees—50 to 50—must ensure not only a dependable armed defense of the Russian state but also the continuity of the traditions of the army, navy, and nation.

Problems with System Seen

935D0511B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Aug 93 First edition p 1

[Article by Oleg Falichev: "Contract Service: the Troops Get Not Only Professionals but Also Problems"]

[Text] At the beginning of this year, scarcely anyone in the troops and fleets knew what contract service is. And it is not surprising: the formation of the legislative basis for defense questions literally took place as we watched. A whole package of military laws was worked out and passed in a short time. They include the Law of the Russian Federation "On the Military Service Obligation and Military Service," legal acts, and statutes regulating the procedures for the making of contracts for military service. What evoked them and what as of today have been the first results of their operation been?

In the time that has passed since January 1992 (the beginning of contract recruitment in the army and navy), more than 100,000 service personnel have been recruited. That is an impressive figure that largely speaks for itself: mostly the army and navy received worthy replacements. Nor is there any reason for the military personnel signing contracts to worry. The state gives them the possibility of serving in the occupation of their choice and grants them significant privileges. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has enumerated them all in detail in the pages of advertising on the branches of the armed services of the Russian Federation. I will merely say that with the accelerating unemployment in Russia the contract service personnel are guaranteed a source of income that exceeds the wages of most specialists in the national economy and in the budget sphere.

The contract made it possible to determine precisely not only the social but also the service base—rights and guarantees of the serviceman in all areas of his work. This gave security about tomorrow and about the fact that the law protects you in any situation and will not leave you in a predicament. Clearly, precisely this explains the substantial number of contract personnel wanting to serve in "hot spots."

It is easy to name many other examples where the contract has worked wonderfully. Still, after the spring call-up, the armed forces were only 51 percent manned with soldiers and sergeants. What is the problem?

As has already been noted more than once, the law on the military service obligation and military service allows a significant number of conscripts to "shirk" their military obligation. As for the contract, it does not solve all the

problems. Lt. Gen. V. Bondartsev, first deputy chief of the Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, spoke about this in summarizing the results of the spring call-up. It was noted at a press conference, in particular, that contract service is in the initial phase and in the next two or three years will not have a substantial impact on raising the strength level of troops and naval forces.

So far, unfortunately, we have not been successful in stopping the outflow of young officers from the armed forces. Whereas in 1992 35,000 people up to 30 years of age were discharged, this year it was already 16,000 as of 1 May. And, as Col. Gen. Ye. Vysodkiy, chief of the Main Directorate for the Training and Distribution of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation noted, people are leaving not only "out-of-the-way places" but also garrisons and large cities with all the amenities. So it appears that representatives of all branches of authority in our state must give considerable thought to these figures and the basic reasons behind them. After all, young officers are not only the "gold mine" of the army, as people use to like to say, but also its future. It is not tanks and missiles but people who constitute the basis of the army. The officers themselves say the following. According to the latest survey carried out in the forces by the Center for Military-Social, Psychological, and Legal Studies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, two-thirds of the respondents said unequivocally that their rights, liberties, and privileges are still being violated to some degree or other despite the passed Law of the Russian Federation "On the Status of Service Personnel."

Still, I am certain that the importance and authority of service under contract will continue to grow. Today on page three, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is publishing the "temporary statute" on the procedures for the making of contracts and the discharge of service personnel from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. We hope that this document will be useful to all those having to do with contract service in the Armed Forces of Russia.

Order by Defense Minister

935D0511C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Aug 93 First edition p 1

[Text of defense minister order]

[Text]

ORDER No 404 of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Moscow, 13 August 1993 On the Procedures for the Making of Contracts and the Discharge of Service Personnel from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

On the basis of Point 6 of the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation No 4983-1 from 19 May 1993 "On Some Measures Having to Do with the Implementation of the Law of the Russian Federation 'On the Military Service Obligation and Military Service'" and prior to its confirmation in the established manner and the putting into effect of the statute on the procedures for the performance of military service, I order:

1. the deputies of the minister of defense of the Russian Federation, commanders in chief of the branches of service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, commanders of the troops of the districts, groups of forces, fleets, armies and flotillas, commanders (chiefs) of the components of the service branches, chiefs of the main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, commanders of combined units and military units, heads of institutions, military training institutions, enterprises, and organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and military commissars to make contracts with subordinate officers, warrant officers, naval warrant officers, and cadets in the manner and time specified by the Temporary Statute on the Procedures for the Making of Contracts and the Discharge of Service Personnel from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Appendix No 1 of the present order);

2. the control of the implementation of the present order to be entrusted to the Main Directorate for the Training and Distribution of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation;

3. the directives under Appendix 2 of the present order to be considered null and void;

4. the distribution of the order down to the individual companies.

[Signed] Gen. Army P. Grachev, Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

List of directives losing force in connection with the issue of Order No 404 for 1993 of the minister of defense of the Russian Federation:

1. Directive No D-30 for 1993 of the minister of defense of the Russian Federation.

2. Directive No D-52 for 1993 of the minister of defense of the Russian Federation.

3. Directive No DZ-31 for 1993 of the deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation.

4. Directive No 173/1/736 from 27 May 1993 of the deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation.

Text of Temporary Statute

935D0511D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Aug 93 First edition p 3

[Text of temporary statute]

[Text]

Temporary Statute on the Procedures for the Making of Contracts and the Discharge of Service Personnel From the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

I. General Provisions

1. The present Temporary Statute (hereinafter—Statute) specifies the procedures and times for the making of contracts with officers, warrant officers, naval warrant officers, cadets, and citizens in the reserves who enter into military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for military positions for which the table of organization provides that

they have the military ranks of officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers (further, citizens in the reserves) and the discharge of service personnel from military service.

2. Officers, warrant officers, naval warrant officers, cadets, and citizens in the reserves enter into military service by contract on a voluntary basis.

3. The contract on the performance of military service may rightfully be made by:

a) officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers who are performing military service in the military positions that they hold:

who have not reached the maximum age for continuation in military service stipulated in part three of Article 48 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On the Military Service Obligation and Military Service" (hereinafter—law);

who have reached the maximum age for continuation in military service and possess rare military-accounting specialties, including those who have university degrees and titles and whose military service was extended for a period of up to one year by the minister of defense of the Russian Federation on the basis of Decree No 4983-1 of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation from 19 May 1993. The decisions on the extension of military service for officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers are made with their consent on the basis of the conclusions of certification boards (including the Central Certification Board with respect to higher officers) and academic councils of military-educational institutions and research organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation at the petition of the corresponding commanders (chiefs).

The documents (personnel lists) for the extension of military service for these service personnel are presented in the established manner to the Main Directorate for the Training and Distribution of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation no later than three months prior to their reaching the maximum age for continuation in military service;

b) officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers at the disposition of the corresponding commanders (chiefs)—only if they are appointed to specific military positions;

c) citizens in the reserves—in accordance with Article 30 of the Law;

d) cadets who have not performed military service and also those who have performed military service after being called up and who entered military-educational institutions—in accordance with part two of Article 31 of the Law;

e) service personnel performing military service under contract—upon entering military-educational institutions.

4. Contracts for the performance of military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will not be made with service personnel who entered military-educational institutions of the Russian Federation prior to 1992 and

who expressed the desire and have a basis for the performance of military service in the armed forces of other sovereign states that are former republics of the USSR.

5. Those entering military service under contract are subject to medical examination: officers, warrant officers, naval warrant officers, and cadets—on the basis of an annual in-depth medical examination, whereby if necessary they will be directed to military medical boards; citizens in the reserves—by military medical boards under the military commissariats of the republics in the Russian Federation, autonomous oblast, autonomous districts, krais, oblasts, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg (hereinafter—republic, kray, and oblast military commissariats).

II. Procedures for the Making of Contracts

6. Contracts with officers, warrant officers, naval warrant officers, cadets, and also some categories of citizens who are not performing military service and enter military-educational institutions are made for the following periods:

a) with officers performing military service in the positions that they hold and having the military rank of colonel (captain first rank) or higher officer and with officers holding military positions for which the table of organization provides for the military ranks of colonel (captain first rank) or higher officer—until 31 August 1993;

b) with officers other than those indicated in subpoint "a" of the present article—until 31 December 1994;

c) with the officers indicated in subpoint "a" of the present article who are on leave or temporary duty assignments, at medical institutes for treatment, or absent from their military units¹ for other valid reasons—no later than one month from the date of their return to the place of their permanent service;

d) with officers having the military rank of colonel (captain first rank) or higher officer who are at the disposition of the corresponding commanders (chiefs) in connection with organizational-personnel measures—in the course of six months—and, for those made available for other reasons—in the course of three months from the day following the date when they are freed from their position;

e) with warrant officers and naval warrant officers—until the end of the period of their obligation but no later than 31 December 1994;

f) with officers and other service personnel performing military service under contract who entered military-educational institutions, a contract (new contract) is made after the issue of the order on their registration at the military-educational institution and prior to the start of their studies;

g) with service personnel who have performed military service under conscription immediately before registration for the first courses of military-educational institutions—after the conclusion of the first course of study;

h) with cadets who have not performed military service before registration for the first course of military-educational institutions—after the conclusion of the first course of study, if they have reached the age of 18;

i) with citizens in the reserves and entering military-educational institutions—after the board of admissions makes the decision on their admission to study and before the order is issued on their registration at the military-educational institution;

j) with citizens undergoing training at educational institutions for higher professional training and entering military-educational institutions as students after the conclusion of the third-fourth course—after the board of admissions makes the decision on their admission to study and before the order is issued on their registration at the military-educational institution.

7. Persons expressing a desire to enter into military service under contract give: service personnel—a formal request through the normal chain of command; citizens in the reserves—an application to the rayon (city) military commissariat. The application may indicate the military-accounting specialty under which they would like to perform military service and the branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (service component).

8. Citizens in the reserves are accepted for military service under contract only if the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have specific vacant positions in accordance with the profile of their training and military-accounting specialty.

9. Upon receipt of applications from citizens in the reserves, the rayon (city) military commissars:

a) study the possibility of satisfying the applications on the basis of existing requests by commanders of military units and, in the absence of requests, send a list of the citizens in the reserves to republic, kray, or oblast military commissariats in subordination;

b) if the corresponding vacant positions exist, they direct the citizens in the reserves to undergo a medical examination;

c) for soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers in the reserves entering military service under contract for military positions for which the table of organization provides for the ranks of warrant officer and naval warrant officer, they draw up personal files which must include the following documents: statement of the desire to enter military service under contract; service record; autobiography written by the applicant himself; copy of the document on education; copy of the birth certificate; information on the family status and place of residence issued in the established manner; information from the military medical board on suitability with respect to health for military service in the corresponding branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (service component); clearance for persons designated for military positions having to do with secret and top-secret work;

d) send the personal files for citizens in the reserves to republic, kray, and oblast military commissariats and, for citizens joining military units located near their place of residence (within the borders of the republic, kray, or oblast), to the commanders of these military units.

10. Republic, kray, and oblast commissars:

a) organize medical examinations of citizens in the reserves on the basis of directions from rayon (city) military commissars;

b) study the possibility of satisfying the applications of citizens in the reserves on the basis of existing requests and lists received from rayon (city) military commissariats. In the absence of such requests, they send the lists of citizens in the reserves to the personnel agencies of military districts, fleets, and branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

c) in the event of the existence of the corresponding vacant military positions, they issue instructions to the rayon (city) military commissars on the drawing up of documents;

d) determine the conformity of citizens in the reserves to the set requirements for specific military-accounting specialties in accordance with the documents of the personal file and, if necessary, call the citizens in the reserves to the military commissariat;

e) send the personal files of citizens, about whom decisions have been made on the possibility of their performing military service under contract, to the commanders of military units.

11. Conclusions on the absence of the corresponding vacant military positions are provided by the following personnel agencies:

with respect to military positions for which the table of organization provides for the military ranks of officers—by the Main Directorate for the Training and Distribution of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation;

with respect to military positions for which the table of organization provides for the military ranks of warrant officers (naval warrant officers)—by the directorates for the training and distribution of personnel of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

12. The commander of the military unit:

a) presents in the chain of command requests through the corresponding personnel agencies, which subsequently send them to the military commissariats for the selection of citizens in the reserves for military service under contract. The requests indicate the point of deployment of the military unit, the military positions and military ranks foreseen for them in the table of organization, the military-accounting specialties for which it is necessary to select citizens in the reserves for military service under contract, and the pay for the military position and necessity of drawing up a clearance for it;

b) organizes the work of the certification board for the review of the incoming personal files of citizens in the reserves;

c) reviews the conclusions of the certification board on the advisability of accepting citizens in the reserves for military service under contract or on the refusal to accept them with a justification of the reasons for that refusal;

d) sends to the rayon (city) military commissariats summons for citizens in the reserves with respect to whom decisions have been made on the possibility of their entering into military service under contract;

e) sends to the rayon (city) military commissariats documents for citizens in the reserves who were refused admission to military service under contract, with an indication of the reasons for the refusal;

13. On the basis of summons received from the military units, the rayon (city) military commissars direct citizens in the reserves to the military units for the making of contracts. The commander of the military unit makes contracts with the arriving citizens on the performance of military service and persons with whom a contract on the performance of military service has not been made are sent back to the corresponding rayon (city) military commissariats and return to them their personal files with the indication of the reasons for refusal.

14. Persons in the reserves who are directed to the military units for the making of contracts are provided in the established manner with military transportation documents (money) from the means of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and, in the event that they do not enter into military service, for the way back but not more than once.

For the time of their travel, they are issued money for food and transportation in accordance with the established norms.

15. The contract for the performance of military service is made in written form between the officer, warrant officer, naval warrant officer, cadet, or citizen in the reserves and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in accordance with the sample contract forms shown in Appendix No 1 to the present Statute.

16. The right to make contracts on behalf of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is granted:

a) with the deputies and assistants of the minister of defense of the Russian Federation, the commanders in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States—to the minister of defense of the Russian Federation;

b) with the commanders in chief of the branches of Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the chiefs of the main and central directorates (directorates) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the chiefs of other bodies of military administration directly subordinate to the minister of defense of the Russian Federation or removed from central administrative bodies of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and the commander of the joint

Russian-Turkmen command—to Col. Gen. V.I. Mironov, deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation;

c) with service personnel undergoing training at military-educational institutions in the positions of cadets, students, post graduate students, and doctoral candidates—to the chiefs of these military-educational institutions;

d) with the remaining officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers performing military service in the positions that they hold—to the commanders (chiefs) from the commander of the military unit and higher, who has a right to issue orders on personnel (on the line unit);

e) with citizens in the reserves entering into military service under contract in positions for which the table of organization foresees military ranks:

from lieutenant colonel (captain first rank) and higher—to the deputies of the minister of defense of the Russian Federation, commanders in chief of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, chief of Rear Services of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, chief of construction and billeting of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, commanders (chiefs) of the branches of service, and chiefs of the main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation;

to the rank of major inclusively—to the commanders (chiefs) with the right to appoint service personnel to military positions in accordance with Article 42 of the Law;

f) with officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in military service in the Armed Forces of Turkmenistan as part of the joint Russian-Turkmen command—to the command of this joint command.

17. Officers performing military service make the contract foreseen by point "a" of the first part of Article 33 of the Law (contract on the performance of military service in the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation).

Citizens in the reserves (entering into military service under contract) and also warrant officers and naval warrant officers performing military service make one of the forms of contracts foreseen by Article 33 of the Law.

18. Contracts for the performance of military service are made for the terms foreseen by Article 34 of the Law or part four of Article 60 of the Law.

Officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers who have reached the maximum age for continuation in military service and whose term of service has been extended for one year make a contract within the limits of the period of extension of service. In so doing, the date of the end of the effect of the contract must coincide with the date indicated in the decision of the minister of defense of the Russian Federation on the extension of military service by him. The time of the termination of military service under such a contract must not exceed:

the age of 50 for ranks up to lieutenant colonel (captain second rank);

the age of 55 for a colonel (captain first rank);

the age of 60 for a higher officer.

19. The beginning of the military service under contract by officers, warrant officers, naval warrant officers, and cadets is considered to be the date of the making of the contract confirmed by the orders on personnel of the commander of the military unit.

20. The beginning of the military service under contract by officers, warrant officers, naval warrant officers, and cadets is made official by the orders on personnel of the corresponding commanders of military units (regiments and ships first rank) and those equal to them and higher, regardless of the nomenclature of the positions for appointment, in accordance with models one through 6 shown in Appendix No 2 to the present Statute.

21. The beginning of the military service under contract of officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers in military service in the Armed Forces of Turkmenistan as part of the joint Russian-Turkmen command is made official by the orders on personnel of the commander of this joint command.

22. The entrance of citizens in the reserves into military service under contract and also the making of contracts by available officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers and their appointment to military positions are made official by the orders on personnel of the commanders (chiefs) who, in accordance with Article 42 of the Law, have the right to appoint them to the corresponding military positions in accordance with models No 7-10 of Appendix No 2 to the present Statute.

23. In the record documents of the officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers, a notation with the following content is made on their performance of military service by contract: "A contract for years was made 199" or "A contract until the reaching of the maximum age for military service was made 199."

After the notation is made in the record document of the officer, warrant officer, or naval warrant officer, mention is made of the number and date of the order on personnel that made official the beginning of military service under contract.

24. Orders on personnel for officers are issued separately from the orders for warrant officers and naval warrant officers with their own numbering.

The storage of the first copies of orders on personnel and the sending of subsequent copies of these orders and extracts from them is accomplished in accordance with articles 110-113 of the regulations for the registration of personnel.² In addition, extracts from the orders for citizens entering military service from the reserves are sent to the military commissariats at the place of their military registration.

III. Discharge from Military Service

25. The discharge of officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers to the reserves is accomplished on the following bases:

a) upon reaching the maximum age for military service (part three of Article 48 of the Law)—[discharge] of those reaching the maximum age for military service;

b) the state of health (part four of Article 49 of the Law)—on the basis of the conclusion of the military medical board finding them less than fully suitable for military service, at their own wish;

c) in connection with organizational-personnel measures (point "a" of part two of Article 49 of the Law:

in the event of the impossibility of utilizing officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers (including with their consent—in lower positions) at the disposition of the corresponding commanders (chiefs) in military service in connection with organizational-personnel measures (in the absence of other bases for discharge);

officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers who have requested that they be allowed to continue military service under contract but with whom the command did not make a contract for the performance of military service on the basis of decisions of certification boards in accordance with the results of competition selection and who could not be accepted for military service in other military units prior to the expiration of the terms for the making of contracts set by the present Statute;

officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers in other military positions in the event that the military medical boards find them to be suitable for military service or suitable for military service with insignificant restrictions but not suitable for flying work, for service afloat, in airborne assault forces, in special structures, or in work with radioactive substances, sources of ionized radiation and electromagnetic fields, and components of rocket fuel;

d) at their own wish (point three of Article 57 of the Law)—officers who have not made contracts for the performance of military service and who have requested that they be discharged from military service, whose total length of military service in military positions for which the table of organization foresees the military rank of an officer amounts to no less than five years after the conclusion of an educational installation for professional training;

e) for family circumstances (in connection with the birth of a child)—women service personnel at their own wish on the basis of a written request in the event of the impossibility of the performance of their duties in the military positions that they hold;

f) in connection with the failure to make a contract (point five of Article 60 of the Law):

officers who have not made contracts for the performance of military service and who request discharge from military service, whose total length of service in military positions for which the table of organization foresees the rank of an officer amounts to no less than five years after conclusion of an educational installation for professional training.

The above-indicated officers are discharged only after individual explanatory work with them without positive results and examination of their requests by certification boards of military units.

The requests must indicate that they do not want to make contracts for the performance of military service.

When the commander of a military unit makes a decision on the discharge of an officer, the date when the officer submitted the request is considered to be the date of the expiration of the term of the contract.

Warrant officers and naval warrant officers are discharged in the same manner (on written request). In so doing, the day of termination of their military service must be no later than the day of the expiration of the effective period of the obligation;

officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers who did not submit a request for the performance of military service under contract or for their discharge from military service after expiration of the term of the contracts set by the present Statute (in the absence of other bases for discharge). In this case, the day of the termination of military service of warrant officers and naval warrant officers must be no later than the day of the expiration of the effective period of their obligations.

26. Officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers performing military service under contract, whose reasons for early discharge to the reserves are not defined in Article 25 of the present Statute, are discharged from military service for the reasons foreseen in Article 49 of the Law. In so doing, they are discharged:

for nonperformance of the conditions of the contract (point "b" of part two of Article 49 of the Law)—for their nonperformance of the conditions of the contract, including in the event of the submission of a request for early discharge from military service;

for the commission of an offense that does damage to the honor of the serviceman (point "c" of part two of Article 49 of the Law)—persons committing offenses damaging the honor of a serviceman, on the basis of the conclusions of certification boards of military units after confirmation by the commander of the military unit.

Warrant officers and naval warrant officers whose term of obligation ends prior to the expiration of the period for the making of contracts established by the present Statute or within three months after the expiration of this period are discharged from military service after serving the set period of active military service, if they do not declare a desire to make a contract for the performance of military service.

27. Officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers are retired from military service:

a) upon reaching the maximum age for military service (part five of Article 48 of the Law)—upon reaching the maximum age for remaining in the reserves at the moment of discharge from military service;

b) for reasons of health (part five of Article 48 of the Law and point "a" of part one of Article 49 of the Law)—those found unfit for military service by the military medical board.

28. Officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers are discharged by orders of commanders (chiefs) who have been granted the right to discharge from military service on the basis of part two of Article 48 of the Law.

29. The recommendations for officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers subject to discharge from military service are sent to the corresponding personnel agencies.

The recommendations on officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers subject to discharge from military service in connection with organizational-personnel measures indicate the number and date of issue of the order (directive) on the basis of which the organizational-personnel measures are being taken, and also a notation is made to the effect that it is not possible to place these officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers in positions corresponding to their training profile.

30. When officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation who are in military service in the Armed Forces of Turkmenistan as part of the joint Russian-Turkmen command are discharged to the territory of the Russian Federation from military service, they are not transferred elsewhere but are discharged directly from the military units located in the territory of Turkmenistan.

31. Officers performing military service under contract who are graduates of military educational institutions and who fail to arrive at the place of their military service within the time indicated in the assignment order without valid reasons, and who in connection with this are not appointed to military positions, are brought to account in accordance with prevailing legislation. In this case, no monetary payments are made to these persons.

[Signed] Col. Gen. V. Mironov, deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation

Appendix No 1 to Article 15 of the Statute Exemplary Form of Contract No 1

CONTRACT on the Performance of Military Service

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the person of commandner (position, code name of military unit, military rank, family name, first name, and patronymic of commandner) and (position, military rank, family name, first name, and patronymic of serviceman) have concluded the present contract on the following:

1. The serviceman (family name and initials), being familiar with the laws of the Russian Federation and other enforceable acts regulating the performance of military service, voluntarily commits himself:

a) to serve under contract (type of contract) for a term (term of the contract) under the conditions set forth in the prevailing legislation on the procedures for the performance of military service;

b) to carry out the requirements of his military oath honestly and conscientiously during the period of performance of military service under contract.

2. The commander of the military unit (code name of military unit) accepts the serviceman (family name and initials) for military service under contract and on behalf of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation guarantees with respect to him the observance of the rights and realization of the

privileges and advantages set forth by the prevailing legislation for service personnel performing military service under contract.

3. The contract was concluded 1993 and went into effect from the day of its signing on the basis of the order of the commander of (code name of the military unit) from 1993, No (number of the order).

4. The contract with the serviceman (family name and initials) may be cancelled if he is subject to early discharge from military service in accordance with Article 49 of the Law "On the Military Service Obligation and Military Service."

5. The present contract was drawn up in two copies, one of which was attached to the first copy of the personal file and the second was issued to the serviceman

6. Additions conditions of the contract:

7. The conditions of the present contract may be amended in written form with the consent of the parties

Serviceman (military rank, personal signature, family name and initials of the serviceman)

Commander (position, name of the military unit, military rank, personal signature, family name and initials of the commander).

Reasons for the early cancellation of the contract: (filled out in the event of the early cancellation of the contract)

Serviceman (military rank, personal signature, family name and initials of the serviceman)

Commander (position, name of the military unit, military rank, personal signature, family name and initials of the commander)

Notes:

1. Signatures are authenticated by the stamped seal of the military unit.

2. In the event of the early discharge of the serviceman for the reasons foreseen by points "c" and "d" of part one and points "b" and "d" of part two of Article 49 of the Law, the sanctions set forth by the statute on the material responsibility of service personnel are applied.

3. Point 6 of the contract is filled out in the event that the parties accept additional obligations while observing prevailing legislation.

Footnotes

1. In the present Statute, military units are also understood to be installations, military educational institutions, enterprises, and organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

2. Put into effect by order of the minister of defense in 1982.

UKRAINE

Ukraine's Role in Local Wars, Nuclear Status Addressed

93UM0775A Kiev *VECHERNIY KIYEV* in Russian
14 Jul 93 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Novikov: "Are We Prepared for Local Wars?"]

[Text] The summer training period in the army and navy has begun. What will the assessments and reports be like? Have the commanders done everything to ensure that the troops are truly taught what is necessary for victory in battle?

The breath of the Cold War has finally sunk into oblivion and will not, possibly, return. The two awesome military-political blocs have ceased to intimidate people. Ours has died, the other is in "resurrection" and pursuing a new policy—peacemaking.

The former Soviet republics and states of the "socialist camp" have come to take a different view of the West and the East, revising their military doctrines. But, unfortunately, not everything is being done in the world as we would like.

The nuclear states are not disarming, no one has left NATO and we are not being summoned there as yet.

So what will happen to Ukraine, whose politicians and statesmen are advocating a nuclear-free status? Under whose reliable missile-defense umbrella should we go? And, generally, why should we rely on anyone and go into bondage voluntarily? Has history, from the times of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Muravyev's with their present-day followers from Moscow and Crimea taught us nothing?

It is well known that the army and navy should be outside of politics. At the same time, however, the army is the political mechanism of the state. And its commander in chief is none other than the president of Ukraine. Proceeding from this, we servicemen also should understand what forces from other states could encroach on our land and will.

In addition, we need, in my view, to remember that our "elder brother"—Russia—is gradually reinforcing its eastern border with Ukraine, deploying there many military units which have returned home from "flash points" or elsewhere, and that we have just one combined unit there.

Account needs to be taken of the number of nuclear states which are and could be in proximity to Ukraine. There are also other manifestations of the "intractability" of our state leaders which are constantly troubling those who have become accustomed to regarding us as bees and who have themselves, after all, the whole time been in the position of drones. The opinions concerning the removal of all barriers in the way of the peaceful building of our democratic state could in my view, therefore, be somewhat rash. The signing of the START I agreement included. We need first, as the Ukrainian Justice Party, for example, believes, to "privatize" the nuclear shield, then decide its fate.

I would in this connection raise the question of the need to train the army for a possible clash with a powerful aggressor without the use of nuclear weapons. We will, possibly, not have such soon.

We have all already witnessed local wars and conflicts. But are we preparing for them? In order to ascertain this I called in on my former air assault unit, which has become air-mobile and even stronger, and made the acquaintance of many new airborne assault troopers, who have a great desire to serve the people of Ukraine. One such—Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Chenskiy—deputy commander of the unit, is chief of the air assault service.

He was exasperated that in the winter training period they had not in practice completed their program in the air. There is no fuel, and the helicopters are grounded, and for a parachute jump, the officer confessed, we pay a soldier 3 karbovantsy, and in Russia he is paid R1,500.

There was reason also for officers of the sociopsychological service, who have for almost a year been without a table of organization and equipment and who have thus remained without the corresponding benefits, to be depressed. And this all in one way or another runs counter to an increase in combat morale. Particularly when you know that almost 30 experienced officers have expressed a wish to be discharged from the armed forces.

"What are we to do," one of them confessed, "when last year we did not obtain a single apartment. One of us went off to be a metalworker...."

Where does a unit's fighting capability begin?

With the officers and their desire to selflessly discharge their duties. When concern is displayed for him, he also does everything according to the dictates of his conscience. Like everyone else, the military man has his private life, children, wife, and parents. And it is for them primarily that the officer should display concern in our difficult times. And have, in addition, accommodations, food, and clothing. Only when he is convinced that the state has an interest in him also does the officer give it everything—even his life.

But we are not as yet seeing a state approach to a solution of the problems of people of the state. Here is an example. The airborne assault trooper and pilot get kopeks for the risks they take. Can we in this case rely on our mobile forces, such as the air assault forces formerly were? A trend toward applying to the Defense Ministry of Russia for a return to their troops is already forming among certain officers. An officer who is discharged into the reserve there, for example, receives 20 months' pay. With us, five. They provide money for leave even for the family. Here, no.

But if at a difficult time for Ukraine the majority of officers and soldiers would cast aside their grievances and defend its land, would there be sufficient forces? It is a big territory, and reinforcement is needed, and time and an ability to command troops and reservists will be needed for this. We do not have that many of such experienced military men. Among the reservists either. The latter could be trained with the resources of the former military schools, incidentally.

But our reformers have been in a hurry to hand these over to the administration of career officers, some civilian organizations and so forth.

If, however, we recall the unsuccessful Soviet-Finnish war and the Afghan war, we can see the desire of our generals to tackle big problems with small forces. This led to the prolongation of combat operations. The same mistake, incidentally, is being made with our "blue berets." Instead of forcing the warring parties to reach mutual understanding with the use under the UN roof or independently of all forces at our command as quickly as possible, we are proving the undoing of our own people. To no avail, in the majority of cases.

The same fate awaits us unless we teach the troops what they need to be taught in these "nonstandard" wars. Because they, as history attests, frequently grow into wars of a world level.

We could and should here, I believe, read again the memoirs of Guderian, the "tsar" of tanks of World War II. He writes in the book *Tanks—Forward!* for example, about T-34 tank drivers, who could be expected from any side because they had not mastered... tactics. And this was important. For the Germans fought according to science. And local wars are more often than not fought not according to science.

So in creating our own armed forces we should display concern in good time to ensure that they conform to the organizational structure, armament, mobilization and command and control mechanism, with the corresponding technical support. And commanders of all levels should know all this and be thoroughly prepared for combat operations under all conditions. We would recall Vietnam, which did not take fright at the formidable aggression on the part of China in the spring of 1979 and knew how to resist and conquer even. And all this thanks to the fact that it preserved the experience of the struggle against the United States.

We, however, in our training do not always, for some reason or other, address such experience. This cannot be said, for example, about Russia, where practically all deputy defense minister-generals have combat experience. Specially at this difficult time, when the flame of local wars has appeared in the former Soviet republics. There are no borders and laws for them, after all. This needs to be remembered, in my view, therefore, when planning exercises in the field or in the air. And this is why: There will frequently be no front line, and armed people will frequently be together with civilians and even close to the military. For this reason aviation will have to "work" from disadvantageous altitudes and directions. Even a Baltic republic, where a former U.S. colonel with experience of combat in the Korean and Vietnam wars is responsible for defense, is displaying concern for this.

And we may once again recall Afghanistan, into which we poked our noses with soldiers who were physically inadequate and unruffled motorized divisions. And take the "guerrillas" whom the military recruitment offices took from home. They did not know how to shoot and run at all. So have we drawn the appropriate conclusions?

I believe not. The experience of the Afghan war is not being studied and not being passed on. On the contrary, there are already many military officers like Major Aleksandr Stepanov from a border military district, for example, who have been discharged without justification. And Major Aleksandr Mirovannyi, a former twice-decorated Spetsnaz officer, was not entrusted with an independent station. And there are many such examples. I know of one subunit from Odessa. The soldiers have not fired weapons once or driven a BMP-2 [infantry fighting vehicle]. And with what skills and experience would we sent them into a local war, should it arise? And what could be said were several states to begin to revise our territory and its borders simultaneously?

What do I see as the solution in this complex situation? Primarily the retention in our ranks of the officers who love Ukraine, have combat experience, know how to exercise authority among their subordinates, and perseveringly study the experience of local wars and can independently forecast the military-political situation and adopt the pertinent immediate decisions.

The time has come, possibly, when it is necessary to create within the Ministry of Defense a center for the study of all historical and everyday factors which led to conflicts and war and how to prevent or win them.

In a word, I would be in no hurry to speak from high rostrums about the fact that the Army of Ukraine is combat efficient in the high meaning of this word.

Defense Minister Morozov Visits United States

Notes on Itinerary, Meetings With U.S. Officials

93UM0777A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
30 Jul 93 p 1

[Article by the Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "The Visit of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine to the United States Continues"]

[Text] The official visit of Colonel General Kostyantyn Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine, to the United States continues. At the beginning of the week, the minister of defense of Ukraine had a short talk with U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry.

Minister of Defense of Ukraine Kostyantyn Morozov and U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin signed a memorandum on mutual understanding and cooperation in the area of defense between Ukraine and the United States. The secretary of defense stated in conjunction with this that the memorandum is a document of historic significance because this is the first agreement between Washington and a republic of the former Union.

This memorandum provides opportunities to look for ways to resolve issues concerning the security of Ukraine, and also envisions an exchange of military delegations at all levels.

During the visit, the ministers of defense will also discuss the issue of nuclear armaments located in the territory of Ukraine.

On 28 July, the minister of defense met with representatives of the American Government, and also spoke at the National Press Club.

The press conference was devoted to the issues of conversion and opportunities for cooperation between America and Ukraine in this field.

The day ended with a reception given for the minister of defense of Ukraine by an association of American military officers of Ukrainian descent. To complete his visit, Kostyantyn Morozov will visit the Norfolk naval base.

Comments to Journalists on Military Cooperation, Arms Reduction

93UM0777B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
4 Aug 93 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Serhiy Nahoryanskyy: "Colonel General Kostyantyn Morozov: 'We Have Felt a Change in Attitude Toward Our State'"]

[Text] From the Press Conference Held by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine for Domestic and Foreign Journalists on the Results of His Visit to the United States of America

Last week, Colonel General Kostyantyn Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine, paid an official visit to the United States of America. The visit took place at the invitation of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and occurred within the framework of an agreement with him during his visit to Ukraine on 6-7 June of this year. Kostyantyn Petrovych discussed the course of the visit and its results during a press conference for domestic and foreign journalists which was held the day before yesterday.

The objective of our visit, said the minister of defense, was to hold meetings and negotiations at possible levels, to explain the situation in Ukraine with regard to the issues of its defense, to reveal the main causes of threat to our state, to substantiate the need for timely assistance to Ukraine, and to establish personal contacts at the level of the supreme military leadership. Negotiations at the Department of Defense and personal talks with the secretary on the issue of building up the defense of Ukraine and cooperation with the United States in this area were envisaged by the program and were held. Negotiations were also held at the State Department concerning the issues of the political situation in Ukraine and its relations with the countries of the CIS, Europe, and the world. Meetings and talks concerning these problems were held with U.S. Vice President Gore, National Security Adviser to the President Lake, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell. A meeting was also held with the chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force. Meetings at the Capitol were held on the issues regarding the development of U.S. legislation as to the policy of the state with regard to Ukraine.

At the Atlantic Security Council [as published], we spoke before the members of the council and representatives of the press. Kostyantyn Petrovych went on to say. We familiarized ourselves with the functioning of the National [Military] Command Center of the U.S. Armed Forces. The

delegation took part in the presentation of a Ukrainian-American joint venture for processing obsolete munitions. We met with the representatives of the Ukrainian community in the United States. Several press conferences were held for journalists and representatives of American and world missions. The delegation visited the unified command of NATO naval forces in the Atlantic. There, the minister went on to say, we familiarized ourselves with the organization of command, its structure, the system of control and support, and the tasks of this formation. We also visited military units and command posts, and familiarized ourselves with combat materiel. To sum up all talks, I would say that we felt a change in the attitude toward our state. There was less pressure and more of a desire to comprehend the reasons which compel Ukraine to be concerned about its security. The signing of a memorandum on mutual understanding and cooperation in the area of defense on 27 July by the ministers of defense of Ukraine and the United States became a consequence of such changes. This is an important document for both countries. It lays the foundation for contacts at the level of military organizational development and puts our relations on a practical basis. A number of agreements on the creation of joint working groups, which will actually begin to operate in Kiev and Washington as early as the beginning of August, have already been achieved on the basis of this document. They will study the conditions for building up our Armed Forces and propose the optimal directions for reforming and developing them proceeding from the available experience. We will be partners with the United States in the sphere of defense and military cooperation; this is in line with our intention to become integrated with European and worldwide structures on a multilateral and bilateral basis.

I believe that the program for the visit was fully carried out. Colonel General Kostyantyn Morozov finished his opening remarks by saying that he was satisfied.

Responding to a question from one of the correspondents about whether Ukraine has a similar memorandum with Russia, the minister of defense said that such a document has not been signed. To the minister's mind, so far there has been no mutual understanding on some important issues. We indeed consider it our main task to develop cooperation with the Russian Federation first of all, as with our large neighbor. However, there are things which should be further studied at the level of experts in order to be considered at the leadership level. The strategic nuclear forces and the organization of the division of the Black Sea Fleet are some of the issues which have not been ultimately looked into at this point. The absence of a similar memorandum with the Ministry of Defense of Russia is not a manifestation of a negative attitude on our part or on the part of the Russian military department. Not all of the conditions have been prepared at this point; there are many conflicting aspects.

Issues of the ratification of the START-I treaty were discussed during the visit. However, said Kostyantyn Petrovych, it is not within my jurisdiction to make any predictions. I am not a member of parliament, and I do not work in deputy commissions, but rather work with them. For this reason, I cannot say what the Supreme Soviet will resolve. It

appears, the minister of defense went on to say, that the political climate for the vision of future relations between our states on the part of the United States has changed.

Conditions were considered on which assistance may be provided directly to Ukraine within the confines of the already known appropriations. At issue is \$175 million. Personally, I think that this amount cannot be considered a basis for the full-scale implementation of the program for reducing nuclear armaments, but only as monetary assistance at the first stage, that is, incentive assistance. Our side expressed support for this idea, and the Ministry of Defense will facilitate the regular development of events which will bring about the signing of a corresponding agreement between our country and the prompt provision of this assistance.

Responding to questions, Colonel General Kostyantyn Morozov said that the schedule calls for completing the dismantling of 10 strategic missiles and 60 warheads before the end of September. This schedule is being met.

During the press conference, the minister answered other questions.

Officers Leaving Ukrainian Army

93UM0803A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Aug 93 First Edition p3

[Report by Anatoliy Polyakov: "Ukrainian Army: Period of Semidisintegration? Not All Ukrainian Officers Wish To Be Heirs to the 'Glory' of Stepan Bandera"]

[Text] Kiev—In the Air Defense Missile Brigade which is commanded by Colonel Ivan Koval approximately 60 officers and warrant officers have submitted applications requesting that they be transferred to the Russian Army or discharged into the reserve. There is an objective reason, seemingly—the brigade is located in the zone of strict radioactive monitoring following the accident at Chernobyl. But it is more than just this, of course.

Combat training in the combined unit has been reduced to the minimum—there are no fuels or lubricants, spares or components, and there are no specialists for performing operational check work. Junior officers are not being trained for the air defense forces in the Ukrainian Army, and two drafts will be discharged simultaneously into the reserve in the fall so there will be simply no one to maintain the equipment. In addition, the brigade has in two years received only five lieutenants, and no reinforcements are seen in the immediate future. And, what is most important, rejection of the overpoliticization and the introduction of the ideas of the Bandera campaign and the OUN-UPA [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Ukrainian Insurgent Army] is growing in the officer corps.

Officers and warrant officers of the Ukrainian Army are under tremendous psychological pressure. All forms and records have long been kept in Ukrainian. The newspapers abound in demands that the army begin to speak the "Ukrainian language." Politicians and statesmen are pushing the Ministry of Defense to introduce its own uniform and its own regulations manuals. The officers cannot fail to see that

everything is being done to move away from Russia and sever the last ties to it as quickly as possible.

The call "Even an alliance with the devil, only not with Russia" was heard at a recent roundtable of the bloc of national-patriotic parties. The proposed economic union and its principal champion, Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma, have now come under the fire of criticism also.

Unwilling to be pawns in the political games, officers, Ukrainian included, are leaving the Ukrainian Army. Many of them still consider Russia their motherland, the same as Ukraine. It is a pity that the politicians are reluctant as yet to come to terms with this.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Deputy Defense Minister Views Development of Armenia's Armed Forces

934K1577D Yerevan YERKIR in Armenian 10 Apr 93 p 5

[Interview with Lt Gen Norat Ter-Grigoryan, highest-ranking officer in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia and first deputy minister of defense, by YERKIR correspondent Armen Zak'aryan, 2 April 1993; place not given; "Armenia Has Considerable Military Potential"]

[Text] One of the first to stand at the head of establishing a regular, that is, battleworthy army is Lt Gen Norat Ter-Grigoryan, formerly a high ranking-officer in the Ground Forces of the former USSR and currently the highest-ranking officer of the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia and first deputy minister of defense. Below is an interview with him by our correspondent Armen Zak'aryan.

[Ter-Grigoryan] Armenia is a signatory to the CIS collective security treaty, and we are pleased to participate in all deliberative sessions. We have even proposed that certain subunits and units of the Armed Forces of Armenia be included in the collective security forces. While in the past this was beyond our capabilities, today we are approaching a capability to do so.

Pursuant to the collective security treaty, if aggression occurs along the external borders of the CIS, such as if Turkey attacks Armenia, the CIS countries are obligated to extend assistance, as well as to provide military forces to Armenia's Armed Forces, since our border also constitutes a CIS border.

We in turn are obligated to do likewise, such as, for example, sending a company, battalion, or regiment to the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The leadership of Tajikistan, however, perhaps taking into consideration the antagonism between Armenia and Azerbaijan, has appealed not to the command of the CIS Unified Military Forces, but to the republics of Central Asia and Russia.

[Zak'aryan] Are there any guarantees that the collective security treaty will be viable and effective?

[Ter-Grigoryan] The Council of Ministers of Defense of the CIS countries will convene in Yerevan on 29 April. A draft document pertaining to this issue will be discussed at that meeting. Following final approval, it will be sent for ratification to the legislative and executive bodies of the republics.

As a private individual as well as a military man and a diplomat (although they say that military people are not diplomats, I do not share that view), I believe that it is very advantageous for Armenia to be part of the CIS. The CIS does not in any way threaten Armenia's independence. To ignore the CIS, not to be a member, would be a major negative to Armenia's independence. Practical realities have shown us that it is extremely difficult for Armenia to be on its own and that Armenia needs allies. Consequently, only within the framework of the CIS, with close cooperation grounded on the principle of equality, is it possible for a country to stand on its own feet and, if aggression occurs on its external borders, to have the expectation of receiving military assistance.

[Zak'aryan] Following the last meeting of top officials of military agencies, CIS Unified Military Forces Commander Ye. Shaposhnikov informed us that they anticipate restoration of the unified structure of the military-industrial complex of the former USSR.

[Ter-Grigoryan] That military industry is a powerful system. Approximately 600-700 production enterprises were involved in the production process of building missiles and tanks. Supply, production and assembly tasks were carried out in cities located thousands of kilometers from one another.

Armenia has always participated in the manufacture of all types of military equipment and has produced unique equipment components for missiles for the Air Force as well as for the air defense system.

Armenia produced automatic control system equipment. In the past this fact was not publicized, but today everybody knows that there are unique specialist personnel in our republic, such as computer programmers, engineers, and others who are skilled in designing and building outstanding products connected with the military production complex and weaponry.

If Armenia is once again drawn into this industrial complex, this will enable the plants to resume operations, with all consequences ensuing therefrom. Being included in a unified military-industrial complex provides Armenia with the possibility of developing and improving its capabilities as well as the possibility of entering into a cooperative relationship with countries other than the CIS nations. I myself, as a military man, saw devices which, because of secrecy, I had no idea where they were being manufactured, even though I was an officer in the Armed Forces of the USSR. It turns out that these devices were produced in Armenia, and I find that extremely gratifying.

The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia has begun establishing close ties with the leadership of enterprises which are part of the military-industrial complex. The results have been quite beneficial. If things continue in this manner, we shall be able to accomplish a great deal through collaboration for the defense of our homeland and the development of our Armed Forces.

[Zak'aryan] You were recently out of the republic for an extended period of time....

[Ter-Grigoryan] That is true. I was away for two months because of family matters. My wife had fallen ill.

[Zak'aryan] I wish her good health.

[Ter-Grigoryan] Thank you. She has not yet recovered fully, but I was forced to return to Armenia earlier because of an urgent need for me to be here working on establishment of Armenia's Armed Forces.

[Zak'aryan] During a conversation we had a few months ago you said that you will be establishing an army which will ensure the defense of Armenia, but that you did not consider it appropriate to write about it in the press.

[Ter-Grigoryan] First of all, let me say that I am not the only one involved in establishing the Armed Forces. We are supported in our efforts by officers and general officers, the president, the minister of defense and all others whose job it is to take part in building the military. Over the past six months, within the extent of our capabilities, we have managed to "lay down" the foundations of our national army.

Everybody kept silent for a long time, and now they want the army to be formed in two days. That is not the way things work. The Soviet Armed Forces went through a process of development and improvement over a period of 70 years.

There will be a new draft call soon, in May-June. It is essential that the Armenian people, concerned for their honor, dignity, and the inviolability of the territory of their republic, come forth and assist the military.

Those young men who have foolishly deserted their military units will live out their entire lives with the stigma of disgrace before history, because it will be noted in their documents that they were deserters and worked against the establishment of their national armed forces. Unfortunately, some parents defend the actions of these young men.

I therefore appeal to people voluntarily to cease and desist such defections and to report to their military unit. If there are difficulties connected with their previous military unit, the military commissariat will assign them to a different one.

[Zak'aryan] You said that the foundations of a national army have been laid down. What do you mean by that?

[Ter-Grigoryan] Pursuant to the Vienna and other treaties [reference to the CFE Treaty and the CSBM Agreement], it is expected that all countries will declare their equipment holdings, which we have done through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. This data is known all over the world and, just as the organizational structure of any country's military forces, is not a secret. Everybody knows, for example, that Russia has an Air Force, Strategic Missile Forces, Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, and a Navy. Russia will not provide figures, however, on the specific holdings of the Ground Forces, motorized rifle and tank divisions, for example. Nor will Russia report the internal structure of the divisions, such as how many regiments and other units there are in each, and how they are equipped. Nor will I provide such information. We are endeavoring to take

into consideration our own experience, that of the Soviet Union, experience acquired in Afghanistan, as well as that of other countries, in order to create the necessary structures proceeding from our economic capabilities.

Our work is hampered by such things as, for example, the article entitled "Sovereign Armenia's Army," by Dneprik Baghdasaryan, president of the Union of Officers of the Republic of Armenia, an article which was published in GOLOS ARMENII. It is a good article, but it contains many unfair assessments and constitutes an insult toward certain of our officers and general officers. It is personnel who will determine the success of our efforts, and they should not be blamed for sitting in their offices. It is the easiest thing in the world for general officers to go and become commander of a military unit. It is more complicated to establish an integral organism and to manage that organism. It is said that Armenia needs only one division, but this is not sufficient to defend the territory of Armenia. If they drive us to that, they are simply committing a crime. We need several divisions, and we shall form them. The article discusses negative phenomena in the military, which we shall take into consideration and shall endeavor to rectify. In order to prevent such phenomena, and with the aim of having a highly-skilled and knowledgeable officer corps, we are setting up higher officer training programs and are establishing a flight personnel training school and a military training school.

[Zak'aryan] During V. Manukyan's tenure, what determined structural changes in the ministry?

[Ter-Grigoryan] One must bear in mind that we are in the process of formation. If negative aspects appear in our structure following the passage of a certain period of time, we endeavor to rebuild as rapidly as possible. For this reason changes could be taking place every month.

I was serving as commander of the Armed Forces (a position of great power and authority), and I myself requested that the position be done away with. All that we had established was being directed and managed, and there was no longer any need for such a position of absolute authority. It is now the turn of the officer corps, which is the brains of the armed forces, to set to work. It organizes, secures, intercommunicates, implements, and oversees. In effect we no longer need a commander in chief. The minister of defense and the officer corps are carrying out the task of building and strengthening the army.

[Zak'aryan] We can say that now the skies over Artsakh are "promising," but from time to time Turkish aircraft invade Armenian airspace. Are there any assurances that such overflights can be prevented?

[Ter-Grigoryan] I must state that we military people, working together, have reestablished our disintegrated, equipment-poor Air Defense Forces, which are confidently performing their assigned mission. Our aircraft have never violated Azerbaijan airspace and have never flown a combat mission to destroy or bomb populated localities. The Azerbaijani, however, are bombing Armenian territory. It seems that lately Azerbaijani aircraft have made themselves scarce. Perhaps they are redeploying their forces, conducting aircrew proficiency inspections, or are preparing for large-scale air operations. We are therefore endeavoring to make our Air Defense

Forces a reliable "umbrella" for Armenia. Toward this end we must work in a unified manner with our people, so that we can prevent the theft of equipment components by persons suffering from "gold fever." Persons who steal combat equipment are criminals, who are being guided by the interests of our enemies and who should be punished according to the laws of wartime, including execution by firing squad. With the support of our republic's military-industrial enterprises, we are replacing the stolen components. This requires a great deal of work, effort, time, and money.

[Zak'aryan] What can you tell us about recent activities by Armenian self-defense forces on the borders of Armenia and Artsakh? (This interview was held on 2 April.—Ed.)

[Ter-Grigoryan] Azerbaijan has recently intensified aggressive activities. Populated localities are constantly being subjected to bombardment, in the north and south, from Tavush to Kapan, from Krasnoselsk to Goris. Homes are being destroyed, and innocent people are being killed. And always it is the Azerbaijani who are the first to attack.

A few days ago the situation got tense in the Yeraskh area: large numbers of bombs and shells were "flying" in our direction from Sadarak. How long can this go on? We also are endowed with the instinct of self-protection, as well as national pride. We are therefore forced to counterattack to the extent of our ability. The enemy attacked the town of Kapan, for example. Our self-defense forces, deployed in the hills, attacked the enemy and, as the enemy retreated, took some ground.

[Zak'aryan] Can one state that conditions for the establishment of an army have been created?

[Ter-Grigoryan] That is the most important thing: to create conditions for establishing an army. In order for an adult Armenian male to have a clear conscience, he must serve in the national army. If we have an army, we shall be able to defend ourselves; if not, we shall all perish. We are obliged to defend ourselves well: we are not surrounded by friends. First of all there is Turkey, which—who knows why?—maintains an entire field army along the border with Armenia, where there is absolutely no need for such a force, since the USSR no longer exists and Armenia has no intention of attacking Turkey.

Then there is Azerbaijan, which is drawing us into a war and which seeks to ignore the fact that Karabakh is a republic.

And the Georgian authorities are doing nothing whatsoever in response to events taking place within their borders. I am absolutely sure that the explosions and acts of sabotage which have occurred are directed by the Government of Azerbaijan, a situation which adversely affects Armenian-Georgian relations.

We could respond to acts of terrorism with terrorism, blowing up bridges and natural-gas pipelines. We consider this not to be an acceptable activity, however, and we maintain that Azerbaijan should put a stop to such actions.

[Zak'aryan] Do you consider it possible that the Turkish field army you mentioned could "enter" Armenia?

[Ter-Grigoryan] No, I do not. If that were to happen, it would be a frightful event of international proportions. Times have changed. I believe that the NATO countries will not allow Turkey to carry out such an act. But if such a thing were to occur, every country which attacks Armenia will take substantial losses in return. And the more we progress with development of our military, the greater those losses will be.

Conflicting Reports on Fighting Around Fizuli

93UM0792B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Aug 93 First edition p 2

[Article by Vitaliy Strugovets: "Battles Near Fizuli: Still Not Clear Who Is Winning"]

[Text] The information coming from the Armenian and Azerbaijan sides regarding the course of battles in the rayon center of Fizuli is traditionally incompatible. According to information received by us in the press service of the political representation of Azerbaijan in the Russian Federation, armed formations of the AR have succeeded in beating back the attack of the Armenian forces southwest of Fizuli and throwing them back to their former positions. But the rayon center and nearby villages continue to be shelled periodically by the opposing side.

At the same time, according to reports by the department of information and press of the NKR, the Azerbaijan army is conducting intensive shelling of positions of the self-defense forces of Karabakh, which are trying to implement the conditions of the armistice, in the Gadрут and Martuni rayons in the south and southeast NKR. In addition, the ARMINPRESS press agency has reported a buildup in the Azerbaijan military presence and in intensity of combat actions along the eastern border of the NKR, where personnel and military equipment of the adversary are constantly arriving.

Plenipotentiary U.N. representative in Azerbaijan Mahmud Al Said has left for the rayon center in order to dot the "i"s and cross the "t"s in the situation around Fizuli.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Update on Government Attacks on Gorno-Badakhshan

93UM0771A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 05 Aug 93 pp 1,3

[Article by Igor Rotar: "Dushanbe Attacking the Pamirs"]

[Text] Military operations carried out by Tajikistan government troops in Gornyy Badakhshan have exacerbated the already difficult political situation in the area. This is a

repetition of the events transpiring in the fall and winter of 1992, when fighters who are members of the People's Front (presently the government troops) were fighting opposition detachments in southern Kurgan-Tyube Oblast. Since political opposition in Tajikistan is inseparable from the regional, the attackers indiscriminately considered all local residents - migrants from the Garmo area and the Pamirs - as followers of the opposition. What happened subsequently is common knowledge: Tens of thousands of peasants, whose only fault was their being descendants of the Garmo residents and the Pamiri, were compelled to flee to Afghanistan. It was not long before those unfortunate people, who have been deprived of their homeland and bare essentials, organized themselves into detachments of fighters who, operating with the desperate plight of the doomed, are carrying out assaults on the Tajik-Afghan border.

Gornyy Badakhshan has a fresh memory of how, after taking Dushanbe, some soldiers of the government troops started to conduct ethnic cleansing, with Pamiri the first to be killed. Therefore, if fighting continues in the Pamirs, Tajikistan is to experience a new wave of immigration, this time from Gornyy Badakhshan. There can be no doubt that the Pamiri - the same as the persons fleeing Kurgan-Tyube Oblast - will not resign themselves to their fate, instead will "drop in unannounced" in their homeland, carrying a weapon.

Nonetheless, the "Pamir War" possesses a uniqueness all of its own. Gornyy Badakhshan is the most inaccessible area of Tajikistan: For 6 months of the year, communication with the outside world is possible only via air. There is no security zone in this particular sector of the Tajik-Afghan border, while the Pyandzh River can be crossed in many locations by fording. As a matter of fact, for some years there was a saying current in the Pamirs: "He who dislikes wet feet does not go to Afghanistan."

The difficult restrictions imposed by nature and the ease with which the border can be crossed create ideal conditions for conducting partisan warfare. The mujahedeen are armed with stingers and can maintain at least partial control of the air space. For this reason, Russian border troops and Tajik army subunits run the risk of being cut off from the main forces.

On the other hand, the Tajikistan leadership's decision to initiate combat activities in Gornyy Badakhshan cannot be said to be unwise. A strike at the back of the government of Gornyy Badakhshan can be launched from the uncontrolled area at any time. An attempt to set up a Tajik-Pamir border would not be feasible, starting with the technical aspect. This is a matter whereby the regime refusing to surrender its power had no alternative, and the Tajik-Afghan border conflict entered a new and even more dangerous phase.

ARMS TRADE

Specifications of "APS" Underwater Submachinegun, "SPP-1" Pistol

93UM0788B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Aug 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Aleksandr Yegorov, under the rubric: "Arsenal: Weapons for Ichthyocentaurs"]

[Text] From our past articles, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers know that special subunits of "underwater infantry" exist. But we have not talked about the weaponry of the underwater riflemen. Imagine it—the APS underwater firing submachinegun and the SPP-1 pistol.

Accepted into the inventory at the beginning of the 1970's, there are no weapons that are similar to these models to this day.

The underwater weapons system was developed at the Central NII [Scientific Research Institute] of Precise Machine Tools by a group of designers from Anatoliy Deryagin's subdivision—by Vladimir Simonov, Oleg Kravchenko, and Ivan Kasyanov. But then again, the latter two were involved with the development of a special cartridge that is shaped like a needle and is 145 mm long (for the pistol) and 150 mm long (for the submachinegun). Ordinary ammunition "does not work" in the water. That is why the APS's magazine looks so strange and why the SPP-1 is loaded in a non-traditional manner—in the barrels of which it has four.

Tactical-Technical Specifications of Weapons for Conducting Fire Underwater

| | SPP-1 | APS |
|--|-------|--|
| Caliber, mm | 4.5 | 5.66 |
| Weight, kg | 0.95 | 3.4 (loaded) |
| Dimensions: | | |
| Length, mm | 244 | 614 |
| Height, mm | 136 | 187 |
| Width, mm | 37 | 65 (with the successive chambering grip) |
| Magazine capacity (clip) | 4 | 36 |
| Operating range at a depth of 5 meters, meters | 17 | 30 |

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Gareyev: 'On Military Science and Military Art'

93UM0786A Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, 1993 (Signed to press 27 May 93) pp 2-8

[Article by Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, General of the Army M.A. Gareyev: "On Military Science and Military Art (Stalin's Understanding of the Problem and the Present)"]

[Text] The most important measures associated with the transition of the army and the navy to a peacetime situation occurred in 1947. Command and control of the Armed Forces, from whose ranks 8.5 million men were released, was transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense (The VGK [Supreme High Command] was eliminated in September 1945), which was soon renamed the Military Ministry and subsequently (1953) the Ministry of Defense. But Stalin continued to hold in his hands all of the primary issues of military organizational development.

Major changes occurred in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces. The technical reequipping of all types of troops began. Jet aircraft appeared. The creation of the rocket troops and later a new service of the Armed Forces—the Strategic Rocket Forces—began with the entry of missiles into the inventory.

Naturally, military science and military art did not stand aside from these events. The primary efforts of military thought were directed at generalizing the experience of the Great Patriotic War. A great deal of interest was displayed in methodological issues of military theory and practice. The published document shows how certain organizational issues were resolved and how views on the issues of the correlation of military science and military art were formed in the first postwar years and how much these views corresponded to their time.

A RECORD OF THE ISSUES Resolved at an 11 April 1947 Reception from 20:00 to 23:00 at Comrade Stalin's Office

Those Present: Comrade Bulganin, Comrade Vasilevskiy, Comrade Antonov and Comrade Shtemenko.

1. After their withdrawal from abroad, station the experienced mechanized armies: one army in the area of [blank in original], a second army in the area of [blank in original], and a third army in the area of [blank in original].

Withdraw the armies only after deployment areas have been prepared for them.

2. Delimit the functions among the reserve and ground troops for which you will create a reserve troops staff. Subordinate all troops deployed on the territory of military districts and groups, with the exception of reserves and troops that are subordinate to the appropriate commanders-in-chief and type of troops commanders, to the Ground Forces commander-in-chief.

Do not link reserve troops with the territory of the military districts.

3. Leave commanders-in-chief of artillery and armored troops subordinate to the minister but oblige them to carry out the tasks of the Ground Forces commander-in-chief in the part that affects its own type of troops.

4. Leave PVO [Air Defense] Fighter Aviation in the PVO System but subordinate it to the Air Force commander-in-chief for combat readiness issues, inspections, manning with cadres and supply with special types of equipment.

5. The reserve troops must be at constant readiness and therefore they will already be maintained at the highest manning level during peacetime. In 1947, we need to bring the manning level of a reserve combined arms army division up to 8,000 men (consisting of nine divisions) and for two each divisions in each reserve mechanized army (a total of six divisions).

6. In 1947, do not conduct a total draft of conscripts who were born in 1928. Draft only 130,000 men to man the reserves indicated above and to augment schools for Air Force and Airborne Troops specialists.

7. Determine the number of divisions that must be deployed in 11,000-man divisions, mountain divisions, and divisions that must operate under special conditions in the future and, in accordance with this, develop peacetime authorized strength levels for them.

8. Discuss the issue of the creation of boats of honor for commanders of formations, generals and admirals at the next session of the Supreme Military Council.

9. Postpone the next session of the Supreme Military Council until the autumn of 1947 when the Field Regulations will have been developed.

10. At the present time, leave the self-propelled artillery within the jurisdiction of the commander of BT [fast-moving tanks] and MV [mechanized troops]. In the future, discuss the issue on the possibility of transferring it to the subordination of the commander-in-chief of artillery. Self-propelled artillery cannot be an independent type of troops.

11. Approve the organization of the machinegun-artillery (rocket) division. Do not have brigades within the UR [Rocket] Troops.

12. Designate a commander-in-chief for the Far East and form a staff for him with a location at Khabarovsk (possible candidate—Comrade Malinovskiy).

13. The issue on Comrades Meretskov and Artemyev: select candidates, look at Comrades Biryuzov and Gorbатов.

14. The issue of Comrades Purkayev and Chibisov.

15. Make Comrade Chuykov deputy to Comrade Sokolovskiy.

16. Sort out the issue on the strength and procedure for utilization and manning of the railroad troops.

17. Publish the primary military magazines with a restricted classification. Do not divulge military secrets on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, which sometimes occurs.

18. Strengthen the editorial staff of VOYENNAYA MYSL magazine.

19. Comrade Govorov's request for a trip to the Far East. There were no objections but there was not a direct authorization.

10. [sic] On military science and military art.

Certain military theorists think that military science and military art are equivalent concepts.

These theorists are profoundly mistaken.

We should not equate military science with military art. Military science—is a broader and more comprehensive concept and military science also includes military art, the latter being one of the components of military science.

Military art includes tactics, operational art and strategy, that is, it is involved with the study of issues that relate to the techniques for conducting military operations and war as a whole.

Military science, besides the issues that are part of military art, studies the issues of a country's economy and its material and manpower resources.

To get to know military science—that means to get to know not only the techniques for conducting war, that is, military art, but to also know the country's economy, its capabilities, weak and strong aspects, and also the trends of its development. Know the material and manpower resources, both our own and our enemy's.

Only under the condition of knowledge and the correct utilization of all of the branches of military science listed above can we count on achieving victory in war.

The experience of the Second World War brilliantly confirms that thesis.

The former leaders of Fascist Germany did not know military science and did not know how to manage the country's economy.

Those leaders, specifically Goehring, did not consider the country's capabilities, tasked it with unfulfillable tasks. This was one of the most important causes of the defeat of the Germans in the war.

The Germans' clearly adventurist plans consisted of the fact that, while striving for world supremacy, they did not consider that the economy of the Allies—the USSR, the United States and Great Britain—was immeasurably more powerful than the German economy.

Tojo, who knew military art, ran the economy in Japan but, just like the Germans, he did not know how to manage it properly.

[Signed] Colonel-General Shtemenko
12 April 1947

The document provides the opportunity to catch sight of the sources of the formation of postwar views on the issues of military science and military art. The victorious war had just been completed and Stalin was at the zenith of his glory. He was considered to be the unquestioned authority in the sphere of military theory and practice. In a conversation with the highest military leadership, he does not simply discuss the issues of military science and military art but states the "truth" and issues instructions not subject to any doubt whatsoever which must be studied and carried out.

It is no accident that Stalin and the highest military leadership in the first postwar years raised the issue on the essence of military science and military art. Quite a few cases are

known in the history of military-scientific thought when they attempted to brush aside the resolution of such complex issues, declaring them to be, in particular, a problem of the essence of military science and military art that are scholastic and do not have serious theoretical and all the more so practical significance. But life, especially at the turning points in the development of the military profession, again and again reminded us that it is impossible to do that. It was already one thing that not only military theorists, but also great military leaders like Suvorov and Napoleon who considered the military profession to be a science and an art attests to the fact that they are far from idle, were involved with these issues.

It is characteristic that these issues were raised before the leadership in the first years of the creation of the Red Army. Seventy years ago, in May 1922 (in that difficult time when the Civil War had still not been concluded), a discussion on the theme "Voyennaya nauka sredi drugikh nauk" [Military Science Among the Other Sciences] was conducted under the leadership of L.D. Trotskiy. L.D. Trotskiy, Main Speaker Professor S. Lukirskiy, Professor A.A. Svechin and others denied the possibility of the existence of military science, suggesting that the practice of the military profession relies on many sciences. In the process, L.D. Trotskiy stressed that war is not science but practical art is a skill. A.A. Svechin asserted that military art does not have its own specific principles because they are general for any struggle—from a discussion and boxing to the struggle between labor and capital¹.

During the course of this discussion and more thoroughly during the process of subsequent scientific and practical work, M.V. Frunze and his comrades in arms convincingly proved that the military profession, while utilizing the achievements and knowledge from various spheres of science, has its own theory, its specific knowledge on the organizational development and training of the army and navy, and armed combat which no other sciences, other than military science, can get to know. In subsequent years, the military profession was understood as science and art simultaneously. Military science—is the sphere of theoretical knowledge that arises based on the generalization of the experience of preparing for and conducting wars. Military art—is the skill and mastery based on profound theoretical knowledge and the capability to creatively employ them in practice while considering the specific conditions of the situation.

In our country, they proceeded from this universally accepted thesis in the entire world until 1947 when the previously indicated orders of the Supreme Commander were issued.

In February 1948, in a report in honor of the 30th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces with a reference to Stalin, N.A. Bulganin stated that military science, besides the issues that are part of military art, studies the issues of the country's economy and its material and manpower resources. This thesis became dominant and began to be introduced and became widespread in military literature.

Explaining this, K.Ye. Voroshilov wrote: "Being a coherent system of truly scientific knowledge of the entire complex of issues of modern war, Stalinist military science, along with purely military elements—strategy, operational art, tactics, organization, and training of troops—encompasses the sum of socio-political, economic and moral factors..."²

That definition in a scientific sense was totally groundless. First of all, it did not correspond to the methods for the classification of sciences since military science alone cannot study such a complex social phenomenon like war and also the issues of strengthening a country's defense, including the economic and moral factors. Many sciences study war from various aspects. Second, from the point of view of philosophical science, military science, like any other science, is a spiritual phenomenon and cannot include in itself military art as a whole but precisely its practical aspect. Third, under this approach, they began to mechanically differentiate military science and military art not by essence but by the quantity and volume of the issues encompassed by them, suggesting that only the issues of preparing for war and its conduct are the prerogative of only science but the others, furthermore, are art at the same time that preparation for war and its conduct always were not only science but also art. Many understood the illogical nature of that approach already at that time and in subsequent years, after disputes and a fierce struggle, on the whole a scientifically-grounded understanding of the subject of military science and the essence of military art was achieved. But since these issues are being raised once again of late and are sometimes being interpreted in a different way, it appears to be necessary to examine them once again.

Historical experience shows that with all of the variation and complexity of the phenomena of war, internal deep and substantial ties are inherent to them and there is something common, persistent and repetitive with the strength of a need in them and therefore the methods and techniques of armed combat are giving rise to not the "free" will of military leaders and commanders but are subordinated, like the very activity of people, regardless of their will and consciousness of the objective activity that is defined by laws and their specific principles. This is explained by the capability and need of military science that is a system of knowledge on laws, the military-strategic nature of war, the ways to prevent it, the organizational development and preparation of the armed forces and the country for war, and techniques for conducting armed combat.

Another specific feature of war consists of the fact that the laws and objective phenomena that are inherent to it, being independent of the will and consciousness of people, operate not with that irreversible spontaneity like the laws of nature but are manifested, like in other social phenomena, through the activity of people. Knowledge of the laws, principles and techniques of conducting armed combat facilitate practical activity, provides the capability to better predict the development of events, and to deliberately act. But this knowledge cannot provide an answer to the question of how to act in some or other specific situation. Therefore, the provisions of military science cannot be employed in all cases

regardless of the conditions of the situation or with that same constancy and identical outcome as the laws of natural science.

The complexity of this issue also consists of the fact that during the course of armed combat we have the opportunity to encounter various objective phenomena and laws that are frequently interwoven with and confront each other, creating the most contradictory situations. Each of the sides attempts to utilize the situation that has objectively developed in its own interests and to impose its will on its opponent, to hide its own intentions, to deceive the opposing side, and to stun the opposing side with unanticipated actions. All of this creates during the course of armed combat an exclusively complex, tense and continuously changing situation. Therefore knowledge alone of the laws and principles of armed combat and military science is inadequate for successful military operations. Military art is required. If victory and defeat in war were determined automatically by the effect of objective phenomena and laws, if the provisions of military science could be employed in practice like the laws of mathematics or physics, military art would lose sense and that concept would not exist. In reality, it plays an enormous role and the outcome of armed combat largely depends on how correctly military leaders and commanders of all levels assess the conditions that have objectively developed and how they make expedient decisions and how skillfully they implement them.

Ye. Smyslovskiy, one of the participants of the 1992 discussion, wrote: *"The study of any science does not at all guarantee mastery of the art that is guided by this science and for us life is repeated examples of so-called 'scientific fools' who, while having perfectly mastered broad scientific knowledge, turn out to be totally helpless in the sphere of the corresponding art. It's one thing to know but another to know how". All military history attests to the fact that military science cannot provide any prepared solution, it can serve only as an orientation point for practice.*

For military art to be at a high level, besides thorough knowledge, developed operational-tactical thinking, a creative approach to the profession, the ability to rapidly assess the situation and to analyze it, and also high organizational and moral-combat qualities, such as courage, bravery and decisiveness, initiative and independence, steadfastness and persistence in the attainment of a goal, are required. All of these qualities are not only innate or characteristic to especially gifted people. They do not appear as a result of just study of theoretical provisions alone but they are developed in the process of combat and operational training, practical activity, and of all military service in peacetime and in wartime. There is a great distance between the mastery of theoretical knowledge and the ability to employ it in practice. For example, at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, perhaps there was not that military leader or commander who could understand theoretically and who knew from the experience of the past about the need to concentrate the primary efforts on the decisive axes, the creation of strike formations, painstaking reconnaissance and reliable effective engagement of the enemy. And yet a significant amount of time passed and quite a bit of

effort and quite a few victims were required before we managed to master the art of resolving these and other missions. The formation of military art was especially impeded due to Stalin's pre-war oppressions and the mass renewal of command personnel. As G.K. Zhukov noted, "the military theory of those years that was expressed in works and lectures and instilled in the regulations, was mainly... at the level of time. However, practice lagged behind theory to a well-known degree..."⁴.

We must not forget that, at the beginning of the war with the USSR, the German Army was very strong, well-trained both in a military context and also psychologically, and had the two-years' experience of combat operations in Europe. Our army had to acquire much already during the course of the war. Therefore, everyone, beginning with the Supreme High Command and the General Staff and ending with the commander of the subunit and soldier learned how to fight during the course of the entire war. Stalin's good memory and his ability to delve into the essence of issues, strong will and firm character created the preconditions for the mastery of military art, but the lack of systematized military knowledge and military experience prevented that. Stalin only began to more or less sort out operational-strategic issues after 1.5 years of serious defeats.

The authoritative people who knew him and worked closely with him unanimously noted that Stalin's strongest side as Supreme Commander-in-Chief was his ability to sort out complex military-political issues and to subordinate the resolution of economic and strategic issues to the interests of policy. Although there were major failures in this sphere as it occurred with the determination of the possible time periods of Germany's attack against our country. However, there were subsequently also major positive steps. The fact that he managed to avoid a simultaneous war against Germany and Japan and to carry out their consecutive defeat, to attain the participation of the Western countries in the Anti-Hitler Coalition or, how he firmly and continuously defended the interests of the USSR at all negotiations during the war already speaks volumes.

But Stalin frequently transformed policy into a goal in itself and did not consider how it was, for example, in 1941, that policy can be vital only in that case if it takes into account, in close interrelationship, economic and military-strategic considerations.

As we all know, Stalin imparted a great deal of significance to the development of the economic foundation of the country's defense, to technically equipping the army and navy and to other, as he said, continuously acting factors that define the course and outcome of war. He was an advocate of maximum centralization of the leadership of all defense matters and the Armed Forces. Since the time when the war began to encompass all aspects of the life of the state, the unification of political and military power in his hands alone was considered to be one of the conditions that favor the most complete mobilization of all of the country's economic, military, and moral capabilities for the conduct of the war. The aspiration toward that was manifested to some or other degree in all states in the First and Second

World Wars, including in the bourgeois-democratic countries, such as, say, the United States and England.

In our country during the Civil War, the most important issues of defense, including the most fundamental military issues, were resolved by the Soviet of Workers and Peasant Defense. But Lenin, while simultaneously heading that Soviet and the government, did not assume the functions of the Narkom [People's Commissar] of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. This gave a certain independence to the military department, although at that time there was quite a bit of confusion and coordination of political, economic, and military efforts was carried out with great difficulty in a number of cases. Certain decisions on the organization of military-political leadership of the country and the Armed Forces in wartime were not made prior to the Great Patriotic War. But in principle it was assumed that the leadership would be carried out in approximately the same manner as during the Civil War. With the initiation of the Great Patriotic War, the Narkom of Defense formally became the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. But since not a single decision could be made without Stalin's knowledge, he soon officially occupied the post of chairman of the Defense Committee, Narkom of Defense and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. That centralization of power also had its positive aspects, permitting him to concentrate to the maximum possible extent the state's efforts in support of the front. In general, firm leadership, implanting strict exactingness and discipline were quite justified during the time of the war. But, while exceeding all permissible rational limits, this centralization largely constrained the activities of the ruling cadres and especially the military department.

Stalin, despite his exceptionally high ability to work and intense activity, could not encompass many issues in a timely manner and they were not resolved without him. Stalin's excessive self-confidence and obstinacy had a pernicious impact on all matters. So, when prior to the war the totally without rights narkom of defense and General Staff, and military district commanders introduced one suggestion after another on bringing the border military districts to full combat readiness, they could not obtain the approval and realization of their proposals. Stalin rejected as defective the General Staff's initial plan on concentrating the Red Army's primary efforts on the Moscow axis. During the course of a heavy retreat of our troops during the first months of the war, he repeatedly rejected the suggestions of the front commanders on the withdrawal of troops to more favorable lines to prevent their encirclement and destruction, as it was near Kiev in 1941, etc.

Already during the investigation of the causes of the "Perm Catastrophe" in 1918, Stalin raised the issue that the "staff of the army should not be restricted by official reports... of division commanders and brigade commanders, it must have its own representatives—agents who regularly inform the staffs and keenly track the precise execution of the army commander's orders"³.

Monitoring the execution of orders—that is the most important duty of any higher organ of rule. But Stalin, being an extremely suspicious and distrustful man by nature, reduced

the requirement on monitoring to the absurd. Excessive monitoring not only restrained but also suppressed any initiative of subordinate echelons. Already in the first days of the war, Narkom of Defense S.K. Timoshenko was sent to the Western Axis, G.K. Zhukov—to the Southwestern Front, B.M. Shaposhnikov—to the Western Front. Many other General Staff and Commissariat of Defense responsible officials were also sent to the troops for monitoring which also further worsened the organization of command and control at the center. Later, representatives of the General Headquarters were sent not only to coordinate operations of several fronts (which was justified) but also to the independently operating fronts. Even when commanders-in-chief of axes were created in 1941, Stalin continued to send his own representatives to monitor them. Furthermore, there existed a numerous corps of General Staff communications officers, representatives of which were permanently located at all organs of rule up to division headquarters inclusively, already not mentioning the many other inspecting commissions, Mekhlis [not found] type inspectors, who literally terrorized subordinates and who disorganized work, about the systematic interrogations by NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs] representatives, special departments and other organs which in aggregate frequently created an onerous and nervous situation in the troop command and control system. The situation was worsened by the continuous replacement of commanders-in-chief and other officials. Prior to the war alone, four chiefs of the General Staff were replaced; frequent replacement of front and army commanders-in-chief occurred during the course of the heavy defensive battles of 1941-1942. But not one, even the most gifted commander, having arrived at the front, can in several days change the situation somewhat but even painstakingly study it and all the more so master the situation.

Furthermore, Stalin practically did not visit an army in the field, did not drive out to the front, and without personal intercourse with those who are accomplishing the combat mission, it is impossible to understand all of the specific features of the developing situation through written and telephonic reports alone. Indeed, this flaw in strategic leadership was compensated for by the frequent visits to the fronts of G. Zhukov, A. Vasilevskiy and other representatives of the VGK General Headquarters. But nothing can replace the personal perception of the situation. By the way, let's note that, in contrast to Stalin, Churchill, De Gaulle, and Hitler visited during the war all combined formations and at many formations of their own troops. And in our time the President of the United States Bush traveled to see his soldiers in Somalia and British Prime Minister Major went to Yugoslavia. Revolutionary leaders already from the times of Robespierre did not thirst very much for the barricades or for the thick of battle. Marx wrote inflammatory letters to the defenders of the Paris Commune, but he himself did not go there. V.I. Lenin both in 1905 and in 1917, with the initiation of revolutionary events immediately returned from emigration to Russia but even he was not at the fronts a single time during the Civil War. In our days, practically no one of the highest leaders of Russia

considered it necessary to be in Ossetia, Ingushetia, or in the Dniester Republic, where the soldiers were accomplishing their assigned missions.

Stalin's main misfortune, like other political figures, for example, K.Ye. Voroshilov and D.F. Ustinov, who at various times presumptuously assumed the responsibility for the resolution of military issues, consisted of the fact that he, not knowing the life of the troops and not having the experience of commanding them, could not at all imagine what consequences would be caused in the troops by the political decisions he made. Hence, the assignment of unrealistic missions to the troops. It seemed to Stalin that he had only to say and the army immediately deploys to repel aggression or that he only had to call by telephone and the army immediately goes over to the offense or inflicts a counterstrike. He did not understand that a certain amount of time is required for all of that.

These vestiges in the leadership of the troops were not entirely overcome and made themselves known in the postwar years, including when the decision was made on the introduction of troops into Afghanistan and the leadership of their operations in that country.

(To be continued.)

Footnotes

1. VOYENNAYA MYSL I REVOLUTSIYA, 1922, Book 3, pp 3-10; f. 33987, op. 1, d. 521, ll. 525-538.
2. Voroshilov, K.Ye., "Stalin i Vooruzhennyye Sily SSSR" [Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1950, p 68.
3. VOYENNAYA MYSL I REVOLUTSIYA, 1922, Book 3, p 19.
4. Zhukov, G.K., "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Recollections and Thoughts], Moscow, "Novosti" Press Agency Publishing House, 1969, p 215.
5. Stalin, I.V., "Sochineniya" [Collected Works], Vol 4, Moscow, 1953, p 212.

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MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Reportage on Afghan-Tajik Border Fighting

93UM0790A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 33,
11-17 Aug 93 (Signed to press 10 Aug 93) p 4

[Article by Yuriy Tyssovskiy: "Not the Last Frontier, But a Frontier All the Same"]

[Text] The engines of the helicopter roared and the aircraft lifted off heavily from the dusty asphalt of the Dushanbe airport, then banked sharply and raced southward toward the region of the Tajik-Afghan border. The journalists excitedly discussed the vicissitudes of the shelling of the 11th Russian Border Detachment, to which we were flying, the day before. Soon out the left side the blade of the Nureksk reservoir appeared gleaming in the sun, seemingly

broken in half by the sharp silhouette of the dam. And further past the mountains, fields and fields without end.

In my trips to the Near East and to Afghanistan, I have always been captivated by the unfathomable secret handwriting of eastern land use, with its tiny kaleidoscopic cultivated sections in all shades of green and yellow-orange. In Dushanbe I was convinced that the agriculture of the republic had entered a profound crisis provoked by the civil war of 1992, as was evident in the stores and bazaars. None of the celebrated dried apricots, none of the potatoes, and interruptions in bread supplies, while vegetables and fruits, not to mention meat, "take a bite" out of your purse. Instability in a number of regions and the actions of armed groups of resisters are due to the "porosity" of the border with Afghanistan, through which warriors of the Islamic-democratic alliance and their Afghan "instructors" constantly fall on the territory of the republic. The key to restoration of security and peace in the country lay there, on the banks of the Pyandzh and Amurdarya.

But further on was "Afghan." So familiar in the smallest details from my five-year stay in the Land of Mountains. The helicopter landed at the 10th, raising as should a cloud of poisonous, all-penetrating dust. The Pyandzh is wide here, and rolls its gray waters past countless braids of shoals, sometimes overgrown with silver rushes. Practically the whole detachment poured out to meet us. On a hillock near the detachment were a "Grad" launcher with rockets already prepared for fire, and muzzles turned in the direction of the Afghan bank, and a tank and impossibly dilapidated "be-em-reshka," an infantry fighting vehicle. All the personnel of the detachment were draftees, ages 18 to 20, from different countries of the CIS, while the BMP crew were "contractors," serving here for 90 thousand rubles a month. But professionals, and this says it all. They had been promised dollars and more than 90 thousand rubles, but they had been tricked. Still they consider it their duty to stand here to the death, as the boys from the unfortunate 12th Detachment, where the crew of a similar BMP had died on July 13, but did not retreat. And the main question they ask is: why don't they assign the defense of the border to such as us, why do they send inexperienced boys? Are they short of money? If that is the case, why bother going on about the strength of the border?

Further on were 12 kilometers of awful road along the Pyandzh to the 11th Detachment, through clumps of dust and countless gullies. I preferred the "armor," because sitting inside this white-hot sauna on tracks is unthinkable. Better the dust than the sweat and accompanying grime. After 40 minutes of uninterrupted jolts, we finally reached our destination.

The eleventh, as incidentally other similar detachments, was formed in its time not as a defensive structure, but as something like a recovery center for *Karatsupa* troops returning from duty, and for their loyal Indus dogs. The structure, bathed in the sun's rays on the very bank of the Pyandzh, is surrounded on the rear by an inviting form of conical hills. Inviting in peacetime, but now sinister. From them, and from the Afghan side it is not very hard to hit the

detachment. And over there in Afghan Takhar they understand this well. That is why after the 12th Detachment, the 11th has become the main target of provocations. Several days before our arrival, a large group of Tajik opposition forces led by Afghan fighters, and as the border guards say, Arab mujaheddin, penetrated the adjacent territory and made camp near the village of Vari. They went at once into the hills, whence they began daily bombardments of the detachment with 120-mm mortars.

We were lucky. That morning the mortar shells were not falling. An operation had begun to eliminate the group. The helicopters were "working," the artillery was hitting, and the Afghan-Tajik Mujaheddin did not have time for us. The border troops explained to us in detail how they had swept the enemy artillery observers from the hills, how they had delivered retaliatory fire. There were no encroachments from the Afghan side either. They described their daily routine: "Instead of bread, we gobble boiled macaroni, and for supper, a can of stew with something for four, a boot shortage for three months, supplies worthless." But the detachment had been reinforced somewhat with personnel, and combat equipment was thrown in. The conclusion: "You can't beat us out of here, but you can't say we're guarding the border."

In the last two weeks, many democrats have suddenly begun to speak in concert for the withdrawal of Russian military from Tajikistan. I will say just one thing: in Tajikistan not only the powers that be, but also the overwhelming majority of the populace, who suffered from the arbitrary rule of the Muslims in the summer of last year, are horrified at the very thought. But the Russian-speaking residents look at such "patrons" simply as traitors or out-and-out unscrupulous politicians, at best people who do not understand the specifics of the Tajik conflict.

In Dushanbe the streets are already deserted at eight in the evening. In the summer the people feared the "green" terror, they fear the "communist" arbitrariness of the Kulyab gangs, and the persecution of dissenters. I can testify to the words of people whom I trust absolutely: against persons from Gorniy Badakhshan, who are automatically counted as adversaries of the regime, Kulyab residents conducting a large-scale campaign of intimidation to force them to leave the city. According to some data, since the start of the year around a thousand activists from Badakhshan have been killed. Insolent youths, with and without automatic rifles, smoking apaches wandering the streets, pose a threat to Russian and German, mountain and plains Tajiks of all ages. These are most hooligans, sometimes bandits, but sometimes undisguised terrorists. Such is the reality. And for this reason I am not one of the defenders of the current regime, and this I dare hope will lend my arguments an aura of some impartiality.

Some democrats are hurling accusations at the Russian leadership, to the effect that by supporting Emomali Rakhmonov, it is condoning the human rights violations by the "antidemocratic regime." Taking no account whatever of the fact that a different regime will stain the republic with the blood of both the Tajik and the Russian population. For this different regime can only be fundamentalist at its worst.

There is no alternative. The democratic part of the unnatural symbiosis has been used by such Islamic leaders as *qazi-kolon* Turadzhonzod, Said Abdullo Nuri, Himmatzod, and others, to impersonate a movement which respects human rights. The leaders of the democratic wing of the alliance, Shadmon Yusuf and Khudonazarov, were either opportunists seeking to ride the Islamic racehorse at least temporarily, or hopelessly blind men, who had forgotten the lessons of the Khomeini revolution in Iran. And there the Ayatollahs quickly smothered all their democratic fellow rebels against the Shah's regime as soon as they had the strength to do so.

The fact is that Moscow has no other choice, but its position toward Dushanbe, as far as I know, is quite strict. We are prepared to meet our obligations to protect the border, but on the condition of a productive dialogue of the authorities with the opposition, at least with its "reconciled" elements. But the "unreconciled" are not stopping; they believe that Tajikistan today is Afghanistan yesterday, and Afghanistan today is Pakistan at the start of the 80s, when it became the supply base for the Mujaheddin. And they do not consider the glaring differences. The Tajiks, the great majority of them, are not fundamentalists, the more so since the seven decades within the framework of the USSR could not leave them unmarked. And indeed, after helping the Mujaheddin, the West is now inclined to suppress the spread of the militant religious fanaticism.

From talks with the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the command of the group of Russian border troops in Tajikistan, the 201st Division, I got the impression that if Dushanbe adheres to the above conditions, we will defend the republic. It is not the last frontier, but it is a frontier nonetheless.

First of all, the border must be radically re-equipped, all the way to construction of minefields and permanent fire zones and fortification structures. This is very expensive, but necessary. Second, it is equally important for the personnel of the border troops to be selected from among the volunteers and "contractors," replacing the recruits with professionals. And third, we must abandon the so-called "retribution strikes" on Afghan territory. Remember the "Grad" which stood at the 10th Detachment? Like a gun on a wall in some play, except that it fired. Right while we were there. And perhaps, even because of the arrival of the journalists. Nine rockets flew off in the Afghan direction somewhere beyond the mountain. Where? The officers assured us that it was "against a concentration of Mujaheddin." But they don't concentrate in the open, they prefer to do it in villages.

Didn't Afghanistan teach us anything? Such a practice brings no results at all, but only leads to unnecessary victims among the peaceful residents and provokes hatred.

Meanwhile blood is being spilled in Tajikistan. The routing of the Vari grouping was complete, more than a hundred opposition troops and Mujaheddin had been killed, and around three hundred "kicked out" back to Afghanistan. And just recently there is a new operation of the forces of the

Tajik State Committee for National Security, this time in the foothills of Badakhshan Pamir, but without the participation of Russian troops.

A beautiful apartment in the center of Dushanbe. Here lives a long-time acquaintance from back in our student days at MGU. As a precaution I will call her Rano, since she is from Badakhshan. That is precisely why her apartment has been attacked and threatened several times, in an attempt to force her to leave. The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), in the opinion of local nationalists, should gain its independence. I ask Rano why. "Oh, you know, we are so stupid! First of all, we are light-colored and our noses are different. Second, we believe ourselves to be the descendants of Alexander of Macedon. Third, we speak a special dialect, different from Farsi. And fourth, the majority of the Badakhshan people are not Sunnis, like the Tajiks, but Ismaili. You see how many differences. Over there they have created an organization "Lali Badakhshan" and have resolved to separate from Tajikistan. As if they could survive on their own."

All true. The mountain people of the GBAO have been counted by Dushanbe as their enemies because of the "Lali Badakhshan" members, who have entered into a civil war, if not on the side of the Islamic democrats, then at least not on the side of Kulyab. The mountain region has been blockaded; it is a good thing that only one road, impassable in winter, goes there. This has caused a real famine, and if it were not for the head of the worldwide sect of the Ismaili, the Aga Khan, the situation there would be deplorable.

In addition another misfortune has befallen the Pamir people. As was learned, a certain "Hunchback Lasha" runs things there. He is the chief of the local drug mafia, controlling millions of dollars and maintaining bands of fighters with them. The "hunchback" has direct ties with Afghan colleagues. During the half-year freeze of his countrymen, his cut-throats send flour and other humanitarian aid across the Pyandzh.

Recently Dushanbe exchanged anger for kindness and sent a truck caravan with food to the center of the GBAO, Khorog. But it was stopped at Tavildar by combined forces of the opposition Islamists and the "Lali-Badakhshan members." The authorities of Tajikistan found themselves facing an unenviable dilemma, either abandon the idea of supplying the GBAO and thus maintain some sort of influence of the rebellious region, or break the blockade. A week ago they took the second route. Combat operations began in the region of Tavildar, with losses on both sides. The oblast council of the GBAO sent a message to Boris Yeltsin asking that he protect Badakhshan and send a Russian consul there. Earlier the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had expressed its dissatisfaction at the blockade-breaking operation, deeming it untimely. Thus a new crisis point arose, in

addition to all else. Russian border troops garrisoned in the GBAO may be drawn into the conflict in one way or another.

Such in general outline is the situation developing in the former republic of the ex-USSR. I do not believe that the Islamic-democratic opposition, even with active support from outside, will be able to achieve any serious success, but the essence of the political settlement is clear. Its prospects will be considered at a meeting of the heads of Russia and the Central Asiatic Republics planned for mid-August. Then there will be a meeting of their representatives plus Afghanistan. The positions of these sides will decide whether it will be necessary to excise the bleeding ulcer or cure it. Russia is for the latter way.

Far East Border Guards to Afghan-Tajik Frontier

93UM0792C Moscow *FEDERATSIYA* in Russian
No 90, 12 Aug 93 (Signed to press 11 Aug 93) p 1

[Unattributed news item]

[Text] Khabarovsk.

The first group of officer border guards serving in the Far East has departed from Khabarovsk to the Tajik-Afghan border.

According to preliminary data, 140 volunteer Far East troops will depart for there in the coming days.

"The motives and reasons for the officers desiring to go to 'hot spots' vary greatly," said the senior officer of the personnel department of the Far Eastern Border District Lt-Col Anatoliy Yenbayev. "Many feel it their duty to be where things are tough. In some cases the monetary interest is decisive. Wages are double for service in the 'hot spots.' But basically the men simply are being true to their profession."

Pentagon's 'Win-Hold-Win' Strategy Pondered

93UM0792A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
14 Aug 93 First edition p 2

[Article by Rear Admiral Radiy Zubkov: "'Win-Hold-Win': The U.S. Continues to Develop an Optimal Variant of Military Strategy"]

[Text] Recently the Pentagon formed a special committee to revise military policy. It has just concluded development of its recommendations and has submitted them to the secretary of defense.

As AVIATION NEWS AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY reports, the committee examined the "win-hold-win" strategy put forward by the administration and proposed a new armed forces structure capable of implementing it. In the opinion of the committee, this will require much less manpower and resources than have been envisaged up to

now in the so-called base force development plan. The essence of the committee recommendations can be seen in the table provided by the journal:

| Forces | Base force development plan | Proposals of the special Pentagon committee |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Strategic Forces | | |
| Ballistic missile submarines | 18 | 14 |
| Heavy bombers | 230 | 158 |
| Intercontinental ballistic missiles | 500 | 500 |
| General-Purpose Forces | | |
| Carrier strike forces | 12 | 10 |
| Nuclear attack submarines | 66 | 55 |
| Marines | 159,000 | 174,000 |
| Tactical air wings | 26 | 20 |
| Army divisions | 12 | 10 |

If these proposals are implemented, by 1997 there will be 1.4 million service members in the U.S. armed forces.

In the opinion of the committee, the proposed manpower and resources will suffice for implementation of a strategy which is now frequently provisionally termed the "one-and-a-half war strategy." It presupposes simultaneous participation of the U.S. armed forces in two military conflicts: in one region (say Southeast Asia, the journal writes) they will conduct combat actions with the goal of stopping a conflict by achieving victory over the aggressor, and in the other (for example on the Korean peninsula) it will help to contain a conflict by providing strong air support to ground troops of the country under attack (South Korea, say). After victory in the first region, the main grouping of U.S. armed forces would be transferred to the second region, where it would also achieve victory, with the goal of halting the conflict.

The committee also supported the basic principles of the "naval strategy" to which the American navy adheres. It called for a shift of basic efforts of the navy from remote regions of oceans and seas to coastal waters, and devotes special attention to amphibious operations. But here it rejects the navy claims to retain 12 carrier groups. The committee believes that, first of all, that there are not enough resources to maintain them, second, that even twelve groups might not suffice to perform all potential missions, and third, that under present-day conditions there is simply no need for the continuous presence of the American navy in all the operationally important regions of the World Ocean.

At the same time, the committee recommendations assign an important role to the marines, with plans to markedly increase their numbers (by almost 10 percent) against the background of cuts in the other services. It is thought that its expeditionary formations, which include powerful aircraft and artillery elements as an organic part, may be used in the

capacity of quick-response forces, and also to support allied troops in regions where a conflict is being contained.

In the area of antimissile defense, the committee recommends concentrating efforts on defense against ballistic missiles in theaters of operations. As for defense of U.S. territory against strikes by ballistic missiles, it proposes that this be limited to technological research and the development of early-warning systems.

Also proposed is elimination or a 35-40 percent reduction of institutions, units and staffs supporting the activity of the U.S. armed forces: medical, scientific, training, supply etc. This comes from a desire to halt the noted unfavorable direction of change in the ratio of combat and support personnel, which according to existing calculations, may be 1 to 3 by the year 2005.

According to the journal, the committee recommendations are more in keeping with the military-political situation prevailing in the world following the end of the "cold war," and with U.S. financial capabilities, than is the current plan for development of base forces.

Reportage on Airborne Unit on Tajik-Afghan Border

93UM0796A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Aug 93 First edition p 2

[Article by Col Vladimir Zhitarenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Russian Soldiers at Hot Spots": "Airborne Assault Troops: Elite of the Border Troops"]

[Text] Tajik-Afghan border—The outpost is named "bag", which means orchard in Tajik. A pomegranate orchard extends toward the Panj. There is a dense band of border troops in trenches here at night: semiautomatic rifles, machine guns with safeties off, wire communication links with the outpost's command element. Every whisper of sound from the river brings an illumination flare and rounds from several barrels. The precautions are certainly not excessive in view of the fact that signal mines have exploded on the bank twice since evening. Someone is clearly "feeling out" the approaches to the outpost.

Gunfire from the rear, from the direction of Krasnaya Hill, poses a greater danger. And this is not because one knows that "spooks" dug in there, on Krasnaya, and on several other heights overlooking the outpost could descend and encircle the outpost tonight as they have on previous nights. The concern is for those who would have to block their way if they did, for the airborne assault group of extended-duty Senior Sgt Oleg Filimanchuk. There are only six of the airborne troops, and they could be facing dozens of insurgents.

The shots from the rear did not last long. It was subsequently learned that some of the attackers were wounded, perhaps killed. The group itself suffered no casualties, even though tactical considerations had forced it to place itself into a far from advantageous position.

It had taken up positions on the approaches from Krasnaya in the evening and camouflaged itself. It had used Sgt

Aleksey Gorbushin, a sharpshooter, to set up sensitive sensors which react to the approach of strangers bearing weapons at those sites which it could not monitor itself. And when the latter descended from the hill, the mobile airborne assault group decided to let them pass through. It was probably just a scouting party. The group was waiting for the main enemy force.

The main force did not come. It became clear that the "spooks" had something else in mind. They would go to the Panj, to that 145th marker where the crossing to the Afghan bank is located. This meant the group would have to catch up and force the enemy to do battle.

The insurgents descended down a path almost straight as an arrow. The group had to hurry, though, paralleling the enemy across a series of hills called "heaters" by the border troops. Up one side, down the other, up one side, down the other, up one side.... They almost arrived in time. At least they saw the backs of the enemy. They did not succeed in capturing them, but following rounds fired by the airborne troops, heart-rending screams, moaning and cursing could be heard ahead of them. The return fire was more than just dense, and Filimanchuk therefore did not attempt to find out about enemy losses at once. Not until daybreak did he visit the site of the skirmish. He found nothing there. The dushman carry off their dead and wounded....

At breakfast, Sr Lt Dzhamshed Pulodov, commander of a mortar battery of border troops, and Capt Zaynan Bagautdinov and Lt Aleksandr Skorobogatskiy, commanders of a motorized and a tank subunit respectively, gave friendly smiles to the senior sergeant. They and their subordinates had also not kept watch in vain the previous night. They too had wreaked havoc upon "spooks" besieging the outpost with fire from their weapons. It is one thing to operate from a distance of a few hundred or even dozens of meters, however, and quite another to encounter the adversary face to face, so to speak, as the airborne mobile landing group had had to do. It is with good reason, very good reason, that the DShMG [airborne mobile assault group] is called the elite of the border troops.

Only Capt Nikolay Fatkhudinov, bearded like a dushman, seared Filimanchuk with an onerous look, one which made the latter forego breakfast. One could sense that only the presence of a correspondent was keeping Fatkhudinov from letting his emotions out. The following soon reached my ears, however:

"So you let the 'spooks' get away, Filimanchuk? We shall talk about that later...."

Nikolay Ganiyevich is chief of the outpost of the airborne mobile assault groups. Naturally, he was in a better position to judge how well his subordinates justified the title of 'elite' the night before.

The captain did not object to my photographing the group, however. The six had not just this battle, and certainly not just failures like this—as Fatkhudinov saw it—to its credit.

Here we see the group. Second from the left is extended-duty Sr Sgt Oleg Anatolyevich Filimanchuk. Next are sergeants Dmitriy Zuykov, Sergey Bayev and Oleg Ovsyannikov, and

privates Yuriy Filatov and Sergey Smagin. Behind them stands that very Krasnaya Hill, from which even then malevolent eyes were fixed on the outpost, from which the next night there would be another attempt to "feel out" the outpost and where the group would again form a covering force....

Some far-sighted person had apparently envisaged this subunit, the DShMG outpost, in the border troops. Even previously it had had plenty to do, but now, at a time of massive attempts to penetrate the border, it had more than enough.

The group presently operating for outpost "bag" was headed until 24 June by Sgt Vladislav Ivanov, serving under contract. Now this was a professional among professionals. He had behind him 2 years of extended duty, then 3 years in the Sverdlovsk special-purpose unit of the Internal Troops. He had mastered every weapon, as well as skills in all types of hand-to-hand combat. He was well developed physically and was the envy of many athletes. All of this came in extremely handy, and not just in order to make his subordinates emulate him but also for purposes of accomplishing the combat missions already facing the group.

The "spooks" had begun infiltrating across the Tajik-Afghan border long, long ago. And they had immediately encountered the reliable "accompaniment" of the airborne assault troops. Filimanchuk recalls how they had assembled on alert at Outpost 16. Scouts had warned them that there could be an attempt to settle up with the Russian border troops. The information was not confirmed, but the group did go out to meet a caravan of weapons traveling from Afghanistan into the Tajik interior. And it escorted the caravan all the way to a village next to the outpost of the adjacent Khorog Border Detachment. It could have destroyed the caravan, but the Khorog border troops had insisted upon a different plan of action. They should not alarm the enemy, but needed, on the contrary, to reassure him. This was the only way to figure out his subsequent plans. The airborne troops swore to themselves, but they did not dare to disobey. Their superiors were in a better position to know. On the other hand, however, if they had made it clear back then, many months ago, that "trips" across the border would be nipped in the bud, perhaps the subsequent tragedy at Outpost 12 would not have occurred and Sgt Vladislav Ivanov, the group's commander, would still be alive.

He died at Outpost 11. When the insurgents surrounded it—Could this have been done with those same weapons carried by the caravan?—the airborne assault group attempted to destroy the Islamic fundamentalists. Ivanov spared their machine-gunner. He did not shoot him when the latter asked him to but gave him an opportunity to surrender. His attention was diverted for an instant, however, in order to point his barrel at two other "spooks" who appeared out of the vegetation. And that instant was enough for the machine-gunner to release a round at the airborne troop who had spared him.

A bullet tore Vladislav's heart exactly in half. It is an unrealistic dream in a war to be resolute and compassionate toward the enemy in equal measure.

Did they learn a lesson from this? Yes and no.

In the maelstrom of fire, when enemy barrels are aimed at them, they will clearly try to shoot first. If possible, however, it is better to take the enemy alive.

They tell—not without a tinge of sorrow—how those penetrating the border include many who were simply deceived and miserable, deprived in Tajikistan not so much of lives of luxury as of pitiful clay and straw huts and who literally starved in Afghan camps. Three prisoners were taken—just skin and bones.

There are many others unlike them, to be sure. A certain specialist in the employment of Stingers and jet-propelled rockets recently met his death in Tajikistan. His supporters in Afghanistan declared a period of mourning. He had fought the infidels almost 15 years, after all. It is doubtful that faith alone takes his kind across the Panj, however. A total of 150,000 dollars was found on an Afghan specialist recently killed. This was probably just "pocket change." Who would carry his entire wealth onto foreign territory?

Each of those in the photograph could be compared with Rambo of the movies. They did not know a great deal themselves, and Senior Sgt Ivanov, contract serviceman, taught them a lot. They were all recommended for their first orders many months ago. Since then they have earned more than a single award. Who can predict, however, which will come to the brave soldiers first—awards or bullets?

Good luck on the battlefield, fellows!

Ivan Mayboroda, younger brother of the chief at Outpost 12, who was killed, wanted to enter a military school. After what he saw on the border, however, he changed his decision. He now has no intention of serving anywhere but in the DShMG. Why?

"My mother asked me to in order to avenge Mikhail's death."

There is indeed obviously no better way to carry out this mandate....

Post-Cold War Fate of NORAD Pondered

93WC0105A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Aug 93 First edition p 3

[Article by M. Ponomarev: "Yesterday Bombers, Today Deer Herds"]

[Text] NORAD—the North American Air Defense command—has now been in existence for four decades. Established in the years of the "cold war" through the combined efforts of the United States and Canada, it was called upon to protect these countries against a Soviet attack from the air and later from space out of the north across the Arctic.

Initially the core of the entire NORAD system was an early remote warning line that was completed back in 1957. By the mid-1980's, however, it was obsolete, for it was unable to track cruise missiles. In 1985, it was decided to replace it with a so-called Northern Warning System. It was planned to extend this system in the territory of Canada along the 70th parallel from Alaska to Labrador. It was supposed to

consist of 11 remote-detection radar stations and 36 radar stations for close-in detection and also include 4 air bases for fighters-interceptors.

So far only the remote-detection stations have been put into operation under this plan. The conclusion of all the work was planned for 1994. But today it is already obvious that the construction of the Northern Warning System has lost its original meaning. The last Soviet bomber entered the zone of NORAD radar sets and was picked up on their screens in 1989 and it is now thought that with the disintegration of the USSR there is no longer any threat to the North American continent from the direction of the Arctic.

What should be done now? This is what they are asking themselves in the United States and Canada. They have installed the most up-to-date equipment and invested an enormous amount of money. Was it all in vain? They are proposing the most diverse alternatives. In Ottawa, for example, they believe that radar stations can be adapted to track the migration of deer herds in the arctic tundra. They thought up another solution in Washington—under its initiative NORAD personnel are already being trained to intercept drug traffic. True, the routes for the delivery of narcotic substances to the United States do not, as you know, cross the Arctic. But after all the personnel need to do something. And they must justify the funds that they have invested. The support of the incomplete Northern System costs Canada alone \$52 million a year. Here you will be dealing not just with drug barons and deer.

SECURITY SERVICES

Activities of Spetsnaz Battalion

93UM0747 Moscow TRUD in Russian 31 Jul 93
Saturday edition p 1

[Article by Viktor Badurkin: "The Gray Wolves"]

[Text] "I find out personally where my colleagues are 'working' from the television news. If something has happened somewhere, it means our boys are there."

(From a conversation with a Spetsnaz officer.)

I saw the "gray wolves" for the first time with my own eyes in hot Tskhinval. They stood out, even among the by no means puny airborne troops from Pskov. And not only because of the "trademark" chevron on the right sleeve with the wolf fangs and the motto "The strongest will prevail." All appeared to be hand-picked, strapping, self-confident, relaxed in their dealings with superiors, but not going beyond the limit of military subordination, inwardly collected, ready for "work" at any moment. When they had free time, they organized a "free circus," broke bricks and boards, instantly scattered a crowd of the "adversary," and shone on the horizontal bars and beams. "For the airborne it is entertainment, for us it is training," said their commander, Misha Gushin.

But there were few such "time-outs." Even when the battles and exchanges of fire had subsided, and the Ossetian and Georgian field commanders, having had their fill of fighting, sent their subunits "home," the Spetsnaz troops were

"working." The leadership of the peacekeeping forces needed information. Not the mutually accusatory statements of the opposing sides, but real, objective data on the situation. This was obtained by the "wolves."

And in both Ossetias and in the other "hot" spots, more than once someone has asked the military command for permission to watch the "grays" in action, but this inevitably met with a refusal, dressed up in polite diplomatic "wrapping," the essence of which boiled down to one thing: outsiders were not permitted to view their "work." And the Spetsnaz troops themselves do not like to discuss it, evading the importunate inquiries with a single sentence: we are conducting reconnaissance. Not a word about what they receive their decorations and early promotions for.

Finally, after long negotiations, we were given permission to see how the "gray wolves" live and train. Their present fixed base is a hundred kilometers from Moscow, near Kubinka, on the grounds of the former training center of the military-humanitarian academy. "In comparison with what we had before, these are excellent conditions," the battalion commander Lt-Col Nikolay Vasilchenko began the conversation. "Firing range nearby, tank range also, even an airfield close by. Not to mention the excellent sports hall and swimming pool. There are barracks, a communal residence for the officers and warrant officers, a kindergarten, mess hall, school. What more could you want?"

To tell the truth, for the first time in recent years I had occasion to meet a unit commander who did not complain about anything. Usually it is the opposite: they immediately unload a heap of problems on the journalist from the capital, demonstrating how hard their work is. And this is not to say that everything is so great here. The "inheritance" from the academy will still take more years to put in order, repair, and "tailor" to the Spetsnaz specifics. The family residences are still in the draft stage, and there is a question of whether there is enough money to build them.

Evidently what the soldiers say, that the best of the best go to the "wolves," and more importantly that they remain and settle down there, is true. [The best] not only in physical strength, but also in strength of spirit. They do not grumble that they see the latest weapons, seemingly developed especially for them, only on television; that the gear has been kept over practically since "the days of Ochakov and the subjugation of the Crimea"; and that they continue to haul around the hopelessly bulky kilograms of their radio sets. They curse, perhaps, only the pilots, who dictate terms to them for parachute training drops, and the high cost of the parachutes, due to which they have had to sharply curtail their jumps "under special conditions."

About selection to the Spetsnaz, in the battalion, as everywhere in the army, there is a shortage of soldiers. True, the reasons are different. "We got a lot of sickly people," the battalion commander mourns, "even in the airborne units. No strength, no endurance, no 'backbone.' Of a hundred wanting to join we can barely take one, and that is with 'allowances.'"

There are enough desirous of serving in the unique battalion (the only one in the Russian army), but only a few make it

through the hundred examinations and tests. Some are weeded out immediately after the "airborne" cross-country run, others do not survive the tests of strength. But the majority "surrender" during the nine-minute "one-on-one" skirmish. Masters of sport in boxing, sambo and hand-to-hand combat are put up against the "wolf" candidates. You can't beat them, of course, but that is not required. The main thing is to demonstrate martial qualities, the will to victory. They will teach you the rest in the battalion.

Everyone trains here: officers, warrant officers and soldiers. They train to fire weapons under any conditions, to drive anything that moves, to handle all known explosives, foreign languages, and of course, parachute jumping. The teachers are not commanders, as in normal units, but specialists.

There are four "combat" companies in the battalion. Three are specialized by TVDs, theaters of military operations: the western, southwestern, and southern. They study the corresponding languages, geography, and tactics of action in mountains, forests and desert. The fourth company is special. Once, in the Main Intelligence Directorate and Staff of the Airborne Troops they wanted to create a subunit capable of performing missions "of a special nature" consisting of officers only. Now they have given up on the officer company as too expensive and ineffective. An officer is like a conscript soldier: you just get finished training him and it is time to leave. While with warrant officers, you train them once and the stay put for 10 or 15 years. Professionals, in a word.

But even they are selected for the fourth [company] "piecemeal," the best of the best. The missions "of a special nature" remain. Of course, we did not get to find out what they entail. The Spetsnaz troops advised asking the government, saying that they would know about it.

Every unit has its own object of pride. One boasts of its glorious combat history, another of its peacetime exploits and receipts of decorations. Here, it is the fact that in the two years of the battalion's existence, all have survived, and that among the "wolves" there are no "shirkers," (persons who are frightened of performing their combat mission). "Our goal is to train our people to survive under any extreme conditions, to get the 'work' done, and return alive", says Nikolay Vasilchenko.

These are not merely words. I remember how they came down from the mountain passes of Northern Ossetia. Frost-bitten, subjected to bombing, exhausted to the extreme, but alive. All to a man. Isn't this the most important thing in war?

Such are they, the "gray wolves." Silent, proud men, with a condescending attitude toward the renowned "Alpha" and "Beta" teams, but openly respectful of their eternal adversaries from the "MVD," the "Vityaz" anti-terrorist detachment. Incidentally, in Kubinka we saw the legendary chevron with the wolf fangs on the camouflage sleeves of only a few persons. One of the company personnel explained: They don't wear it because nowadays it is being sold in Arbat for hard currency, "we don't need that kind of glory."

We flew away to Moscow, while the combat teams of the Spetsnaz went to the firing range to train. With the exception of two, which were on four-hour readiness; there was unrest in Tajikistan.

Lessons To Be Learned from 'Tragedy' at 12th Border Guard Post

93UM0765A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Aug 93 pp 1, 2

[Article by Col. Nikolay Poroskov: "The Tragedy at the 12th Border Guard Post Teaches..."]

[Text] No matter how much time passes, the mental wounds of the lads who engaged in combat at the 12th Border Guard Post will not heal and the feat of those who died and those who survived will not be forgotten. We say dispassionately and sincerely that they are heroes. Their heroism is associated with a tragedy and there must be reasons for the latter. The edict of the president of the Russian Federation from 27 June 1993 "On Measures to Settle the Conflict on the Tajik-Afghan Border and the General Normalization of the Situation on the Borders of the Russian Federation" speaks of the inadmissibility of cases of irresponsibility "expressed in the nonperformance of state decisions on the strengthening of the border and in the low state of readiness to repel armed aggression against subunits of the border forces of the Russian Federation, which led to casualties among the Russian border guards."

Who today can guarantee that some other small garrison in the mountains or on the banks of the Pyandzh will not be subjected to a vicious attack? Border violations, skirmishes, and fire contacts are continuing even today. And therefore it would be unreasonable and even criminal not to extract some lessons from the tragedy at the 12th Border Guard Post. At the highest levels, the political and strategic conclusions have been drawn and as far as I know measures are being taken. But I think that it is significant to make an analysis at the level of the particular facts and details that I was able to learn during my trip to the border in conversations with soldiers, officers, and officials. The impression that I gained is this: if the appropriate measures had been taken, the tragedy would have been less bloody even if it might not have been prevented.

Thus, there were 48 people at the border post the night of the attack, including 2 officers and 2 men in extended service. The facility was guarded by 6 border details with a total strength of 19 men. The people were deployed along the border, that is, essentially in the territory of the border post: they received an order a few days prior to the tragic events not to send any details beyond the territory of the border post so as not to stir up any "spirits." Private Nikolay Pukhov, one of those who came out of the battle along with Lieutenant Merzlikin, heard this order. Other border troops also confirm it.

It may be that in this way officials wanted to protect the people who were already frequently engaged in skirmishes with Islamic fundamentalists who cross the border. There were killed and wounded. Just three days before the attack,

remote details were sent precisely in the direction from which the Islamic fundamentalists came.

The cessation of the sending of details beyond the bounds of the border post can be explained. But there is no logic behind the order of the deputy commander [and I believe that he himself did not do this] to move ammunition from the emplacements to the artillery depot, where the first mortar shell landed. This is why the border troops had a minimum amount of rounds and in part this is why the crew of the infantry fighting vehicle of the motorized rifle regiment fought longer and more stubbornly than the others: they had their ammunition with them.

There was no communication with the border post at the most critical moment. The Modzhakhedy cut the aerial line (on poles). And the batteries of the radio stations "ran down" in the first few minutes: a few days before that the failed recharging apparatus was taken to the detachment for repair and they did not leave anything to replace it.

The story with radio communications was very confused. The frequencies on which they talked over the air remained unchanged practically since the Afghan war. In April of this year at one of the intermediate Dushman bases, they found, among other things, a radio set whose dial showed that they know the frequency and accordingly listen in on radio communications.

The helicopter crewmen recall how when they were being subjected to an attack by unguided rockets from one of these intermediate bases, the Islamic fundamentalists went on the air, identifying themselves as border troops and trying to divert the fire. They shouted over the air: "You are hitting your own people!" Even during the fight at the 12th Border Post, they tried to use the same method to get a helicopter to land at the post that they occupied. The pilot, detecting the accent and an inaccuracy in the number of the radio call sign, asked:

"Where is the commander?"

"Here, at the post," came the reply.

"Go back, they have a machine gun there," shouted Lt. Col. Vasily Masyuk, who was on the line and correcting fire from the pass.

A few days before the attack against the border post, the Modzhakhedy sent over the air a "letter" in which every other word was horrible cursing and whose content amounted to this: "Go home, Russian Ivans, otherwise death to all." The frequencies simply were not changed, although technically this is not such a complicated operation. In the communications forces, for example, there is an algorithm for the periodic change of frequencies that is effective. And in general there is a system that makes it possible when necessary to shift to a reserve frequency that is determined in advance.

When he visited the destroyed border post, Col. Gen. Vladimir Shlyakhtin, then still commander of the border troops, noted bitterly in the presence of Russian deputies: "The soldiers are certainly heroes but they fought too compactly and showed tactical incompetence..." But where

can they get this competence if a rather large share of the personnel are boys with no battle experience, who were quickly assembled from other more peaceful border districts? There were 200 such people in the detachment. And 30 officers were assigned here, who in the spirit of the time are called "humanitarian assistance" here. A large group of soldiers was sent from the Western Group of Forces that was withdrawn to Russia. Only here did they see the border for the first time, change their collar tabs, and some took up an assault rifle for the first time.

And here as well, you cannot blame anyone among the officials of the border forces. They were forced to take this measure to close the holes in the border, especially since the picture is not very pleasant here with respect to contract people, in contrast to the 201st Division: there are just seven of them and they are in the detachment rather than at the border guard posts.

And you cannot make yourself call the replacements from among the local young people resolute warriors. I saw some of them at the stockade sitting out their punishment in filthy old civilian clothing. After serving just over a week, they deserted, possibly out of fear of being sent to the border posts. They were brought back—some of them by members of the local defense force and others by their parents.

"I am tired of being a politician, diplomat, and military man all at once," Lt. Col. Vasiliy Masyuk told me after meeting with four inhabitants of the village of Sorigor. They came to the border post to ask that they be permitted to go in the direction of the border. Somewhere in that area more than 200 cows were left by themselves; the shepherds ran off when the shooting started. They asked for an armed escort and a radio set.

Constantly rubbing his temples after shell shock and frequently asking them to repeat themselves [his hearing had gotten worse], the lieutenant colonel promised to help. He then reproached them: Why had they not informed him when the attackers were passing through the village?

The visitors justified themselves by mumbling something about the lack of communications and the cruelty of the "vovchiki." Yes, although they appear to be well-meaning, they try with every fiber of their soul to maintain neutrality, for it is uncertain how everything will turn out. And the Russian soldiers are the outsiders.

The link between some of the villagers and the Islamic fundamentalists was proven in June of this year but they were in no hurry to resettle the inhabitants. And only when Viktor Barannikov visited the border post did the president of Tajikistan propose to do this, granting the freed housing to the soldiers.

Among the trophies found at the 12th Border Post after it was taken were Romanian and Chinese weapons and munitions manufactured in Saudi Arabia. The portable radio sets and night-vision equipment are superior to ours. At one of the positions on the heights along the border, Lt. Col. Igor Kozhemakin showed me a binoculars that was now hardly serviceable as originally intended: the soldiers had taken it apart many times so that they could use the lens to light their

cigarettes and camp fires—there are no matches. In short, the problem of providing the people everything that they need is many times more complicated than in other regions, for it is directly related to the preservation of the lives of the people.

We have already said that the recruitment of personnel at the border post is difficult. For this reason, apparently, the already-mentioned edict to the Supreme Soviet proposes reviewing the question of repealing or suspending the decision on sending drafted servicemen to serve beyond the borders of Russia only with their consent. But if such a decision is made, then the selection of the people and their careful examination should not be made secondary. Today the workers of military counterintelligence are studying a well-founded version under which the Islamic fundamentalists had their own man, an informer, at the border post.

The border guards know their sections rather precisely, where one can ford the turbulent Pyandzh by making use of the so-called "ebb and flow" places. If there were enough people, it would be possible to maintain permanent posts there, in the opinion of officers of the border troops. A typical example is the section of the gold-bearing stream 6 or 7 km from the 12th Border Post. There they have repeatedly apprehended violators and sent them to Dushanbe, only to encounter them again a short time later.

Of course you cannot set up an ambush on every supposed route. But you can lay mines. I went on reconnaissance with officers of the special forces to the region of several border posts. After the government of the republic approves the decision, the approaches will be mined. And this is also a lesson from the tragedy.

The border forces were originally established to guard (we stress this word) the borders of the country, that is, to stop individual violators and small groups. Today, with unceasing attacks, it is necessary not to guard but to defend the borders. They must be strengthened significantly through the border guards themselves as well as through army subunits. In part this has already been done. Mortar crews and crews of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are constantly on duty along the border. If by no other way, you can tell by the numerous shell cases shining in the sun on the sides of the hills that they are not sitting idly.

They have set up heavy artillery—howitzers—in the gorges. But their fire is not always effective. The gunners are sometimes unprofessional artillery personnel and communications have not been developed. At the 10th Border Guard Post, Lt. Col. Aleksandr Rybak holds two telephone receivers to his ears, working in the role of retransmitter: on the line are the gunner and artillery personnel. The conversation goes like this: "Catch it"—this is to for the gunner, so that he will observe where the projectile falls; "800 to the left, 200 higher"—this is for the artillery people. The fire is corrected by the chiefs of the border posts on the towers. They say that this is temporary....

I did not set for myself the goal of lining up the facts of "kompromat" [expansion not given]. The case at hand is

different. The objective of the publication, I repeat, is just this: to draw some lessons from the tragedy and not let it happen again.

Today it seems to many that the 12th Border Guard Post is a link knocked out of a chain, that it simply no longer exists. This border post is the youngest in the detachment, having existed a little more than five years. Today there is not a single building fully intact there and the ground under your feet is strewn with shells and fragments. But the post is alive. There stand subunits from the 201st Division and an assault group of border forces led by Lt. Yevgeniy Bunkov. You have a sense that everything is temporary; several combat grenades lie on the table next to a head of cabbage. But the new site of the post has already been determined. It is a little higher than the present one. I am certain that the border post will live.

In a small half-demolished house, I saw a nice drawing fastened to the wall: a powerful border guard holds by the neck a sickly Dushman with an assault rifle sitting on a donkey. I hope that this is how it will be in reality. It will be if we pay attention to the lessons from the tragedy.

Changes in Law on State Security Organs

935D0506A Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian No 90, 12 Aug 93 (Signed to press 11 Aug 93) p 5

[“Law of the Russian Federation on the Introduction of Amendments and Supplements to the Law of the Russian Federation ‘On the Federal State Security Organs’”]

[Text] **Article 1.** Introduce the following amendments and supplements to the Law of the Russian Federation “On Federal Organs of State Security” (Register of the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, 1992, No 32, art. 1871):

1. To point “d” part one, article 2 after the word “terrorism” add the words “and illegal encroachments on the constitutional order of the Russian Federation.”

2. In article 6:

In point 2 the words “cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg” should be replaced with the words “individual regions of the Russian Federation, the city of Moscow and the Moscow oblast, the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad oblast (territorial organs)”; the words “(operational organs of border troops)” should be added after the words “organs of border defense”;

In point 3, after the words “create subunits” add the words “and facilities”; after the word “training” add the words “and retraining,” replace the words “training institutions” with the words “educational facilities for professional education (academic institutions),” and eliminate the words “under the jurisdiction.”

3. State part three of article 7 in the following wording:

“The structure and the organization of activity of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation are defined by the Provision on the Ministry of Security of the Russian

Federation, ratified by the President of the Russian Federation, and its staffing is approved by the Minister of Security of the Russian Federation within the limits of the numerical strength and budget appropriations allocated to the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation.”

4. In the title and text of article 8, replace the words “cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg” with the words “city of Moscow and Moscow oblast, city of St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast (territorial organs).”

5. In the title and text of article 10, after the words “organs of border defense” add the words “(operational organs of border troops).”

6. In article 11:

In the title of the article, replace the words “and civilians” by the word “(organizations)”; add the following sentence to the part: “Interrelations of the federal organs of state security with foreign special service and organizations are established on the basis of international treaties of the Russian Federation.”

State part three in the following wording:

“To accomplish the tasks of safeguarding the security of the Russian Federation, service members of the federal organs of state security may be assigned to the organs of state authority and control, ministries, state committees and departments, enterprises, facilities and organizations by the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. The assignment of service members of federal organs of state security is implemented in accordance with special normative documents.”

In part four, replace the words “tasks defined by this Law” with the words “the tasks assigned to them.”

7. In article 12:

In point “b,” replace the word “work” with the word “activity” and add the following sentence to the point: “Here the procedures for the use of secret methods and resources of intelligence activity are determined by the normative documents of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, adopted in agreement with the corresponding committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation under whose jurisdiction the security questions fall.”

To point “e” add the words “and illegal encroachments on the constitutional order of the Russian Federation”;

Supplement the article with points “o,” “p” and “q” as follows:

o) Detect radio emissions of transmitting radioelectronic equipment on the territory of the Russian Federation whose operation poses a threat to the security of the Russian Federation, and also those used for illegal purposes; conduct registration and centralized accounting of radio operating data and radio emissions of transmitting radioelectronic means.

p) In accordance with legislation and within the limits of jurisdiction, participate in the resolution of questions

having to do with gaining and losing citizenship in the Russian Federation, entering and exiting the Russian Federation, and travel beyond the borders of the Russian Federation by citizens of the Russian Federation, foreign citizens, persons without citizenship, and also in support of procedures governing the stay of foreign citizens and persons without citizenship on the territory of the Russian Federation.

q) Participate, with the limits of jurisdiction, in monitoring compliance with the rules governing procedures of the State Border of the Russian Federation, [regular] border procedures and procedures at entry points through the State Border of the Russian Federation, and also customs procedures."

8. In article 13:

Part one:

In point "a," replace the words "and suppress" with the words: "suppress and expose"; after the words "federal organs of state security," add the words "and also participate in the discovery, prevention, suppression and exposure of crimes associated with encroachments on the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, organized crime, terrorism, corruption and drug trade"; after the words "and also" add the words "implement intelligence activity";

State point "b" in the following wording:

b) In accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation, conduct inquiries and preliminary investigations of criminal cases whose investigation is assigned by law to the jurisdiction of the federal organs of state security, and also participate in investigation of crimes associated with organized crime, terrorism, corruption and the drug trade.

State point "e" as follows:

e) Enter without hindrance residences and other premises belonging to citizens, plots of land belonging to them, and grounds and premises of enterprises, facilities and organizations regardless of the forms of ownership, in suppressing crimes whose investigation is assigned by law to the jurisdiction of the federal organs of state security, and pursue persons suspected of committing them, when delay could endanger the lives and health of citizens, and also safeguard state security in natural calamities, disasters, accidents, epidemics, epizootic diseases, and mass disorders.

All such cases of entry of the residences and other premises belonging to citizens must be reported by the federal organs of state security to the prosecutor within 24 hours.

Add points "l," "m" and "n" to the part, with the following content:

l) Conduct criminal and other expert examinations and studies.

m) In accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation "On Operational Investigative Activity in the Russian Federation," pay pensions to persons providing secret assistance to the federal organs of state security, and to the members of their families, when this is provoked by the

need to provide guarantees of their rights and social protection, using the financial resources allocated from the republic budget of the Russian Federation to the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation for operational-investigative activity.

n) By the processes provided for by legislation of the Russian Federation, implement the administrative detention of persons violating the procedures of the state border of the Russian Federation, [regular] border procedures, procedures at entry points through the State Border of the Russian Federation, and customs procedures, and of persons committing legal violations associated with attempted penetration or penetration of specially protected areas of special-procedure installations, closed administrative-territorial formations and other protected installations, and also check the identification papers of these persons, receive explanations from them, perform physical searches, and search and remove their possessions and documents;"

In part two, replace the words "this Law" with the words "the laws of the Russian Federation."

9. State article 14 in the following wording:

"Article 14. Associates of the federal organs of state security.

The federal organs of state security are to be manned with service members and civilian personnel (blue and white collar workers). Service members of the federal organs of state security (except for service members conscripted for military service) and also persons who are civilian personnel assigned to military positions are associates of the federal organs of state security.

The personnel strength of the federal organs of state security (not counting the scientific-research and medical elements and personnel for the operation, protection and maintenance of service buildings and premises of the federal organs of state security) is established by the President of the Russian Federation in coordination with the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. The numerical strength of the service members and civilian personnel of scientific-research and medical elements and personnel for the operation, protection and maintenance of service buildings and premises of the federal organs of state security is established by the Minister of Security of the Russian Federation within the limits of budget appropriations allocated for these purposes to the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation.

Service members of the federal organs of state security perform military service in accordance with legislation regarding performance of military service by citizens of the Russian Federation with allowance for characteristic features established by this law arising from the specifics of the functions they perform.

Military ranks are awarded to service members of federal organs of state security in accordance with article 46 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Compulsory Military Service," and to the Minister of Security of the Federation, [a rank] no higher than the military rank of Army General.

A supplemental contract for a period of five years, and also subsequent five-year contracts, can be concluded with service members of the federal organs of state security who have the military rank of senior or highest officer personnel who have reached the maximum age for military service and who are highly qualified specialists. The maximum age limit for military service for service members with military ranks of senior officer personnel should not exceed 55 years, and that for service members with military ranks of highest officer personnel should not exceed 60 years.

The duties and rights of service members of federal organs of state security are defined by this law and by legislative or other normative documents of the Russian Federation.

The duties, rights and benefits of civilian personnel of the federal organs of state security are defined by legislation of the Russian Federation on labor and state service, by the Provision on service by white-collar employees in federal organs of state security, ratified by the government of the Russian Federation in coordination with the corresponding standing commissions of the chambers and with committees of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, and also by other normative documents of the Russian Federation.

An associate of the federal organs of state security may be awarded the honorary title of "Honored Associate of the federal organs of state security."

The honorary medal "Honored Associate of the federal organs of state security" is awarded by the President of the Russian Federation upon presentation by the Minister of Security of the Russian Federation.

The provision regarding the honorary medal "Honored Associate of the federal organs of state security" is ratified by the President of the Russian Federation."

10. State paragraph three of point 4, article 15 in the following wording:

"It is forbidden for associates of the federal organs of state security to organize or participate in strikes, to work at any type of entrepreneurial activity, or to combine military service with work in enterprises, facilities and organizations, except for work in scientific teaching or creative activity (if it does not hamper execution of the duties of military service), with the exception of cases when this is out of service necessity. They are forbidden to provide assistance to physical or juridical persons by using their service position in implementation of entrepreneurial activity, or to receive compensation or benefits for this. Civilian personnel of the federal organs of state security are forbidden to organize or participate in strikes, or to work in any type of entrepreneurial activity."

11. State article 16 in the following wording:

"Article 16. Legal and social protection of associates and civilian personnel of the federal organs of state security.

The state guarantees the legal and social protection of associates and civilian personnel of the federal organs of state security. The rights and social protection of associates of federal organs of state security are defined by the Law of

the Russian Federation "On the Status of Service Members" and by other laws and normative documents of the Russian Federation.

Associates of the federal organs of state security on all territory of the Russian Federation enjoy the right of free travel on all types of public transportation of municipal, suburban and local lines (except taxis), and in rural areas, on transport going in the same direction. In addition, associates of the federal organs of state security who are serving on transport facilities have the right to free travel on trains, river, sea and air transport within the limits of the territory they serve.

Associates of the federal organs of state security using personal transportation for service purposes will be paid monetary compensation in amounts established by the government of the Russian Federation.

Associates of the federal organs of state security will receive telephones at their place of residence within a year of application.

The procedures for pension support of service members of federal organs of state security and members of their families are defined by legislation of the Russian Federation on pension support of persons performing military service.

The procedures for pension support of civilian personnel of the federal organs of state security are determined by the legislation of the Russian Federation on state pensions.

Service members of federal organs of state security are considered to be performing the duties of military service in the cases indicated in article 36 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Compulsory Military Service."

12. From point 1 of article 17, eliminate the words "In cases specified by contract."

13. In point 3 of article 20:

State paragraph one as follows:

"Lands granted for support of the activity of the federal organs of state security are not subject to land taxes. The property of the federal organs of state security (including buildings, structures, enterprises, and equipment) developed (under development) or acquired (in the process of acquisition) with budget or other resources of the Russian Federation are the federal property of the Russian Federation";

Add the following new paragraph to the point:

"Enterprises, facilities and organizations developed (under development) for support of the activity of the federal organs of state security or which are under their administration (regardless of the sources of financing of these enterprises, facilities and organizations) are not subject to privatization."

14. Add articles 5¹, 16¹ and 18¹, with the following content, to the Law:

"Article 5¹. Protection of information regarding the federal organs of state security.

Persons admitted to military service (work) in the federal organs of state security, and also given access to information about the federal organs of state security will go through the procedures for legalizing access to information which constitutes state secrets, if other procedures are not provided for by the laws of the Russian Federation. Such procedures include acceptance of the obligation not to reveal this information.

A person given access to information about the federal organs of state security which constitutes a state secret bears responsibility for its unauthorized revelation as provided for by law.

Materials of archives of the federal organs of state security of historical or scientific value, declassified in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation, are provided for the use of representatives of science, culture and public associations (organizations), the mass media and citizens by the procedures provided for by legislation of the Russian Federation on the state archives.

Materials of the federal organs of state security containing information about personnel, about persons who provided or are providing confidential assistance to the federal organs of state security, or about the methods used by these organs and their means of performance of operational service tasks will be stored in the archives of the federal organs of state security."

"Article 16¹. Medical support of associates, civilian personnel, and pensioners of the federal organs of state security and members of their families.

Protection of the health of associates of the federal organs of state security is provided in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation "On the Status of Service Members" and other laws and normative documents of the Russian Federation.

Provision of medical assistance to civilian personnel of the federal organs of state security is free at military medical subunits, units and facilities of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation (henceforth military medical institutions).

If there are no military medical facilities at the site of work or residence of civilian personnel of the federal organs of state security, or if these institutions lack the appropriate departments or special medical equipment, and also in urgent cases, medical assistance is provided to these persons unhindered in health-care facilities, regardless of their departmental subordination.

The funds spent on treatment (examination) of associates and civilian personnel of the federal organs of state security, including for provision of medicines and medical items and manufacture and repair of dental prostheses (with the exception of prostheses made from precious metals) in health-care facilities of other ministries and departments will be compensated for by the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation when there is a corresponding conclusion (order) of the medical facility to which they are assigned for medical care.

The time of treatment for associates of federal organs of state security in connection with wounds, contusions or injuries received in the line of military duty is not limited.

Free medical assistance is provided at military medical facilities to family members (wives, husbands, children up to age 18) of associates of federal organs of state security, to their dependents, and also to children up to age 18 of civilian personnel of federal organs of state security.

The rights and benefits of associates of federal organs of state security and members of their families provided for by parts one, four and five of this article apply to civilians who were discharged from military service from federal organs of state security upon reaching the age limit for military service, or because they were found by a military medical commission to be unsuited or suited with limitations for military service (for reasons of health), and also in connection with organizational staff measures, provided that the total duration of their military service was 20 years or more (by preferential calculation), and to members of their families.

The programs for medical support of service members, civilian personnel, civilians discharged from military service and members of their families at military medical facilities, and also the procedures for conduct of medical hygiene and anti-epidemiological measures in the system of the federal organs of state security are defined by the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation.

Financing of the military medical facilities of the federal organs of state security is provided from the republic budget of the Russian Federation in amounts determined by the specific features of military service (work) in the federal organs of state security.

The funds allocated for these purposes which are not expended in the current year are transferred to non-budgetary accounts of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation and are subsequently to be used for the development of military medical facilities.

"Article 18¹. The conditions and limits of use of physical force, special equipment and firearms by associates of the federal organs of state security.

Associates of the federal organs of state security have the right to use physical force, including combat fighting techniques, special equipment and firearms whose use is implemented in cases and by procedures provided for by articles 12 through 16 of the Law of the RSFSR "On the Militia" and with combined-arms regulations."

Article 2. This law enters into force on the day of its publication, with the exception of paragraphs six and seven, point 9, article 1, which enter into force after introduction of the corresponding amendments to the Law of the Russian Federation "On Compulsory Military Service."

President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin Moscow, House of Soviets of Russia 1 July 1993 No. 5306-1

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